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Board Authority to Accommodate Religious Observance by 
Employees. (1985) 
Directed by Dr. Joseph E. Bryson. Pp. 271 
School boards and school administrators face a continu­
ing problem today in making and implementing policy dealing 
with religious guarantees respecting reasonable accommodation 
for Sabbath observance and leaves of absence (both short and 
long term) for public school employees. The school boards 
have been placed in the same position as all employers in 
the American workplace by constitutional and legislative 
provisions. 
Since the founding days of America/ the various states 
were left virtually free to legislate in areas respecting 
religion/ until the 1940 Cantwell v. Connecticut decision 
held that the Fourteenth Amendment embraced all the liberties 
of the First Amendment. Thus the states were left in the 
same position as the Federal government in neither advancing 
nor promoting the practice of religious observance. Judicial 
decisions over the past two decades have strengthened the 
legal concept requiring public and private employers to 
accommodate the religious practices of their employees. 
With the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in 
the intervening decades/ Congress has gone further in legisla­
tive and administrative functions to spell out guidelines for 
accommodation of employees' religious beliefs and practices. 
An analysis of significant judicial decisions reveals 
that the intent and implementation of these guidelines meet 
constitutional muster. 
This study reviews (1) the origins of the Judeo-Christian 
Sabbath/ (2) the Sabbatarian practices that emerged from the 
Protestant Reformation, and (3) an analysis of the states' 
statutes with regard to Sabbatarian practices permitted by 
the several states. It also presents an in-depth analysis 
of landmark and significant judicial decisions dealing with 
employers' accommodation of employees' religious beliefs and 
practices in the American workplace. 
Based on an analysis of judicial decisions the following 
conclusions were drawn: (1) the employee is free to enjoy the 
guarantees of the First Amendment religious clauses and is 
not subject to religious discrimination in the American work­
place; (2) the legislative and administrative guidelines of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protect and preserve the intent 
and practice of religious freedom; (3) the employer may adopt 
policies dealing with work rules and religion if the rule is 
secular in nature, neither advancing nor prohibiting religion, 
and does not involve an excessive entanglement between policy 
and religion. 
This study includes a list of recommendation:: for school 
boards and administrators so that policy and administrative 
practices assure each religious employee the right to be 
accommodated in practicing sincerely held beliefs. 
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During the last decade a number of religious discrimina­
tion suits have been filed against school boards for dismiss­
ing employees who were absent from school observing religious 
holidays or activities that did not occur on the Sunday Sab­
bath. Numerous journal articles and studies have discussed 
the suits brought about under the Civil Rights Act and the 
1972 Amendment/ the Equal Employment Commission (EEOC) and 
the courts without clearly defining the accommodations for 
religious observance by employees. 
In August/ 1977/ a United States District Court (Eastern 
District-Wilmington/ N.C.) sustained Pender County School 
Board's decision in a jury trial dismissing an auto mechanics 
teacher who insisted his dismissal occurred because he missed 
nine school days for religious holidays. In 1977/ a Califor­
nia Appeals Court sustained a school board's decision dis­
missing a tenured teacher who was absent 31 days for 
religious reasons. 
The 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from 
failing to or refusing to hire an individual because of reli­
gion. The 1972 amendments to,the Civil Rights Act insisted 
that "religion" encapsulated all aspects of religious obser­
vance/ practice/ and belief; that >an employer must reasonably 
accommodate an employee's (even a prospective employee's) 
2 
religious observance or practice. 
The religious issue in employment is larger than educa­
tion. In order to examine the legal ramifications in reli­
gion and employment practices for school boards/ major cases 
litigated from the American industry, and business marketplace 
2 
are to be considered. The major focus of this study concerns 
constitutional questions that have applicability to school 
boards as employers in accommodating religious practices for 
employees. 
School boards should be cognizant of the mandates of 
individual freedom under the First Amendment "respecting an 
establishment of relitgion,or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof..." as they consider the adoption of policy provid­
ing for religious accommodations for employees. Under the 
current United States Supreme Court analysis/ the "establish­
ment clause" requires that when government action touches on 
a religious sphere it must reflect a clearly secular legisla­
tive purpose; it must have a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; and it must avoid excessive 
3 
entanglement with religion. 
*Joseph E. Bryson/ "Church-State:Duty of the Employer 
to Make Religious Accommodation for Employment." In Contempor­
ary Legal Issues in Education/ (Topeka: NOLPE.1979)/ pp 152-153. 
^Ibid. 
^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973). 
3 
In 1972/ Congress enacted section 701 (j) of the Equal 
Opportunity Act which under certain circumstances requires 
employers to modify neutral work policies when those policies 
conflict with an employee's religious belief or practice. 
This requirement,which is commonly referred to as the "reason­
able accommodation" rule# can be utilized by employees so as 
4 
to insure that they do not work on their Sabbath. Under 
the reasonable accommodation rule, the employer is required 
to attempt to accommodate the employees* wishes if the 
employees do not want to work on their Sabbath. Moreover/ 
the rule requires employers to accommodate the religious 
practice of their employees unless such accommodation results 
5 
in undue hardship on the conduct of the employers' business. 
Undue hardship on the employer's part was addressed in 
the Hardison v. Trans World Airlines decision in 1974. 
Associate Supreme Court Justice Byron White/ speaking for 
the majority (7-2 decision)/ said that requiring the employer 
to bear more than a de minimis cost in accommodating an 
employee's religious observance is an undue hardship. Notic­
ing a considerable difference in judicial opinion between 
the District Court and Circuit Court of Appeals over de 
minimis cost/ Justice White accepted the District Court's 
442 U.S.C. 2000e (j) <1976). 
5 
James L. Beard/ "The Constitutionality of an Employer's 
duty to Accommodate Religious Beliefs and Practices/" Kent 
Law Review 56 (1980): 635. 
4 
position that a seniority system had no intention of locking 
members of any religion into a pattern wherein their freedom 
to exercise their religion was limited.0 Justice White 
added/ "In the absence of clear statutory language or legis­
lative history to the contrary# we will not readily construe 
the statute to require an employer to discriminate against 
some employees in order to enable others to observe their 
Sabbath. 
In 1983/ a Colorado District Court denied a tenured 
Jewish teacher's claim that having only two paid personal 
leave days per year interfered with free exercise of his 
Jewish faith. The District Court/ Judge Moore/ held that 
permitting two personal leave days with pay did not consti­
tute impermissible interference with the right to free exer­
cise of religion/ notwithstanding that for many Jews it is 
important to attend temple for two days on each holiday. 
Moreover/ the court held that at the outset of the teacher's 
employment/ the school board's policy had been even more strin­
gent than it was at the time of litigation/ and the acceptance of 
employment had not been a bar to acceptance of employment by the 
teacher. The court further held that/ unlike an assembly 
line worker/ the teacher is essential in the continuity of 
the educational process. Even though a substitute may be 
6Bryson, pp. 152-153. 
7 
Trans World Airlines/ Inc. v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 79 
(1977). 
5 
available, "there is a diminution - however grave or slight-
in the educational process when the regular teacher is 
8 
absent". The Colorado Court reasoned that two days of paid 
personal leave for teachers had tones of arbitrariness but 
was a creature of the give-and-take in negotiations that had 
a legitimate compelling public interest at base. The line 
was drawn in order to serve students for whose benefit the 
school system exists and the line was not constitutionally 
impermissible.9 
On appeal/ the Tenth Circuit Court/ in affirming the 
District Court/ held that the school district's policy of 
allowing only two days paid special leave did not constitute 
discrimination against the Jewish teacher on basis of religion 
merely because it required the teacher to occasionally take 
unpaid leave to accommodate his religious practices, and the 
school board's policy was not violative of the teacher's 
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion.^"® 
Throughout the history of the United States/ many Ameri­
cans have regarded religious freedom as a fundamental right 
protected by the Constitution. The general intent of the 
\ 
8Pirisker v. Joint District No. 28J of Adams and Araphoe 
Counties, D. C. Colorado, 554 F. Supp.. pp. 1052 (1983). 
9554, F. Supp. 1052 (1983). 
*°Pinsker v. Joint District No. 21 J 7 Adams and Araphoe 
Counties, 735 F2d 388 (1984). 
6 
religious clause has been that both religion and government 
can best achieve their respective purposes if each is free 
within its proper sphere from interference by the other.11 
The "establishment clause" prohibits government from forcing 
. . . . 12 
a citxzen to believe m a religion. The United States 
Supreme Court in Everson (1947) summarized the interrelation 
between the two clauses when it said: 
"The structure of our government has for the 
preservation of civil liberty rescued the 
temporal institutions from religious inter­
ference. On the other hand/ it has secured 
religious liberty from the invasion of civil 
authority."13 
For all its importance as the pivotal element in our 
church-state arrangements, the term "religion" was left un­
defined in our constitution and amendments. It is possible 
that here as elsewhere in the deliberations of the framers, 
ambiguity was the price for consensus, that the imprecision 
was intentional/ and that the task of delimiting the term 
precisely was purposefully left to later generations. Central 
to a search for meaning in the religious clause is a recog­
nition that it is a political charter and not a tenet of 
theological faith. If the meaning of religion is a political 
11Bruce Beezer, "Religion and Employment: How Extensive 
Is a Teacher's Religious Freedom?", Education Administration 
Quarterly 18 (Spring 1982): 96. 
13 
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, (1947). 
7 
formula, it should be sought in the field of law rather than 
14 
theology. In this context/ religious accommodation should 
be an operative principle for school boards and the ascertain­
ment of it should be sought in legal aspects. 
The Courts have attempted to define religion in a legal 
rather than a theological context ever since the Marbury v. 
Madison decision when the United States Supreme Court said: i 
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial 
15 
department to say what the law is." 
Present-day school boards should examine the religious 
issue in employment in the same context without attempting 
to administer religious tests. The centrality and depth of 
the employee's religious belief is protected under the First 
Amendment. The 1964 Civil Rights Act/ amended, and recent 
court decisions place; the burden on the school board to deal 
with the "reasonable accommodation" - "undue hardship"*6 
dichotomy and policies affecting employee religious practices. 
The overall purpose of this study was to provide school 
boards with appropriate information regarding the legal 
aspects of policies in accommodating religious observance by 
its employees. To ensure that employees' 'First and Fourteenth 
•^Edward R. Lilly, "The Meaning of Religion: A Consti­
tutional Perspective" Viewpoints 120 (27 September 1982): 1. 
^Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
*6Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
8 
Amendments guarantees17 are protected/ school boards need to 
have at their disposal,clear and definitive policies to 
accommodate religious practices and safeguard the educational 
process in the schools. 
Statement of the Problem 
It is obvious that school boards and educational deci­
sion makers face a dilemma today in making policy to accommo­
date religious observance by employees. The First Amendment/ 
"Congress shall make no lav/ respecting the establishment of 
religion/ or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."18 
and the Fourteenth Amendment "nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life/ liberty/ or property/ without due process 
19 
of law" require the school boards to accommodate religious 
observance by employees regardless of their Sabbath or reli-
20 
gious practices. While doing so, school boards have to 
juxtapose the rights of individuals to religious practice 
with the "reasonable accommodation" - "Undue hardship" 
21 clause. In issues not clearly answered by the courts/ the 
17 
U.S. Constitution, amend. 1/ XIV. 
18 
U.S. Constitution/ amend. I. 
1®U.S. Constitution/ amend. XIV/ sec. 1. 
2®Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
9 
1964 Civil Rights Act, amended 1972/ and the Equal Opportunity 
Employment Commission (EEOC) have gone further in the legis­
lation and administrative branches to spell out guidelines 
22 
for accommodations of religious practices by employees. 
Thus, there is a need for examining the legal issues asso­
ciated with the school boards'^legal authority to make and 
administer policy that will accommodate the religious 
practices for all Sabbatarians. 
Since the questions of "reasonable accommodation" and 
"undue hardship" continue to be widely debated in the courts 
and by school boards, there is a need to review the major 
legal issues for the purpose of determining when to grant 
privileges for religious observance as a part of the accommo­
dation process. 
Questions To Be Answered 
One of the stated purposes of this study is the develop­
ment of practical, legal guidelines for school boards to 
have at their disposal when making policy decisions concern­
ing accommodation for religious observance by employees. 
School boards should guard against violations of First Amend­
ment provisions: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof " Below are listed several key questions which 
^Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, sec 701 (j)» 42 
U.S.C., sec 2000 e (j). 
10 
research needs to answer in order for school boards to main­
tain the church-state separation. 
1. What constitutes reasonable accommodation for reli­
gious holiday observance by employees? 
2. When does religious accommodation (either short 
term or leaves of absence for religious observances) 
for an employee place an undue hardship on the 
school board? 
3. What is the legal authority of the school board to 
establish policy concerning religious holiday 
observance by the employee? 
4. What are the legal aspects in implementation of 
policy by the school administration? 
5. Based on the results of recent court cases, what 
specific issues relating to religious holiday obser­
vance by employees are being litigated? 
6. Based upon the established legal precedents, what 
are the legally acceptable criteria for policy mak­
ing concerning employee religious accommodation? 
Scope of the Study 
This is a historical study of the legal aspects of 
school board's authority to accommodate the religious beliefs 
and practices of its employees. The research describes the 
church-state relations litigated under the Religion Clauses 
of the First Amendment applicable to the employer's 
11 
accommodation of employees' religious beliefs and practices/ 
the reasons for litigation, the results of the major court 
cases, and the effects these court decisions have on school 
board in policy development for religious employees. 
Even though this study includes numerous references to 
litigation requiring accommodation of religious beliefs and 
practices in the private sector, the courts have made the 
legislation applicable to the public employers, including 
school boards. 
The major thrust of this research is directed toward 
the legal aspects of school boards' authority to accommodate 
religious beliefs and practices under existing legislation 
and litigation through the courts, establishing precedent 
and "case law" for school boards. In order to focus on 
religious beliefs and practices of employees, a review of 
the origins of the Judeo-Christian Sabbath is included in 
the review of literature. 
This study includes a review of the statutes of the 
fifty states, District of Columbia/.and Puerto Rico/ major 
court cases from 1940 through 1985, and legislation related 
to reasonable accommodation and undue hardship arising from 
the First Amendment clause respecting free exercise and 
establishment of religion. 
Methods/ Procedures and Sources of Information 
The basic research technique of this study was to j 
12 
examine and analyze the available sources concerning the 
duty of school boards to provide for religious beliefs and 
practices by their employees. 
In order to determine whether a need exists for such 
research/ a search was made of Dissertation Abstracts for 
related topics. Journal articles related to the topic were 
located through use of such sources as Reader's Guide to 
Periodical Literature, Education Index, and the Index to 
Legal Periodicals. 
General research summaries were found in the Encyclo­
pedia of Educational Research, various books on school law/ 
and in a review of related literature through computer 
research from the Educational Resources Information Center 
(ERIC). 
Federal and state court cases related to the topic 
were located through the use of Corpus Juris Secundum, 
American Jurisprudence, the National Reporter System, and 
the American Digest System. Recent court cases were found 
by examining case summaries contained in 1983, 1984, and 
1985 issues of the NOLPE School Law Reporter. All of the 
cases were reviewed and placed in catagories corresponding 
to the issues noted from the general literature review. 
Definition of Terms 
For the purpose of this study, the following selected 
terms are defined: 
13 
Undue hardship. The normal conduct of an employer's 
business is not required to suffer in allowing employees to 
practice the tenets of their religion which occur on an 
established work schedule. The claim of undue hardships 
cannot be supported by conceivable or hypothetical hard­
ships; instead, a determination must be made by the facts 
23 
of each case. In the Pinsker decision (1983), the court 
reasoned that attendance of teachers is of greater concern 
to school boards than attendance of other employees to other 
employers.^ 
Reasonable accommodation. The language of the 1972 
amendment to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act obligates 
an employer to provide "reasonable accommodation" for an 
employee's religious observance, practice or belief short 
of an undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's busi­
ness . ̂ 
Religious observance. The term "religion" includes 
all aspects of religious observance and practices as well 
as beliefs and is not limited to either Sabbatarianism or a 
practice mandated or prohibited by a tenet of a person's 
, . . 26 
religion. 
23Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corporation, 648 F2d 1239 
(1981). 
24pinsker v. Joint District No. 28J of Adams and Ara-
phoe Counties, 554 F. Supp. 1049 (1983). 
2542 U.S.C. 2000e i(j). 
^Redmond v. GAF Corp., CA. 111. 1978, 574 F2d 897 (1978). 
14 
Religion. The United States Constitution makes no 
distinction regarding the definition of religion in the 
pivotal element of church-state relations. It is possible 
that the imprecision was intentional by the framers in 
order to get a consensus, leaving precision in defining 
27 religion to later generations. In religious discrimination 
suits filed under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, the courts have defined 
"religion" to include conduct which is religiously motivated 
2 8 
in all forms and aspects of religion however eccentric. 
A discernment must be made between beliefs of personal pre­
ference and the concept of "religion" as protected by the 
United States Constitution and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 
29 
amendments. 
Significance of Study 
The First Amendment, adopted in 1791, provides the free 
exercise clause prohibiting any governmental regulation of 
30 
religious beliefs. The face of the First Amendment appears 
to apply to Congress to speak to the question of religion. 
Seventy-seven years later the states adopted the Fourteenth 
27t.,, Lilly, p 1 
28Redmon v. GAF Corporation, 574 F2d 897 (1978). 
29Brown v. Pena, D. C. Fla. 441 F. Supp. 1382 (1977), 
Affirmed, 589 F. 2d 1113 (1978). 
30 
U.S. Const./ amend. I. 
15 
Amendment which prohibits a state from invading the "the 
privileges of immunity of citizens" and from denying a person 
31 
liberty without the due process of law. The 1964 Civil 
Rights Act protects employees from religious discrimination 
under Title VII. Moreover, the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 1972 
Amended Title VII insisted that employers must guarantee 
employees consideration in all aspects of religious obser­
vance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an 
employee's religious observance or practice without undue 
32 
hardship on the conduct of the employer's business. 
In an article published in Contemporary Legal Issues 
In Education in 1979, Bryson raised questions about the 
religious practices of the majority of Americans which, he 
contended, the marketplace has accommodated. A minority of 
religious people view these accommodations as arbitrary 
33 
mandates that circumvent their religious dictates. 
Judicial interpretation and application of the employer's 
duty to accommodate for religion by the various courts has 
resulted in confusion. Not only is there irreconcilable , 
31 
Joseph Beckham and Perry A. Zirkel, eds., Legal Issues 
in Public School Employment . (Bloomington, Indiana: pm 
Delta Kappa, 1983), p. 55. 
32Civil Rights Act (1964) amend.(1972), Title VII, 42 
U.S.C. 2000e (j). 
33Bryson, pp. 152-153. 
16 
conflict among the district courts but also from panel to 
panel in the same circuit. While the factors considered 
relevant by the courts in the decision making are the same, 
their opinions lack uniformity. Consequently, the conflict­
ing decisions stem from the lack of Congressional definitions 
and standards for key concepts in accommodating religious 
practices by employees. Judicial determinations fill in the 
gaps on an ad hoc basis resulting in diverse opinions.^ 
This study is significant in that it examines religion 
in employment practices from a legal perspective in order 
to assist school boards and educational decision makers to 
formulate better policies to prevent religious discrimination 
in accommodating religious observances and practices. A 
review of the Constitution, legislative, and judicial deci­
sions was conducted to determine court decisions regarding 
accommodation for all Sabbatarians in their religious obser­
vances and practices. 
Recent legislative actions and judicial decisions that 
address religious accommodation in employment were examined 
in light of Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) 
Regulation 1605.1— 
Sue Gordon, "Up Against the Accommodation Rule," 
University of Missouri (Kansas City) Law Review 45 
(February 1976): 57. 
17 
The term "religion" includes all aspects 
of religious observance and practice, as well 
as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that 
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employee's religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer's business. 
and major court decisions arising from claims litigated on 
Constitutional issues and statutory provisions. 
The study examined the school board's authority to 
make religious accommodation for all employees in considera­
tion of the tripartite test which analyzes constitutional 
issues involving religion. Under this test, the policy must 
(1) reflect a clear secular purpose; (2) be neutral in its 
effect; and (3) not involve excessive governmental entangle-
35 
ments with religion. 
Design of the Study 
The remainder of this study is divided into four major 
parts. Chapter ii contains a review of literature related 
to the origins of the Judeo-Christian Sabbath. 
The third chapter includes a narrative discussion and 
review of the statutes of the fifty states, the District of 
Columbia, and Puerto Rico which allow Sabbath observance by 
public school employees. An attempt is made to show the 
statutory provisions for Sunday observance either by explicit 
or implied legislation. Also included in this chapter 
^Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
18 
is a series of tables indicating statutory provisions for 
the Non-Sunday Sabbatarian, Good Friday and Easter Monday, 
Christmas, designation of special days by the governors or 
President of the United States, and acts of mercy and charity 
on Sunday. 
Chapter IV includes a narrative discussion of the 
legal issues related to accommodation of religious observance 
by employees with major reference to accommodation of public 
employees. An attempt is made to show the applicability and 
relationship of religious accommodation afforded under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments, Congressional enactments, 
and major court cases establishing precedent and "case lav;" 
for reasonable accommodation of employees short of undue 
hardship on the employer. 
The fifth chapter contains a general listing and dis­
cussion of the judicial decisions which contain reference to 
the general topic of reasonable accommodation to employees. 
The first category of cases includes a listing of those cases 
relating to the broad constitutional issues of church and 
state focusing on the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment. Other categories of cases 
selected for review include those related to reasonable 
accommodation of religious practices of employees in 
business and industry with applicability to public school 
employees, and cases related specifically to accommodation 
19 
of religious practices of public school teachers and 
employees with applicability to school boards' employment 
policies. 
Chapter VI contains a summary and conclusions of the 
information in the review of the literature and from the 
analysis of the selected court cases. The questions asked 
in the introductory section of this study are reviewed and 
answered in this chapter. Recommendations concerning legally 
acceptable criteria for policy development and implementation 
are included. Finally/ recommendations are made to be used 
as a guide in developing and implementing legally sound 
policies ensuring Constitutional guarantees for "reasonable 
accommodation" of religious observance by employees. 
20 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Early History of The Judeo-Christian Sabbath 
Mankind has measured periods of existence in various 
ways. Ancient peoples counted time by decades/ nundines 
(the eighth day)/ the first day of the month, the ninth 
day before the middle of the month, and the middle of the 
month (ides). The seven-day week was not general at the 
dawn of history; it prevailed only in the near East, pri­
marily among Jews, Egyptians, and Persians.^" The early 
dating of the Sabbath suggests that the rest day could 
have originated as a lunar taboo day with the early Hebrews 
declaring periodic rest days of the lunar phase to be taboo 
and recommending abstinence and quiescence in order not to 
incur taboo. 
In Egypt the people rested securely in their belief 
in the regularity of life. The sun rose over the desert 
each day and set over the Nile while it periodically over­
flowed its banks in a predictable cycle of harvest and 
*Winton V. Solberg, Redeem The Time (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 7. 
2n. A. Barak, History of The Sabbath (New York: 
Jonathan David, Inc., 1965), p. 14. 
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hunger. 
The political hegemony of the priestly class denied to 
other classes self-determination and the questioning of their 
station in life. The unchanging of cycles was empowered 
by the gods and had to be appeased in the person of the 
Pharaoh. 
In Mesopotamia/ unpredictable storms, floods/ and the 
tempest of war compounded the natural order; thus the 
people viewed the gods as arbitrary and capricious. In 
this context/ the pagan sought to bring order out of chaos. 
The priest performed rites hoping to convince the various 
deities to allow the cycle of days and seasons to turn over 
once again.^ 
The Babylonians through their astronomical knowledge 
had established the invariability of siderial revolutions 
and were led to the idea of a Necessity/ superior to the 
gods themselves. Since this Necessity commanded their 
movement and ruled their gods/ it was bound to hold sway 
over mankind. Priests foretold the future according to the 
stars. By purifications and sacrifices/ they professed 
to drive away evils and to secure more certainty of 
3 
Bruce A. Kimball/ "The Origin of the Sabbath and 
Its Legacy to the Modern Sabbatical/" Journal of Higher 
Education 49 (1978): 305. 
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promised blessing.4 Babylonian theology never entirely 
broke with the primitive reverence with which Semitic 
tribes regarded all the mysterious forces surrounding man."* 
Primitive cultures across the world adopted a "period 
of abstinence and quiescence." Native cultures of the 
South Seas, the Americas/ Asia, and Africa observed 
periodic rest days arising from superstitions of certain 
days associated with the phases of the moon.® 
Biblical scholars argue that the origin of the seventh-
day Sabbath was not a divine revelation but that man's reason 
may have discovered the seven-day week. The appearance of 
a new moon would suggest a division of twenty-eight days* 
a full moon would lead to two weeks, . and half of that would 
be a perfect septenary division of time.^ 
It is disputed whether the name "Sabbath" vas used for 
the recurring seventh day in Assyria and Babylonia. A day 
of appeasing the gods was called by a name of'Bhabattu".8 
4Franz Cumont, Astrology and Religion Among The 
Greeks and Romans (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 
1960),pp. 10-17. 
5Ibid, pp. 10-17. 
g 
Kimball, p. 306. 
7 
Solberg, p. 10. 
0 
John D. Davis,. A Dictionary of the Bible (Phila­
delphia: The Westminister Press, 1929), pp.662-663. 
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There is little or no evidence of a particular day of the 
Q 
week or a day when labor was suspended. There is debate 
whether the Hebrew idea of the Sabbath was derived from the 
Arabian rest day "sabbat" or from the ancient Hebrew word 
"seba"/ meaning seven. •*-0 
Tablets copied from the reign of Ashurbanipal, about 
650 B.C., show that the seventh/ fourteenth/ nineteenth/ 
twenty-first and twenty-eighth days of each month were 
regarded as inauspicious for certain specified acts. The 
unlucky days were not connected with the phasing of the 
moon as it does not quarter on the nineteenth day, and in 
months of thirty days, it would only occasionally 
quarter on the seventh day. These recurring seventh days 
were not days of national rest when the tablets were in 
force; a few specified acts were dangerous on those days.*^" 
The Hebrews probably adopted the Babylonian rest day 
and connected it with the moon, stripping it of supersti­
tions and making it subservient to religious ends.*2 
9Ibid. 
10Kimball, p. 307. 
11Davis, pp. 662-663. 
12s.R. Driver/ The Book of Genesis, 10th ed. (London: 
Methuen and Company/ 1916)/ p. 35. 
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The uniqueness of the Sabbath arose from its groundings 
in Hebraic religion. Israel came to regard human events as 
reality# not some secondary effect of cosmological battles 
among capricious deities. Through this insight# humanity 
realized greater stature because man was considered to have 
a direct hand in the course of events in the universe. This 
laid the foundation for human responsibility and a higher 
14 ethical code. 
The first occurrence of the name "Sabbath" in the Hebrew 
records is in Exodus 16:23.. The Israelites had not reached 
Sinai or received the Decalogue/ but in the wilderness of sin 
when manna began to be given, a double amount fell on the 
sixth day and Moses said: 
"This is that which the Lord hath said/ Tomorrow 
is the rest of the holy sabbath unto the Lord: 
bake that which ye will bake today, and seethe 
that ye will seethe; and that which remaineth 
over/ lay up for you to be kept until the morning. 
Though scholars largely declare the issue unresolvable/ 
parallels between the Genesis creation account and the Exodus 
description of God's seventh day after creation raised new 
questions of the Sabbath's origins.^ In Genesis 2:2-3/ 
^Solberg/ p. 8. 
14Kimball, p. 306. 
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Exodus 16:23 [All biblical references are from the 
King James Version.] 
16Kimbal, p. 307. 
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we find: 
"and on the seventh day God ended his work which 
he had made; and he rested on the seventh day 
from all his work which he had made. And God 
blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; 
because that in it he had rested from all his 
work which God created and made"^' 
Exodus 20:11 repeats the description of God's seventh day: 
"For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, 
the sea and all that in them is, and rested the 
seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the 
Sabbath day, and hallowed it.^-® 
The Genesis 2:2-3 account does not name the Sabbath or 
specify any law for its observance.^ The sanctity of the 
seventh day is presented unhistorically. The Sabbath's 
closing the week determined the days of creation and not 
the days of creating the week.^0 
The Exodus 20:11 and 31:17 accounts ("It is a sign be­
tween me and the children of Israel forever: for in six 
days the Lord made heaven and earth, and on the seventh 
21 day he rested and was refreshed." ) describe God's 




•"•'Cumont, p. 8. 




The Old Testament describes the Sabbath after God made 
Israel a Covenant people and delivered them from Egyptian 
bondage. The Decalogue reduces to its significant essence 
a body of instruction for the chosen people in observing 
23 
the Sabbath as recorded in Exodus 20:8-11: 
"Remember the Sabbath day/ to keep it holy. Six 
days shalt thou labour/ and do all thy work: But 
the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy 
God: in it thou shalt not do any work/ thou/ nor 
thy manservant/ nor thy maidservant/ nor thy 
cattle/ nor thy stranger that is within thy gates: 
For in six days the Lord made heaven and earth/ 
the sea/ and all that in them is, and rested the 
seventh day: wherefore the Lord blessed the Sab­
bath day/ and hallowed it."24 
The form of God's Covenant given in the Decalogue 
rests upon a different foundation2^ as recorded in Deuter­
onomy 5:15: 
"and remember that thou was a servant in the 
land of Egypt/ and that the Lord thy God brought 
thee out thence through a mighty hand and by a 
stretched out arm; therefore the Lord thy God 
commanded thee to keep the Sabbath day."26 
References in the Old Testament such as Amos 8:5/ 
("when the new moon be gone that we may sell corn and the 
Sabbath/ that we may set forth wheat/ making the ephah 
small and the shekel great"/27) appear to associate the 
22Kimball/ p. 307. 
23Driver/ PP. 65-68. 
24Exodus 20:8-11 





Sabbath's observance with the moon/ thus suggesting a lunar 
day. Jewish scholars appear resistant to the theory of pagan 
origins of the Sabbath/ although they find it appealing to 
attribute the Sabbath beginning to the early nomadic period 
28 
of the Hebrews. 
Probably in that age the Sabbath was somewhat less 
sharply distinguished from the other days of the week/ for 
the nomad shepherds had certain labors to perform each day/ 
and the Israelites in Egypt were not their own masters and 
could not rest on the seventh day. However/ when the 
Hebrew nation was organized at Sinai a different mode of 
life was adopted. The people formed their own laws/ formed 
an independent community/ and exchanged the life of the 
wilderness for a settled life of agriculture and trade/ and 
as a natural result/ resting on the Sabbath made a greater 
29 
outward difference than it had done before. 
The recordings in Exodus make clear that the Sabbath 
was a covenant between God and the chosen people. It re­
quired that the people rest from labor and observe religious 
exercises on the seventh day of the week and keeping 
28 
Barack/ pp. 2-14. 
29 
Davis/ pp. 662-663. 
28 
the covenant was so important that severe penalties would 
30 be imposed on those disobeying it: 
"and the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak 
thou; also unto the children of Israel, saying, 
verily my sabbath ye shall keep: for it is a 
sign between me and you throughout your genera­
tions; that ye may know that I am the Lord that 
doth sanctify you. Ye shall keep the sabbath...; 
for it is holy unto you; everyone that defileth 
it shall surely be put to death for whosoever 
doeth any work therein, that soul shall be cut 
off from among his people. Six days may work be 
done; but in the seventh is the sabbath of rest, 
holy to the Lord: whosoever doeth any work in 
the sabbath day, he shall surely be put to death. 
Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the 
sabbath, to observe the sabbath throughout their 
generations, for a perpetual covenant. It is a 
sign between me and the children of Israel for 
ever: for in six days the Lord made heaven and 
earth, on the seventh day he rested, and was 
refreshed.31 "six days shall work be done, but 
on the seventh day there shall be to you an holy 
day, a sabbath of rest to the Lord: whosoever 
doeth work therein shall be put to death."32 
In the Jewish law, we find the oldest description of 
33 
the Hebrew Sabbath in Exodus 23:10-13. In that passage, 
Exodus 23:12 "For six days you shalt do thy work and on 
the seventh day thou shall rest; that thine ox and thine 
ass may rest, and the son of thy handmaid, and the stranger, 
may be refreshed." The passages in Exodus 34:21 and 
30 
Solberg, p. 9. 
31Exodus 31:12-17. 
32Exodus 35:2. 
33Kimball, p. 309. 
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Deuteronomy 5:14-15 suggest to some that the Sabbath was a 
means to relieve the farmers and their animals from overwork. 
Moreover/ since the covenant code was recorded several 
centuries after the settlement of the Hebrews in Palestine, 
it may reflect a more complex, settled society which may 
have needed a rest day. Scholars have noted the appearance 
of rest days in agrarian societies as well as a market 
day to facilitate commerce.^ This thesis would seem to 
strengthen the argument that the Hebrew Sabbath emerged as 
an economic innovation in a developing society—a day to 
35 
rest and allow a market day in an agarian society. 
Orthodox scholars dispute this utilitarian interpreta­
tion and the borrowing of the lunar and cultural origins. 
In the course of becoming a nation and establishing rule, 
the ancient Israelites linked an ethical code of justice 
to the worship of one God and the observance of a holy day 
of rest dedicated to that God which also required the ob­
servance of the ethical code. During the tenth and ninth 
centuries B.C., the Sabbath acquired its name and anchored 
the association of rest day to worship of God and the 
prohibition of work became subordinated to the idea of the 
^H. Webster, Rest Days; iA Study in Early Laws and 
Morality (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 101. 
3^Kimball, p. 308. 
30 
o/r 
Sabbath. Table 1 (end of chapter) presents a time-line 
showing the Sabbath observance through the centuries. 
The linking of the Sabbath to the biblical recordings 
of God's bringing the chosen people out of bondage attest 
to the association with the Hebrew covenant with God. In 
the ninth century B.C./ the Sabbath evolved from a rest 
day or market day to a day of spiritual renewal of man— 
a day to rededicate oneself to the source of meaning. 
During the eighth and seventh centuries B.C./ the Sabbath 
evolved as a holy feast day at the temple by the priests. 
It is very likely that the religious cult transformed the 
significance of the seventh day to a day of ritualization 
37 
from the idea of rest and renewal. 
Jerusalem was captured and the Jews were deported to 
Babylon. During the sixth century B.C. exile/ priests 
focused on the Sabbath as a means through which the people 
of Israel could maintain their religious heritage in a 
pagan foreign land. The priests recommended severe penal­
ties for Sabbath breaking to ensure that the people would 
38 
remember and practice their religious tradition, 
36n. Andreasen/ The Old Testament; A Traditional 
Historical Investigation I Missoula/ Montana: Society of 
Biblical Literature/ 1972)/ p. 139. 
37Ibid, p. 309. 
38Kimball, p. 309. 
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"Ye shall keep the sabbath therefore: for it is 
holy unto you: every one that defileth it shall 
surely be put to death ; for whosoever doeth any 
work therein# that soul shall be cut off from 
among his people. Six days may work be done; 
but in the seventh is the sabbath of rest; holy 
to the Lord: Whosoever doeth any work in the sab­
bath day/ he shall surely be put to death."39 
The individual rationale for the modern Sabbath ne­
glects the pluralism of meaning in the Sabbath tradition 
and in life itself. The Sabbath has for centuries provided 
rest and renewal for the individual and has provided a time 
to ask "Who are we? and Why are we here? and Does our work 
have meaning?"4® A good summation of the Sabbath heritage 
is presented by the Jewish scholar/ Abraham Herschel:41 
"The meaning of Sabbath is to celebrate time 
rather than space. Six days a week we live 
under tyranny of space; on the Sabbath we try 
to become attuned to holiness in time. It is 
a day on which we are called upon to share in 
what is eternal in time, to turn from the re­
sult of creation to the mystery of creation; 
from the world of creation to the creation of 
the world."42 
The Israelites observed the Sabbath as a festival day 
with pleasure and delight; its observance honored Yahweh. 
In time/ a narrow legalism evolved and many prohibitions of 
work surrounded the holy observance,4^ with ̂ restrictions 
39Exodus 31:14-15. 
40Kimball, p. 313. 
4*Ibid. 
^Abraham Herschel/ The Sabbath (Cleveland: World 
Publishing/ 1963) pp. 2/10 
^Solberg/ p. 9 
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becoming a "hedge about the Law" and a byword for extrava­
gance and absurdity.^ 
Christian Influence on the Sabbath 
Jesus Christ came out of Israel and with him came the 
New Covenant that perfected the bond between God and man. 
Jesus came to fulfill rather than to abrogate the Law, but 
he found that man's invention had replaced what was divine 
and spiritual in the Sabbath. He interpreted the Fourth 
Commandment in relation to his life and mission, sometimes 
keeping and sometimes breaking the Sabbath. He defended 
his disciples for working in cases of necessity and justi­
fied his own healing of the sick and lame on holy days. 
Jesus reminded his critics that in cases of conflict even 
they violated the rest day by holding to the law of circum­
cision over the Sabbath ^5 ("and he said unto them, the 
Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath: 
• 46 
Therefore the Son of Man is Lord also of the Sabbath'.' ). 
Christian exegetes have taken the whole Bible as a 
unified testimony. The Epistle to the Hebrews exemplied 
this approach4? by saying that God spoke to us in many ways 
44 
• • Solberg, p. 9. 
4^Solberg, p. 10. 
46Mark 2:27-28. 
47Solberg, p. 10. 
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by the prophets" but in the last days he spoke through his 
48 son whom he appointed heir and by whom he made the worlds. 
Allegorists could find Christian content in the Jewish 
texts by use of symbols and imagery to find significance 
and freedom in making the Sabbath not a cessation of work 
on the seventh day but a day of spiritual rest from sin at 
all times. The allegory freed the church from pure literal-
4Q 
ism but opened the way for theological chaos. 
Other interpretations of the Sabbath include the typolo­
gical exegesis which draws a parallel between the two Testa­
ments/ making the Old Testament types as models for New 
Testament antitypes. The Literalist interpretation became 
important to Protestant reformers seeking emancipation from 
Catholic interpretive tradition and making the Bible the stand­
ard for judging the church. Their seventeenth-century follow­
ers, fearing subjectivism, came to regard all parts of the 
Bible as true and divinely inspired providing fertile soil 
50 
for modern-day Sabbatarianism. 
With the advent of the Christian era, the Lordb Day 
replaced the Sabbath as a positive entity of the Church. The 
Apostles and followers of Jesus found practical reasons for 
using another day as a periodically recurring day that would 
4®Hebrews 1:1-2. 




allow them to assemble for worship and would distinguish them 
from the Jews. The First Day celebration resulted; though 
analogous to the Jewish Sabbath/ it did not use the Fourth 
Commandment as a justification for cessation of work and 
. . . 51 
sanctifxcation. 
Apostle Paul: The Transition 
In the first century of the Christian era# Western Civil­
ization was coterminous with the Roman Empire. Roman rule 
had established order and peace out of an evil political 
system by making the provinces cooperative units in a common­
wealth instead of objects of plunder by a narrow circle of 
aristocratic families.^ Within this secular domain/ there 
was a widely spread religion that combined the splendor 
of antiquity and the tenacity of a national faith—the 
religion of the Jews. Alongside the stately public rituals 
of the cities were the private and independent religious 
brotherhoods which tried to provide a religious atmosphere 
more satisfying to the ordinary man than the antiquated 
and formal rites could provide.^ 
51Ibid. 
52C. H. Dodd/ The Meaning Paul For Today (New York: 
Meridian Books, 1957)/ p. 21. 
53Ibid/ p. 22* 
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The Apostle Paul having been reared in a Gentile envir­
onment/ but having been trained in the Jewish tradition/ was 
peculiarly suited for the task of interpreting the gospels 
to the Gentiles.^4 Later Paul repudiated his former life 
within the Jewish community but continued to rest heavily 
on the basic beliefs and insights that Judaism had instilled 
55 . 
into his life and thought. Similarly/ his resistance to 
compromise with paganism did not deter his using the vocab­
ulary of the pagan religion and philosophy. Paul was the 
transition and indispensable apostle in the transfer of 
56 
Christianity from Palestine to the larger Roman world. 
Paul's letters show that he had little interest in the 
involved methods of interpreting scripture that were common­
ly used by the rabbis of his day, although he used some of 
57 
the more familiar allegories in his letters: 
"Moreover brethren/ I would not that ye should 
be ignorant/ how that all our fathers were under 
the cloud/ and all passed through the sea; and 
were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in 
the sea; And did all eat the same spiritual 
meat; And did all drink; for they drank of that 
spiritual Rock that followed them: and that 
Rock was Christ. 
54James A. Hessey/ Sunday: Its Origin/ History and 
Present Obligation (London: Longmans# "Green and Company/ 
1902) pp. 104-107. 
55Ibid%/ p. 210. 
56Ibid., p. 211. 
^7Ibid./ p. 210. 
5®I Corinthians 10: 1-4. 
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Paul's writing was generally Pharisaic in attitude; however/ 
he had little sympathy with the rigid legalism associated 
59 
with the Pharisees. 
TABLE 2 
Chronology of Apostle Paul's 
Life and Travels 
Death, resurrection and ascension 
of Christ 
Conversion of Paul 
First subsequent visit to 
Jerusalem 
Paul at Tarsus 
Visit to Jerusalem with gifts 
from Antioch 
First missionary journey 
Council at Jerusalem 
Second missionary journey 
1 and 2 Thessalonians 






Imprisonment in Caesarea 
Accession of Festus 
Paul arrives in Rome 
Colossians/ Philemon, 
Ephesians, Philippians 
Release from Roman imprisonment 
1 Timothy 
Titus 
Hebrews/ if by Paul 
2 Timothy 












































61 or 62 
62 or 63 
63 
64 or 65 
65 or 66 




^Kee and Young/ p. 210. 
®°J.W. Davis/ A Dictionary of the Bible (Philadelphia: 
Westminister Press/ 1929) p. 586. 
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In the early Jewish-Christian church, the Pharisees 
held strict observance of the Sabbath, applying the law to 
the most trivial acts, and forbidding many works of necessity 
and mercy. They denounced Jesus for his acts of healing and 
the disciples for tending the animals just as on ordinary 
61 
days: 
"And he was teaching in one of the synagogues on 
the Sabbath. And/ behold, there was a woman 
which had a spirit of infirmity eighteen years, 
and was bowed together, and could in no wise 
lift up herself. And when Jesus saw her, he 
called her to him, and said unto her, Woman, 
thou art lossed from thine infirmity. And he 
laid his hands on her: And immediately she was 
made straight, and glorified God. And the 
ruler of the synagogue answered with indigna­
tion, because that Jesus had healed on the 
sabbath day. And said unto the people, There 
are six days in which men ought to work: in them 
therefore come and be healed, and not on the 
sabbath day. The Lord then answered him, and 
said, Thou hypocrite, doth not each one of you 
on the sabbath loose his ox or his ass from the 
stall, and lead him away to watering? And ought 
not this woman being a daughter of Abraham, whom 
Satan hath bound, lo, these eighteen years, be 
loosed from this bond on the sabbath day? And 
when he had said these things, all his adver­
saries were ashamed: And all the people rejoiced 
for all the glorious things that were done by him. 
The day for synagogue worship was the seventh day of 
the week, Saturday. The Apostolic Christian Church held 
worship on the first day of the week justifying it as the 
l 
day Christ arose from the dead. Paul directed the Christians 
61 . 
Davis, p. 664. 
62Luke 13: 10-17. 
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in Corinth to make contributions to the charities of the 
church on the first day/ designated as the Lord's Day. 
Members of the early church made no distinction between 
days/ including Jewish festivals and Sabbaths and possibly 
the first day. Some of the Jewish converts continued to 
keep the seventh day and the Jewish festivals as a matter of 
liberty so long as the convert did not hold the observance 
64 as necessary for salvation. 
Over the next several centuries/ the Jewish Sabbath and 
the Christian Lord's Day occupied roughly equal significance 
in the belief of the faithful/ while the Lord's Day/ by 
65 
degrees/ shifted to the first day of the week. 
Emperor Constantine/ in 321 A.D. in his Edict of Milan 
decreed that a weekly holiday (Sunday) be established for 
66 
the Christians. He decreed: "on the venerable day of the 
sun let the magistrates and people residing in the cities 
rest/ and let all workshops be closed. In the country/ how­
ever/ persons engaged in... cultivation may freely and law-
6 7 
fully continue their pursuits..." He reasoned that other 
^Davis/ p. 664. 
64Ibid./ p. 457. 
®^Solberg/ p. 12. 
66Solberg/ pp. 12-13 
67Hessey/ pp. 104-107. 
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days might be unsuitable for sowing and planting# and that 
neglecting the proper season would cause the loss of heaven's 
bounty.68 
Biblical scholars have interpreted this declaration as 
an approximation of Sabbatarianism, while others see the 
church aided by civil authority and not as a divine ordin­
ance. Still others considered Constantine practical in 
that he exempted the rural pagans in his decree; and whil\e 
he encouraged Christians by giving them this day of obser­
vance/ he gave it the civil name of Sunday/ thus avoiding 
69 
offense to the pagans. 
In the absence of reference to the Fourth Commandment/ 
Constantine's deed was not Sabbatarian; it did not discour­
age the cheerfulness associated with the Christian permis­
sion to labor nor impose upon the urbans an unwelcome rest 
from labor on Sunday. The Christians had already stopped 
working and conducting legal matters on the day of observ­
ance. The decree provided Christians with civil authority 
for the religious ordinance they had been practicing since 
70 
the time of the Apost'les. 
For the followers of Christ/ the Lord's Day stood alone 
as a festival in the Christian year until the Council of 
Nicaea in 325/ even though confusion resulted over the Sabbath 
68Ibid./ p. 58 
69 
Ibid./ pp. 59-66 
^°Solberg/ p. 12 
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and the Lord's Day. After the Nicean Council/ the church 
adopted a liturgical calendar to celebrate events in the 
life of Jesus/ thereby putting Christian impress on the 
rhythm of nature. 
Special reverence accorded to Saints' Days often obscured 
the divinely appointed Sunday. Christians occasionally 
apologized for the many holidays by analogy to the Jewish 
and Christian observances. As a result the Christians were 
in danger of forgetting that the Lord's Day was different 
from the Sabbath and that'its apostolic beginnings placed 
it above ecclesiastical ordinances.7* 
Through the fourth and fifth centuries A.D./ the 
ecclesiastical and civil authorities promulgated rules and 
edicts that imposed Judaism into the Christian practices. 
A strict rest was required on Sunday with attendance at 
worship becoming a requirement. The Fourth Council of Car­
thage proscribed the payments of debts and civil proceedings/ 
and in 386 A.D. Emperor Theodosius forbade any transaction 
of business affairs on Sunday. Despite the strictness of 
the ecclesiastical and civil rules there was no ban on 
recreations and necessary duties if these affairs did not 
72 interfere with divine worship. 
71Hessey/ pp. 67-87. 
72Ibid . 
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During the next millennium/ Christian Sabbatarianism 
developed as an aspect of medieval religion. The Roman 
Catholic Church instituted many fasts and festivals which 
tended to lessen the Lord's Day to the status of the many 
other ceremonies that rested on ecclesiastical authority. 
Rome surrounded Sundays with numerous proscriptions. Be­
cause of these restrictions, the church devised ceremonies 
to insure the observance of the Lord's Day, declaring them 
successors of the old Jewish ceremonies by reference 
to the Fourth Commandment with a moral law binding all man-
73 kind rather than just the Jews. 
Roman Catholic legalism gave rise to a system that 
required a day of rest like that of the Jewish Sabbath and 
calling for sanctification of Sunday. Both civil and eccle­
siastical authorities issued rules to further the ideal of 
sanctification by rest from servile labor and commercial 
4.- »• • 74 activities. 
The first Sunday statutes date from the seventh century 
A.D. in England when West Saxon King Ina forbade work on 
Sunday. During the ninth century A.D. Edgar the Peaceable 
75 
ordered the Lord's Day "to commence at three o'clock on 
73 
Solberg, pp. 13-14 
74 
J. L. Cate# "The English Mission of Eustace of Flay" 
(1200-1201) , in Etudes d'Histoire Dedi'ees a la Memoire de 
Henri Pirene (Brussels: Nouvelle Societe d' Editions, 1937)# 
pp. 67-89. 
'^Solberg, p. 14. 
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76 
Saturday afternoon and to last until dawn on Monday." 
77 The term "Christian Sabbath" was first used in Europe 
around 1201 A.D. when Abbot Eustace of Flay set out to cru-
78 
sade in England for a Judaic Sunday observance. 
The intervening centuries to the Protestant Reformation 
gave rise to efforts by the church to formulate a demanding 
theory of Christian Sabbatarianism. Both in Germany and 
England in the late thirteenth century A.D. came an effort 
to heighten prohibition of work on Sunday with strong admoni­
tions of divine judgment for those transgressing the Sabbath 
observance. In the fourteenth century A.D., the Spanish 
Bishop of Avila declared it a moral sin to do any unnecessary 
79 
labor on Sunday. 
Although the medieval church sought to strengthen a 
theory of Christian Sabbatarianism/ it failed to get a gen­
eral compliance with the ideal. Many laymen failed to ob­
serve Sundays and the many feast days. They remained absent 
from worship and spent the day with participation in page­
ants/ carnival processions/ folk dances/ and consuming large 
80 
amounts of ale at the parish celebrations. 
76Benjamin Thorpe, ed.# Ancient Laws and Institutes of 
England/ 2 vols. (London: 1840) p. 1:105. 
77Hessey, p.  90.  
78Ibid. 
79 
Ibid./ pp. 91-92. 
80 
Solberg, p. 14. 
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The Church overlooked these transgressions as long as 
81 
the offenders did not question the precepts of the church. 
Despite the dissatisfaction of sectarian groups with the 
prevailing practices in medieval Christianity/ little was 
accomplished to challenge the ecclesiastical theory of the 
Catholic Church. The Christian Sabbath was one of the many 
non-scriptural elements in the late medieval religion that 
82 obscured the original meaning of the Lord's Day. 
Sabbatarian Doctrines of The Protestant Reformation 
The Protestant Reformation unleased powerful forces 
that changed Christianity and the concept of a Sabbatarian 
doctrine. Continental Protestants rejected the Roman Catholic 
ecclesiastical traditions and papal authority, holding the ' 
Bible as the ultimate rule of Christian life. However/ they 
differed over the interpretation and the relationship between 
the two Testaments. Their views led to different positions 
83 
on the holy day. Table 3 shows the doctrinal difference^ 
of the Sabbath observance emerging in the Reformation. 
81Ibid./ p. 14. 
Q O 
°^A. G. Dickens/ Lollards and Protestants in The Dio-
cese of York/ 1509-1558 (London: Oxford University Press/ 
1959), pp. 9, 242-244. 
83 
Solberg/ pp. 16-20. 
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TABLE 3 
Sabbath Observance: Doctrines of the 
Protestant Reformation 
DOCTRINES 
£ Z w to OT 
w o OS OS Z 
H H W u < 
2 u s E EH 
< H OS OS M 
OS J o o OS 
a w (XI tu D 
an os w a 04 
OS OS 
D a 
J a i-3 SB 
E < W 
PS u H 
o M J 
,1xi Q o 
;a < z 
OS OS U 
Justification by faith. x 
Antithesis between Law and Gospel. x 
Fourth Commandment-a Jewish ceremonial 
law abrogated by the New Testament. x 
Strict observance of Fourth Commandment 
on the Sabbath. x 
Abolition of Lord's Day; restoration of 
Jewish Sabbath. x 
New Testament as normative. x 
Old Testament as typolocical and allegorical. x 
Mystical approach to Testaments. x 
Church as mystical body of Christ. x 
Inspiration of Holy Spirit. x 
Basic unity of Old and New Testaments. x 
Salvation lying in obedience to the Law. x 
Precise adherence to Decalogue. x 
Christians not bound to outward observance 
of Fourth Commandment. x 
Restructuring of Sabbath for man's relief 
from mundane tasks. x 
Christians Lord's Day for sake of bodily 
need. x 
Sabbath to be observed on seventh day as 
prescribed by Fourth Commandment. x 
Spirit acting upon the heart to make external 
religious discipline unnecessary. x 
Political and ecclesiastical orders co­
existing; Salvation to be obtained in the 
world by those finding their place in a 
providentially governed universe. x x 
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TABLE 3 (continued) 
DOCTRINES 
s Z w W w 
Ui o OS OS z 
M M a a < 
Z u s E 
< H OS OS M 
as J O o OS 
u W En faj D 
a: 05 W W CU 
EH OS OS 
D P 
J W •J as 
£ < w 
OS u M 
o M •J 
Cu a u 
pa < z 
OS as w 
Everyday is a Sabbath-not only the 
seventh day (Anti-Sabbatarianism). x 
Abrogation of holy days-(reap the harvest 
and advance the crafts). x 
Sabbath precept of Jewish origins. x 
Church-a community of the elect, not one 
imposed by the hierarchy. x 
Sabbath of the Decalogue identified with 
Christian Sabbath. x 
Duty to God over claims of mammon. x 
Fourth Commandment a part of moral law 
rather than ceremonial. x 
Sabbath binding on Christians. x 
The Lordb Day to be observed. x 
Acts of mercy can be performed on the 
Sabbath. x 
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Martin Luther attacked the numerous saints' days in the 
Christian church and insisted the Sabbath perpetuated the 
Jewish ordinance of the Sabbath observance. He preached 
that the Lord's Day was a day to refrain from evil works, 
to rest and offer service to God by hearing and discussing 
84 
his Word. In 1544 during a sermon at Torgau, Luther ac­
cepted Sunday as the Sabbath as long as Christians insisted 
they were lords of the Sabbath and did not attach a special 
85 holiness to a particular day. 
John Calvin/ a principal in the Reformed religion on 
the European continent/ emphasized a basic unity in the Old 
Testament and New Testament which differed from Luther's 
86 
antithesis of Law and Gospel. Calvin/ in his Institutes 
of The Christian Religion/ 1536 and 1559 A.D.» using 
exegetical methods similar to the Epistle to the 
Hebrews, attempted to Christianize the Old Testament and 
Judaize the New Testament on the significance of the Sab­
bath. This unity attempted to focus on one unified covenant 
allowing the believer to find his proper relation with God 
®4Solberg/ pp. 16-20. 
85 
Theodore G. Tappert/ trans, and ed. The Book of Con­
cord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
(Philadelphia: Muhlenburg Press/ 1959)/ pp. 375-379. 
86Solberg, p. 16. 
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and the Universe through strict adherence to the Deca-
, 87 logue. 
The Fourth Commandment took on a spiritual meaning 
which encouraged Christians to desist from evil work and 
find rest in God by Calvin's portrayal of the Decalogue as 
a perfect code of morals. In dealing with the Sabbath, 
Calvin acknowledged it as a divine institution for a day of 
rest and arbitrarily substituted the first day for the 
^ 88 seventh. 
The Radical Reformers, the left wing of the Protestant 
movement, and its subdivision of Anabaptist and Spirituals 
provided no stimulation for the growth of the modern Sabba­
tarianism as did the influence of Martin Luther and John 
89 
Calvin in Lutheranism and Reformed religion. Within the 
Radical Reformers, several sects interpreted the New Testa­
ment treatment of the Sabbath as normative and the Old 
Testament's Sabbath as typological and allegorical. 
Other motivating influences in the Radical Reformation 
had both positive and negative impulses on the Sabbath as 
John T. McNeil, ed., John Calvin, Institutes of the 
Christian Religion, 2 vols., trans. Ford L. Battles, 
(Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1960) pp. 1:394-401. 
88 
Hessey, pp. 95-96. 
89 
Solberg, p. 16. 
90Ibid. 
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opposed to those in the Protestant mainstream. Opposing theor-
I 
ies on the Sabbath held that the Decalogue was completely moral 
and the proscription of labor still in force; Jesus had 
come to fulfill the Law and the Sabbath should be observed 
on the seventh day with the rigor prescribed in the Old 
91 
Testament. 
The second Radical theory subscribed to the New Coven­
ant as replacing the Law with a ministry of Grace; the whole 
Mosiac Covenant had been fulfilled and passed. This aspect 
of the movement held that Christ did not institute or 
authorize a special day of rest or worship in place of or 
in succession to the Jewish Sabbath. The immediate influ­
ence of the Spirit on the heart relieved the believer of 
92 
external religious discipline. 
The adoption of these ideals of the Radical Reformation 
by the Quakers and leftist Puritans gave them vitality and thus/ 
93 
an antilegalist approach of the Sabbath passed to America. 
England escaped much of the doctrinal conflict during 
the early Reformation while the assault on the theory and 
practice of the Sabbath consumed much of the mind of 
^George A. Williams; The Radical Reformation (Phila­
delphia: Westminister Press"i 1962), pp. 848/ 408-410 
92Ibid. 
^Solberg, pp. 18-19. 
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94 
continental theologians. In the 1530's Henry VIII broke 
with the Roman Catholic church and placed the English crown 
as head of a national church which refused to permit Lutheran 
and Reformed teaching of the Sabbath. 
English reformers gave strong voice to anti-Sabbatarian 
theory. They contended that Sundays should be no 
holier than any other day, and that Christians changed the 
95 
Sabbath from Saturday to distinguish themselves from Jews. 
During the early years of Henry VIll's reign, religious 
festivals/ Sundays,and holy days totaled 217 days annual-
96 
ly. Despite the fact that many went unobserved/ dissatis­
faction arose,prompting Commons in 1532 to voice opposition 
to the excesses of the worshipers. In 1536/ Henry VIII 
ordered the clergy to abrogate certain holy days during har­
vest time on the grounds that the idleness and frolic led 
97 to the decline of industrial crafts. 
Despite the break with the Catholic church, the Church 
of England was slow to emancipate itself from the Roman 
Catholic Sabbatarian beliefs. The Church of England embrac­
ed the Fourth Commandment apart from the other nine, holding 
94Ibid., p. 22. 
^William A. Clebsch/ England's Earliest Protestants, 
1520-1535 (New Haven: Yale University Press/ 1964) pp. 45, 
121-122 
96Solberg, p. 23. 
97Ibid., p. 23. 
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the Fourth as ceremonial. It reasoned that rest from bodily 
labor on the seventh day was a Sabbath precept pertaining 
only to Jews and rest from sin was binding on all Christians. 
A person could work if necessary in order to enhance agri­
culture or industry and failure to do so out of principle 
98 
of conscience offended God. 
The influence of John Calvin gained its hold on the 
Sabbath during the reign of Edward VI (1547-1553). The 
religious innovations of Protestantism during these years demon­
strated the Anglican spirit of compromise; they concerned 
themselves less with what people thought than with how they 
acted. The Act of Uniformity (1552) required church worship 
on Sundays and holy days but stipulated no penalty for 
99 
offenders. 
The Royal Injunctions of 1547 struck a compromise on 
the question of Sunday labor*^® as did those of Emperor 
Constantine in 321 A.D. Rest and worship were ordered for t|ie 
followers but dispensation was granted for those who needed 




lQ1Edward Cardwell/ ed., Documentary Annals of the Reform­
ed Church of England/ 2 vols. (Oxford/ 1844), pp. 1:15-16. 
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The accession of Elizabeth I to the throne brought no 
immediate change in the official policy toward the Sabbath 
observance. The Act of Uniformity and the Royal Injunction 
of 1559 required observance of Sundays and holy days by the 
public. The injunctions allowed labor after worship in 
times of harvest; moreover/ they contained admonitions re­
garding absence from worship as superstitious in nature. 
Church and state in cooperation sought to realize of­
ficial policy by holding ecclesiastical court that sought 
to punish the Sabbath-offenders. Individuals unable to 
attend holy worship on the Sabbath might be turned over to 
the civil authorities who shared responsibility for main-
102 taining the religious discipline. 
Dissatisfaction with the official attitude grew under 
the reign of Elizabeth and mid-way in the reign# a number 
of forces worked together to bring a change in the practice 
of Sabbath observance and a new theory of the Sabbath. The 
impact of the vernacular Bible, the influence of the new 
covenant of Puritan thought/ a new attitude toward the 
economic action (work ethic)/ and the condemnation of Sunday 
recreation worked interrelatedly to produce the Puritan 
Sabbath.103 
102Solberg/ pp. 31-32. 
103Ibid./ p. 32. 
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The Reformation made the Bible the supreme guide to 
life and righteousness. Out of this search came the Geneva 
Bible which was made available to the comman man. Over the 
next forty years/ circulation grew to call for sixty edi-
104 
tions. The availability and wide usage of the Geneva 
Bible by the common man set before the reader/ in comprehen­
sible terms keyed to the Scriptures,a statement in the 
common tongue of the conception of man's inner life derived 
from Paul by way of Calvin. It enabled the reader to dis­
cover for himself in the text the essentials of the great 
105 
doctrine of salvation by the election of divine grace. 
The discipline of the Word figured prominently in the rise 
of English Sabbatarianism. The common man, anxious to find 
a rule for life, and believing the Scripture was the rule, 
affirmed the Reformed tenet that the Old and New Testaments 
constituted one unbroken covenant for the Sabbath.*06 
Many seized upon the Fourth Commandment as the source 
for observance of the Lord's Day. Learned Puritans believed 
the Scripture was self-illuminating, even to the uneducated 
and in searching the Book found the Fourth Commandment the 
A. K. Wikgren, "The English Versions of the Bible", in 
Peake's Commentary on the Bible, (ed. Thomas Nelson and H. H. 
Rowley, ./London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962), pp.24-26. 
E. Tyrrell Green, The Thirty-Nine Articles and the 
Age of the Reformation, (London: 1896), p. 53. 
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only explicit spiritual basis for keeping the holy day. 
This equating of the Lord's Day with the Sabbath laid 
1.07 
English Sabbatarianism on the ancient foundation of 
108 
the Mosaic Law as a basis for obedience. 
Early American Sabbatarianism 
Puritans of New England 
Basic in the belief of the Puritans was the doctrine 
of divine Providence which governed every aspect of the 
universe. After the Reformation/ Protestants insisted that 
the Protestant rather than the Roman Catholic Church was the 
proper vehicle for advancing the kingdom of Christ, and 
Englishmen were eager to create the New Israel in their 
land. Unable to reform England, some Nonconformists decided 
109 to establish the pure church in the New World. 
American Puritans thought that New England was the 
spot for them to build a religious society based on God's 
word as contained in the Scriptures. New England was not 
precisely the land of promise, but Puritan immigrants held 
that Providence had postponed the New World opening until their 
own time, allowing God's people to escape from religious 
^^Solberg, p. 34. 
108 
Charles H. George and Katherine George, The Protest­
ant Mind of The English Reformation, 1570-1640 (Princeton: 
University Press, 1961), pp. 232-233. 
109Solberg, pp. 107-108. 
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oppression in England.110 
New England Puritans deserve the major credit for 
kindling the Sabbath light in a new nation. They settled 
this region primarily to establish their theological doc­
trines and raise the Sabbath to a prominent position because 
they held it as the palladium of true religion. The Puritan 
movement, seen in relation to the goals of the Reformation# 
was an advanced expression of the Protestant movement to 
regenerate man spiritually and reorder society according to 
the Scriptures, and the theology of the Sabbath was a prime 
reason to justify their migration and understand their role 
in history.**1 
The Lord's Day observance by the Puritans was consid­
ered holy rather than festive. The Sabbath was a time for 
solemn rejoicing and a day of surcease from incessant toil, 
^ 112 a memorial of the Resurrection, a foretaste of heaven. < The 
New England Puritans considered an establishment of a pure 
I 
Sabbath essential in the fulfillment of their divine mission 
to build a truly reformed society. They identified with 
113 ancient Israel which was their model for the New Israel. 
110Ibid. 
111Solberg, p. 107. 
112Ibid., p. 113. 
113Ibid./ p. 109. 
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The Puritan Sabbath fell into the tracks of a Hebrew 
custom/ and the adherents found a sanction for their Sabbath 
observance in the Fourth Commandment. The Puritans came to 
New England to plant the Gospel in the Reformed tradition/ 
believing in the basic unity and equal significance of the 
114 115 
two Testaments. They were "Old Testament Christians" 
drawing on Hebrew writings to serve their needs; proper 
Sabbath observance was a means of bringing sinners to 
Christ and a rule for righteousness. 
The orthodoxy for the Puritans in New England was 
shaped by an early and typical settler/ Edward Johnson/ 
who said: 
"How much more shall Christ who created all power/ 
call over this 900 League Ocean at his pleasure/ 
such instruments as he thinks meete to make use 
of in this place/ from whence you are now to de­
part/ but further that you may not delay the 
voyage/ for your full satisfaction/ know this 
is the place where the Lord will create a New 
Heaven/ and a New Earth in/ New Churches/ and a 
New Common-wealth together. 
. 114Ibid./ p. 113. 
*^Clifford K. Shipton/ "The Hebraic Background of 
Puritanism"« Publications of the American Jewish Historical 
Society 47 (March 1958): 141. 
116Ibid./ pp. 140-153. 
117 
'Franklin Jameson/ ed./ Johnson's Wonder-Working Provi­
dence/ 1628-1651/ (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910)/ 
pp. 23-25. 
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These thoughts# though shaped by religious orthodoxy/ 
offer a statement on the relation of the Sabbath to the 
ideas that inspired the founding of Massachusetts and the 
118 colonies of New England. 
Chesapeake: Anglicans and Catholics 
The new doctrine of the Sabbath which emerged in England 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century pervaded various 
strata of society as colonization of America began. The 
powerful Englishmen carried the theory to the original Amer­
ican settlements,and the growth of Sabbatarianism demonstra­
ted the powerful force of Puritan ideology in shaping 
119 legal and religious thought in American culture. 
In the Chesapeake area/ Virginia's religion was a child 
of the Church of England/ and the early settlers there sought to 
make the church the centerpiece of their life. The presence 
of Catholics and Protestants in Maryland deterred the offi­
cial establishment of religion and gave the church a lesser 
role than in Virginia. In both environments/ geography and 
climate were suitable for a strong agarian life/ thus pre­
cluding a compact/ closely knit society like those in England 
and New England. However/ as time passed, contrasting 
H®Solberg/ p. 110. 
**9Solberg/ p. 85. 
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patterns of religious observance were created but later came 
120 to share a similar type of Sabbatarianism. 
Sabbatarianism in Virginia was the product of an inter­
action between the imported Puritan ideal and local religious# 
economic#and social conditions. Across the Potomac a differ­
ent pattern of Sabbatarianism developed in the religious 
121 pluralism which conditioned the Lord's Day observance. 
The Maryland colony had promised new possibilities for 
religious liberty under George Calvert, the first Lord 
Baltimore who sincerely desired to found a colony based on 
T O O  
the principle of religious tolerance. Calvert/ a Catho­
lic/ envisioned Maryland as a "land of sanctuary" for dif­
ferent faiths/ because this was the only way he could obtain 
permission from a Protestant king to establish a safe haven 
123 
for fellow Catholics. 
Both Maryland and Virginia forbade normal labor and 
certain activities on Sunday. These laws were enforced with 
a measure of uniformity. 
120Soiberg/ p. 85. 
121Solberg/ p. 93. 
^•22William T. Russell/ Maryland/ the Land of Sanctuary: 
A History of Religious Tolerance in Maryland from the First 
Settlement Until the American Revolution (Baltimore: J. H. 
First Co./ 1907). 
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The setting of the Lord's Day represented an isle of rest 
in an ocean of endeavor made necessary by establishing entre-
124 preneurs. "
Baptists of Rhode Island 
The consolidation of the Puritan theory of the Sabbath 
in New England was the background for legal foundations for 
Lord's Day observance in Massachusetts. The colony had 
emphasized the importance of public worship with the passage 
of laws requiring Sabbath observance and fines for failure 
to attend worship. In this environment; Ezekiel Holliman 
was brought before the court for not attending public worship 
I O C  
assemblies and departing from orthodoxy. Holliman fled 
to Rhode Island where he and Roger Williams baptized each 
126 
other and founded the first Baptist Church in America. 
As Rhode Island took shape, Roger Williams/ its founder# 
intended the area to be "a shelter for persons distressed of 
127 conscience". The civil community in Rhode Island began 
as a simple democracy where religious refugees were admitted 
124Solberg, p. 99. 
^•2®Ibid/ p. 160. 
^•^Massachusetts Bay Recorder/ 1:140/221 
1 97 
"'John R. Barlett/ ed./ Records of the Colony of Rhode 
Island and Providence Plantations/ 10 vols. (Providence/ 
1856-1865), 1:22 
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with allowance for exercise of religious conscience; however/ 
social pressure if not law put a premium on attending reli­
gious services. Nevertheless/ forced worship was not per­
mitted/the inhabitants enjoyed freedom in observance 
on the First Day. Roger Williams/ though observant of the 
Sabbath/ refused to travel on the First Day/ but on occasions 
dealt in trading with Indians on Sunday. Williams encounter­
ed criticism because he made no attempt to convert the 
Indians; he saw no value in securing external observance out 
of respect for him rather than of conviction. The leaders 
of Rhode Island leaned toward inward religion and a lessen­
ing of the institutions of the Sabbath. Roger Williams 
succeeded in establishing a civil government silence on 
religion; this was construed as making liberty of conscience 
an inviolable right. 
Settlements in Rhode Island/ in 1647/ formed a legal 
code without drawing upon the Old Testament. The code pro­
vided for the death penalty for a number of crimes and did 
not mention religion but concluded that./ apart from the trans­
gressions therein forbidden/ "all men may walk as their con-
128 sciences persuade them, every one in the name of his God." 
Mindful of the First Day observance by the inhabitants, 
the General Assembly reacted 1 to complaints of disturbances 
by enacting laws prohibiting disturbances on the First Day and 
^®Rhode island Colonial Records, 1:190 
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not mentioning "Sunday", "Sabbath", and "Lord's Day". 
Such a law, unthinkable in Puritan New England, was enacted 
by Rhode Island to balance liberty of conscience with the 
130 
claims of Sabbatarianism. 
Quakers of Pennsylvania 
With the division of New Jersey came a group of Friends 
who wished to establish a Quaker Commonwealth in the new 
world. The Quaker leaders adopted the Concessions and 
Agreements of 1677 to provide a government for their pro­
vince. This government was willing to legislate to promote 
morality, especially in sexual matters, but not regarding 
131 the Sabbath. Twenty years later, the Assembly legislated 
the Colony's first Sabbath legislation which declared: 
"it hath been the practice of all societies of 
Christian professors to set apart one day in 
the week for the worship and service of God, 
and it hath been and is the ancient law of Eng­
land (according to the practice of the primitive j 
Christians) to set apart the the first day of the 
week to that end."*32 
The statute prohibited unnecessary servile labor and 
129 
Ibid, pp. 279-280. 
130Solberg, p. 193. 
131Ibid, p. 249. 
132Ibid. 
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travel on the Lord's Day or First Day except for religious 
133 worship or necessity. 
William Penn after arriving at Chester in 1682 called 
the Quaker assembly and council into session and from that 
meeting came the Proprietors Frame of Government and the 
Great Law. Penn's influence brought about two articles guaran­
teeing liberty of conscience to all Monotheists and forbidding 
service labor on the Lord's Day. These articles allowed the 
believers to dispose themselves to read the Scriptures of 
truth at home, or attend religious worship as might suit 
134 
their respective beliefs. 
Quaker Sabbatarianism received acceptance as the pro-
vience of Pennsylvania grew with the arrival;of the English/ 
Scottish/ Irish/ Welsh/ Dutch and German immigrants. Quaker 
meetings were established in various places and Friends 
gained positions of control in the government. Sunday was 
regarded as different from the rest of the week, and Sabbath 
observance laws were enforced. At the outset of the 1700's 
a new Sabbath law was enacted to amend the liberty of con­
science. This law restricted the protection to Trinitarian 
Christians/ dropped the clause enjoining observance of the 
Sabbath/ rehearsed the value of the weekly rest, and 
133Ibid. 
134y0tes and Proceedings of the House of Representatives 
of the Province of Pennsylvania/ 1682-1776/ 8 vols. (Phila-
delphia, 1752-1756), pp. 108/ 116. 
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increased the penalty for worldly work on the Lord's Day.*3^ 
Orthodox protestants took a "higher" doctrinal ground 
on the Sabbath than the Quakers; however/ the Quakers and 
Protestants were in agreement with the Sabbath laws of 
1705.136 
The Seventh-Day Baptists brought the doctrine from 
England into Pennsylvania and it spread southward into 
Virginia and the Carolina back country. They were the first 
group in Pennsylvania to claim the right to worship according 
to their own conscience under the charters granting liberty 
of conscience to all men. This assertion/ creating civil 
strife/ was a precursor of the church-state problems the United 
States would face in later years.*-37 
The emergence of a unique and divergent attitude toward 
Sabbath observance is a landmark in the transition from the 
medieval to the early modern age in England. The influences 
of the Protestant Reformation laid open a fertile ground for 
the framers of the Constitution in the search for a legal 
meaning of religion and the observance by Sabbatarians. 
Perhaps the imprecision of the religious provisions of the 
First Amendment "Congress shall make no law respecting the 
135 
The Laws of the Province of Pennsylvania (Philadel­
phia, 1714)/ pp. 32/ 35-37/ 77. 
1 Og 
Solberg/ p. 263. 
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establishment of religion/ or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof..."138 was intentional; precision was left to be 
determined in the field of law rather than theology. 
To ensure that school employees may observe their Sab­
bath , school boards and administrators should be cognizant/ 
in developing policies protecting these guarantees/ of the 
imprecise nature of religion and the guarantees afforded 
citizens under the First Amendment and the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act/ amended in 1972: 
"The term religion includes all aspects of reli-
tion observance and practices/ as well as belief/ 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable 
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or pro­
spective employee's religious observance of prac­
tice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer's business".139 
138 
U.S. Constitution, amend. 1. 




Historical Origins and Development 
of the Judeo-Christian Sabbath 
Observance 
1300 B.C. Canaanites enacted cultic drama to worship 
pagan deities with hope the fertility rites 
would continue the earth's fertility for the 
coming year. 
1200 B.C. Moses established Hebrew nation at Mount Sinai. 
1220 B.C. The early dating of the Sabbath plus the nomadic 
existence of the ancient Hebrews suggest that 
the rest day could have originated as a lunar 
taboo day. 
1200 B.C. Agrarian society of the tribal federation suggests 
an economic origin to the early Hebrew Sabbath. 
1200 B.C. Ancient passages relied on oral histories to 
describe the Hebrews' escape from Pharoah's 
slavery in Egypt and wandering in the desert of 
Sinai. Hebrews practiced some form of Sabbath 
in the days of Judges and possibly before the 
settlement of Palestine. 
900-800 The Sabbath acquired its name anchoring the 
association of the rest day to the worship of 
Yahweh. Prohibition of work became subordinated 
to the concept of Sabbath. Whether or not the 
Sabbath began as lunar day/ a rest day/ or a 
market day/ it became dedicated as a day of the 
Lord and thus a signal of Hebrew promise to 
maintain Yahweh*s covenant and its ethical code. 
900-800 Hebraic sensitivity to holy times traced to 
founding of their culture. 
800 B.C. The Sabbath transcended the rest day to become 
a day of spiritual renewal. 
800-700 The Sabbath evolved into a holy feast day cele­
brated by the priestly class at the temple. 
65 
TABLE 1 (continued) 
650 B.C. During the reign of Ashurbanipal/ the seventh/ 
fourteenth/ nineteenth/ twenty-first and twenty-
eighth days of the month were regarded as in­
auspicious for certain acts. 
587 B.C. Priests focused on the Sabbath as a Hebrew insti­
tution in a pagan land with recommendation for 
severe penalties for Sabbath-breaking to ensure 
that the Israelites would remember and practice 
their religious traditions. 
500 B.C. The Hebrew priests probably added Genesis 2:1-3/ 
and Exodus 20:11 and 31:17 to the original Bibli­
cal passages to suggest inactivity and rest of 
the creator God following the creation of the 
world. 
0-100 A.D. Followers of Jesus adopted the Lord's Day as a 
positive institution of the church. Apostles 
and followers of Jesus used the First Day as a 
recurring day distinct from the Jewish ceremony 
of the Sabbath. The Jewish Sabbath and the 
Christians' Lord's Day coexisted. 
300 A.D. Council at Eliberis and Sardica announced pen­
alities for absence from church on Sundays. 
313 A.D. Edict of Milan: Emperor Constantine secured a 
rest day for Christians by decree giving it a 
civil name—Sunday. Thus/ State authority for 
observing religious days was established. 
321 A.D. Emperor Constantine•s decree established a 
weekly holiday: "on the venerable day of the 
sun/ let the magistrates and people...rest and... 
workshops be closed. This was interpreted as an 
approximation of Sabbatarianism or state aiding 
a church custom and not a divine ordinance. 
325 A.D. Council of Nicaea: The Christian church develop­
ed a liturgical calendar celebrating historical 
events in the life of Jesus and observing a 
rhythm of nature with Christian impress on the 
day. 
386 A.D. Emperor Theodosius the Great forbade the trans­
action of business on Sunday. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
436 A.D. Fourth Council of Carthage discouraged Lord's 
Day attendance at games and circuses. Civil 
officials proscribed payment of debts and legal 
proceedings. 
499 A.D. The Lord's Day had not yet been transformed into 
a Jewish Sabbath dependent upon the Fourth Com­
mandment . 
500 A.D. Ecclesiastical and civil authority began to 
circumscribe the liberty of the Lord's Day. 
Strict rest on Sunday and attendance at public 
worship became required. 
500 A.D. and the following millennium: 
(1) Christian Sabbatarianism developed as an 
aspect of medieval religion. 
(2) The Roman Catholic Church established fasts 
and festivals which lowered the Lord's Day to 
ecclestiastical rather than divine authority. 
(3) Roman leaders declared the new Christian 
ceremonies to be successors of the old Jewish 
ceremonies. 
(4) The Church justified Lord's Day by refer­
ence to the Old Testament Sabbath. The Fourth 
Commandment became a moral law binding all man­
kind rather than a ceremonial law binding only 
Jews. 
(5) Roman Catholic legalism required a rest 
like that of the Jewish Sabbath and sanctifica-
tion of Sunday. 
(6) Bishops enjoined rest from servile labor/ 
commercial activities, prohibited travel and 
recreation on the Lord's Day. 
743 A.D. Nest Saxon King Ina forbade all work on the Lord's 
Day. Archbishops of York incorporated prohibi­
tion into constitutional form. 
943 A.D. Edgar the Peaceable ordered the Lord's Day begin 
at three o'clock on Saturday afternoon, extending 
until dawn on Monday. 
1100 A.D. The term "Christian Sabbath" was used. 
1201 A.D. Abbot Eustace of Flay crusaded in England for a 
strict and Judaic Sunday observance. 
1526 A.D. Martin Luther translated the New Testament, thus 
freeing believers from the legalism and moralism 
of the Jewish Sabbath. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
1528 A.D. Oswald Glart and Andrew Fisher proprogated 
Sabbath observance in the Jewish tradition 
fifty years later. Judizing Sabbatarians emerged 
to give impetus in England and America to Seventh-
Day Baptist and Seven-Day Adventist churches. 
1530 A.D. The Augsburg Confession criticized Rome for 
exercising human authority in instituting new 
ceremonies and placing new "legalism" in 
requiring the Sabbath observance as a condition 
of salvation . The issue was Christian liberty 
versus bondage to Law. 
1530*s A.D. Henry VIII of England broke with the papacy 
establishing the crown as head of the church. 
Henry VIII directed the clergy to abrogate 
certain holy days during harvest time leading 
to superstitions# idleness# riot and decay of 
industrial crafts. 
Martin Luther# in a sermon at Torgau, accepted 
Sunday as the Sabbath on conditions that Christ­
ians were lords of the Sabbath and did not 
attribute special holiness to a particular day. 
The Royal Injunctions required worship on Sun­
day with special dispensation granted for harvest 
time and labor. 
Act of Uniformity ordered Christians (Protest­
ants) to attend the parish church on Sundays 
with no penalty for offenders. 
Parliament inVHoly Days and Fasting Act" reduced 
festal days. 
The Royal Injunctions directed the people 
to observe holy fasting. 
Scotts Confession of Faith condemned the 
keeping of holy days but contained no trace 
of Sabbatarianism. 
Scotts Book of Discipline stressed .idea of the 
Fourth Commandment requiring worship and obser­
vance of Sunday with free time for religious 
services. 












STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS FOR 
RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE 
BY PUBLIC SCHOOL 
EMPLOYEES 
Though the United Stated States Constitution remains 
neutral in respect to the establishment of a particular 
religion, the several states remain free in their statutes 
to accommodate religious practices by public school employees/ 
often favoring one religion by remaining silent on 
others. 
The special days for religious observance have been 
spelled out in the statutes to accommodate the majority 
groups by making Sunday the day of religious observance or 
the day of cessation of servile labor. Minority groups/ 
primarily non-Sunday Sabbatarians/ are accommodated by 
statutory provisions in ten states. The other states 
remain silent on the seventh-day Sabbatarian. 
The statutory text providing religious accommodation 
in the fifty states/ the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico is included in the appendix. 
Sunday As A Legal Holiday 
Twenty-seven states/ the District of Columbia and Puerto 
Rico/ have statutes granting school and public employees 
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Sunday as a legal holiday. Civil proceedings are declared 
"non dies juris" while the statutes in some states speak to 
closing of certain types of businesses on Sunday/ the Sabbath. 
Tables 4 through 10 outline the state statutes that accommodate 
religious observances in some sort of statutory provision. 
Table 4 outlines the statutory provision for the enumerated 
and inferred Sunday observances by public employees. 
Sabbath Provisions Enumerated 
Table 4 lists those states having provision for a Sabbath. 
The states of Minnesota/ Mississippi/ Missouri/ Oklahoma/ 
Vermont and Washington treat the Sabbath as Sunday in their 
statutes. Table 5 also indicates that ten states provide 
accommodation for the non-Sunday Sabbatarian. Four states 
are shown with the statutory language for the Sunday Sabba­
tarian. Vermont and Washington are included as just recently 
repealing their Sabbath provisions. 
Minnesota. Minnesota statutes prohibit "certain acts" 
that cause "serious interruptions on the repose and religious 
liberty of the community and doing of such acts on that day 
shall constitute Sabbath-breaking"''' though the Sabbath is 
considered the first day of the week; and the time for the 
2 Sabbath is "included all the time from midnight to midnight." 




States with Statutes Enumerating 
Sunday As A Legal Public 
Holiday and States 
Inferring Sunday 
By Transfer To 
A Weekday 
States Sunday as a holiday Sunday inferred 





























New Hampshire X 
New Jersey X 
New Mexico X 
New York X 
North Carolina X 
North Dakota X 
Ohio X 
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TABLE 4 (continued) 
States Sunday as a holiday Sunday inferred 




Rhode Island X 
South Carolina X 







West Virginia X 
Wisconsin X 
Wyoming X 
District of Columbia X 
Puerto Rico X 
* Georgia declares Sunday as religious holiday# Sect. 1-4-2 
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Mississippi. Mississippi statute/ section 97-23-63, cited 
the Sabbath as the first day of the week with exceptions for 
acts of mercy/ charity/ and churches or religious societies' 
transacting business on the first day of the week. 
Missouri. Missouri has no Sabbath statute/ but infers 
Sunday as a holiday; however/ the statutes of Missouri assume 
a neutral position for those persons wishing to oberve the 
tenets of their faith on the days of the week other than the 
first. A "No Penalty" statute disallows discrimination in 
employment "because of his or her refusal to work on his or 
4 
her normal day of worship." 
Oklahoma. Oklahoma statutes declare Sunday as a legal 
holiday but spell out in other statutes a definition of Sab­
bath-breaking. Normal labor is among those "acts forbidden 
to be done of the first day of the week/ the doing of any 
of which is Sabbath-breaking: ..."^ 
Vermont. Vermont has recently (1983) repealed all its 
statutes speaking to "Sabbath Breaking11/ "A Common Day of Rest"/ 
and a section related to an alternate day of rest for persons 
who observe a Sabbath other than Sunday. 
O . , 
.Mississippi/ Code Annotated/ sec. 97-23-63 
4Missouri/ Annotated Statutes/ chap. 578, sec. 578.115 
^Oklahoma/ Statutes Annotated/ chap. 21/ sec. 908 
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Washington. Washington, in 1976/ repealed all statutes 
related to Sabbath Breaking but retained Sunday as a legal 
holiday by statutory language. 
Statutory Provisions for Religious Observance 
by Non-Sunday Sabbatarians 
Ten states currently have statutes providing for religious 
observance by non-Sunday Sabbatarians. 
Connecticut. Connecticut statutes provide an exemption 
from the Sunday law for those persons observing Saturday as 
their Sabbath: 
"No person who conscientiously believes that the 
seventh day of the week ought to be observed as 
the Sabbath/ and actually refrains from secular 
business and labor on that day/ or who conscient­
iously believes that the Sabbath begins at sun­
down on Friday night and ends at sundown on 
Saturday night and actually refrains from secular 
business and labor during said period/ and who 
has filed written notice of such belief with the 
prosecuting attorney of the court having juris­
diction/ shall be liable to prosecution for per­
forming secular business and labor on Sunday/ 
provided he shall not disturb any other person 
who is attending public worship."® 
Kansas. Kansas/ in 1976/ repealed a series of statutes 
regarding legal holidays and enumerated in section 35-107 the 
legal public holidays. Kansas' reference to the Saturday is 
in section 69-101 and exempts persons 
^Connecticut/ Revised Statutes/ chap. 946/ sec. 53-303 
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whose religious faith and practices is to keep 
the seventh day of the week/ commonly called 
Sunday# as a day set apart by divine command as 
the Sabbath or rest from labor and dedicated to 
the worship of God/ shall be subject...to serve „ 
as a juryman in a justice's court on that day..." 
Kentucky. Kentucky statutes allow working on Sunday only 
for acts of necessity/ charity/ and certain business. Excep­
tions are made for certain businesses and labor (public service 
or public utility). Those exceptions for Sunday work are for 
"(2) persons who are members of a religious society which 
observes as a Sabbath any other day in the week than Sunday 
shall not be liable to the penalty...if they observe as a 
8 
Sabbath one (1) day in each seven (7)." 
Maine. Maine infers Sunday as a legal holiday by moving 
the day from Sunday to the following Monday. Also defined is 
the Lord's Day which 
"includes the time between 12 o'clock on Saturday 
night and 12 o'clock on Sunday night."® 
Allowance is made for Saturday as a holy day: 
"No person conscientiously believing that the 7th 
day of the week ought to be observed as the Sab­
bath/ and actually refraining from secular busi­
ness and labor on that day/ is liable to said 
penalties for doing such business or labor on 
the first day of the.week/ if he does not dis­
turb other persons." 
7 'Kansas/ General Statutes Annotated/ chap. 69/ sec. 69-101 
^Kentucky/ Revised Statutes/ chap. 2, section 436.160 
9 
Maine/ Revised Statutes/ chap. 17/ section 3201 
10Ibid., sec. 3209 
75 
TABLE 5 
States With Statutes Enumerating 
Religious Observance For Non-
Sunday Sabbatarians and 
Sabbath as Sunday 
States Non-Sunday 
Sabbatarians 









New York X X 
Oklahoma X 
Rhode Island X 
Virginia X 
West Virginia X 
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Maryland. Maryland statutes proscribe work on Sunday and 
disallow the employers to command children or servants to do 
any manner of work on the Lord's Day/ commonly called Sunday. 
Exceptions to the Lord's Day observance is granted to persons 
who observe the seventh day as the Sabbath"'"'1' and to those 
persons conscientiously believing 
"that the Sabbath begins at sundown on Friday 
night and ends at sundown on Saturday night and 
who actually refrains from secular business and 
labor during such period... 
Michigan. Michigan is explicitly clear in defining the 
seventh day as a Sabbath and the period of time included: 
"Sec. 1. Whenever in the statutes of this state, 
rights, privileges, immunities or exemptions are 
given or duties and responsibilities are imposed 
on persons who conscientiously believe the seventh 
day of the week ought to be observed as the sab­
bath, said sabbath or seventh day shall mean the 
worship and belief of such persons to include 
the period from sunset on Friday evening to sun­
set on Saturday evenings" 
New York. New York's General Business Law sets apart the 
first day of the week as the Sabbath for rest and religious 
14 
uses. Two court decisions arising out of New York on 
Sabbath statutes have spoken to Sunday: "The public 
policy of the state is to set aside Sunday as a day of 
^Maryland, Annotated Code, art. 27, sec. 492 (2) 
12Ibid. (3) 
*3Michigan, Public Acts, Title 18, sec. 18.856 (1) 
14 
New York, General Business Law, art. 2, sec. 2. 
77 
repose"-^ and "The Sabbath is a political and civil institu-
1 
tion and subject to regulation by the civil government." 
Sabbath Breaking/ sec. 3/ defines a violation of the pro-
17 
hibition in sec. 2 as Sabbath breaking and is a misde­
meanor.*® 
New York statutes allow religious observance for the 
Saturday Sabbatarian by a 
"defense to a prosecution for work or labor on 
the first day of the week that the defendant 
uniformly keeps another day of the week as holy 
time/ and does not labor on that day/ and that 
the labor complained of was done in such manner 
as not to interrupt or disturb other persons 
observing the first day of the week as holy 
time." 
Public school employees in programs financed by the 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) in districts 
having fewer than six hundred pupils may teach any day of 
the week. Moreover/ "No students or teachers shall be 
required to attend classes if they observe any such day as 
a Sabbath or a holy day in accordance with the requirements 
15 
DePaul v. Berkowits/ 54 Misc. 2d 156/ 281 N.Y. 
2d 449 (1967). 
16People V. Polar Vent of America/ Inc. 151 N.E. 
2d 621 (1957). 
17 
New York/ General Business Law/ art. 2, sec. 3. 
18 
Ibid./ sec. 4 
19lbid./ sec. 6 
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of their religion."20 
Rhode Island. Rhode Island sets Sunday as a legal 
public holiday and further prohibits work or recreation on 
Sunday21 with imposition of fines for offenders. Provisions 
are made for: 
"Every professor of the Sabbatarian faith or of 
the Jewish religion/ and such others as shall be 
owned or acknowledged by any church or society 
of said respective professions as members of or 
as belonging to such church or society# shall 
be permitted to labor in their respective pro­
fessions or vocations on the first day of the 
week/..."22 
Virginia. Virginia statutes allow broad Sabbatarian 
practices for all faiths and believers and for certain 
conditions of employment. With the presence of penalties 
for Sabbath work/ persons observing Saturday as Sabbath are 
exempt if they conscientiously believe "that the seventh 
day of the week ought to be observed as a Sabbath and 
actually refrain from all secular business and labor on 
2 3  .  . . .  that day." A broad practice of Sabbatarianism is accom­
modated by having at least one day of rest in each week/ 
20New York/ Education Law/ sec. 3603 
21 
Rhode Island/ General Law/ chap. 40/ sec. 11-40-1 
22Ibid.# sec. 11-40-4 
^Virginia/ Code 1975/ Crimes and Offenses Generally/ 
Section 18.2-343 
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except in an emergency.24 Non-managerial employees are en-
25 26 titled to Sunday or Saturday as a day of rest. 
The Virginia statutes enforce the Sabbatarian practice 
by including a non-discrimination clause protecting employ­
ees who exercise the "one day in seven" for rest or worship: 
"No employer shall/ in any manner/ discharge/ discipline or 
penalize such employee for exercising his right under this 
section(s). 1,27 
West Virginia. West Virginia infers Sunday as a legal 
holiday and imposes penalties for violations; however/ 
penalties 
"shall not be incurred by any person, who con­
scientiously believes that Saturday ought to be 
observed as a Sabbath/ and actually refrains 
from all secular business or labor on that day/ 
provided he does not compel an...employee/ not 
of his belief to do secular work or business 
on Sunday."28 
Statutory Provisions for Easter Observance 
North Carolina is the only state among the fifty/ the 
District of Columbia and Puerto Rico to enumerate Easter 





West Virginia/ Code of 1955/ sec. 61-10-27 
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Monday as a legal holiday. Thirteen states provide statu­
tory provisions for observance of Good Friday. Table 6 
deals with the states and this designation/ and 
lists the states with statutory language beyond designation 
of "Good Friday". 
29 
California. "Good Friday from 12 noon until 3 P.M." 
30 
Indiana; "the movable feast day of Good Friday" 
North Dakota. "the Friday next preceding Easter 
31 
Monday". 
South Dakota. South Dakota does not designate Good 
Friday as a legal holiday generally; however/ in another 
section dealing with Legal Discontinuance of School/ the 
language mandates that "school shall be legally discontinued 
only in the event the enumerated day occurs on a regularly 
32 
scheduled school day" . among those days is Good Friday. 
Wisconsin. "After noon on Good Friday/ in lieu of the 
period specified in Section 895.20"-(ll:00 A.M. to 3:00 P.M.)33 
29California/ Annotated Codes/ sec. 6700 
on 
J Indiana/ Statutes Annotated/ chap. 9, sec. 1-1-9-1 
31 
North Dakota/ Revised Code/ Education/ sec. 15-38-04.1 
32 
South Dakota/ Session Laws/ Education/ sec. 13-26-3 
33 . 
Wisconsin/ Codes/ sec. 16.30/859.20 
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TABLE 6 
States with Statutes Enumerating 
Good Friday and Easter Monday 
As Legal Public Holidays 










North Dakota X 
Pennsylvania X 




Christmas Observance as a Legal Holiday 
Each of the fifty states/ the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico enumerate Christmas Day as a legal holiday for 
public employees and school employees. 
The states of Arkansas, Georgia, and Wisconsin are the 
only states among the fifty, the District of Columbia, and 
Puerto Rico allowing December 24, Christmas Eve, as a legal 
holiday for public employees. South Carolina sets December 
26 as a legal holiday and allows the governor of the State 
34 
to proclaim December 24 as a legal holiday. Wisconsin 
sets the afternoon of December 24 as a holiday for state 
employees. 
Massachusetts statutes provide permissive authority to 
"Establishment of Guidelines for Celebration of Christmas 
and Other Festivals"': 
"The School committee may set appropriate guide­
lines for the celebration of Christmas and other 
festivals observed as holidays for the purpose of 
furthering the educational, cultural and social 
experience and development of children".^6 
34 
South Carolina, Codes, sec. 53-5-10 
35 
Wisconsin, Codes, sec. 16-30 
36 
Massachusetts, Annotated Law, chap. 71, sec. 31A 
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The states of Florida and Mississippi go further in 
observing Christmas as a holiday in the schools. Florida 
statutes, in addition to setting December 25 as a legal 
holiday, sets 
"That period of the school year beginning on 
or before December 24 and continuing for a 
period of time to be fixed by the school 
board which shall include January 1, shall 
be set apart as a vacation period/ and that 
time shall not be considered a part of the 
school month".3? 
Mississippi statutes provide permissive language for 
the county superintendent and board of trustee in municipal 
school districts to close for the Christmas holidays, not 
exceeding two weeks. 
Special Days Designation and National Thanksgiving Day 
Twenty-seven states, District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico, provide statutory authority for the Governor or the 
President of the United States to proclaim a special day not 
specifically enumerated as a legal holiday for a public 
fast, thanksgiving, or other religious observance. Table 8 
lists those states allowing special days observance. The 
states of Alabama, California, Connecticut, Illinois, 
Kentucky, and South Carolina use this special day provision 
in observing the National Holiday of Thanksgiving on the 
fourth Thursday of November. Other states shown in Table 7 
07 
J'Florida, Statutes Annotated, sec. 683.01 
3Q " 
Mississippi, Code Annotated, gee. 3-3-7 
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set apart/ as a legal holiday/ a statutory provision for 
the National Thanksgiving holiday and the sixteen states 
enumerating a special day proclamation and Thanksgiving 
Day as the fourth Thursday in November. 
Jewish Religious Days as Legal Holidays 
North Carolina is the only state among the fifty 
states the District of Columbia/ and Puerto Rico to 
include a Jewish holy day/ Yom Kippur, as a legal 
39 
holiday. 
Though the statutes governing schools in North 
Carolina allow no provision for religious holidays 
other than Sunday for school employees/ the North 
Carolina Administrative Codes in teacher substitutes 
regulations provide: 
"Observance of Bona Fide Religious Holidays. 
Absence from school for bona fide religious 
holidays may be allowed for a maximum of two 
days within any one school year with prior 
approval... The teacher must agree to make 
up the amount of time for which his or her 
absence has been excused. The superintendent/ 
in consultation with the teacher/ shall desig­
nate such religious holidays/ provided that 
such days are not already scheduled as vacation 
or other holidays in the school year... Any 
such absence shall be with full pay."40 
39 
North Carolina/ General Statutes/ chap. 103/ sec. 103-4 
(Ha) 
40 
North Carolina/ Administrative Code/ 16 2F..0108 (J) 
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TABLE 7 
States with Statutes Enumerating 


































New Hampshire X 
New Jersey X 
New Mexico X 
New York X 
North Carolina X 
North Dakota X 
Ohio X 
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TABLE 7 (continued) 





Rhode Island X 
South Carolina xa X 







West Virginia X 
Wisconsin xb X 
Wyoming X 
District of Columbia X 
Puerto Rico X 
as a 
aThe Governor has 
holiday. 
^Wisconsin allows 
authority to proclaim December 24 
the afternoon of December 24. 
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TABLE 8 
States with Statutes Allowing Designation of Special 
Days by the Governor or the President of the 
United States for Thanksgiving# Pasting/ 
or Religious Observance and the 
Annually Proclaimed National 
Thanksgiving Day as a 
Legal Holiday 











Georgia X X 
Hawaii X X 








Maryland X X 
Massachusetts X 






Nevada X X 
New Hampshire X 
New Jersey X X 
New Mexico X 
New York X X 
North Carolina X 
TABLE 8 (continued) 
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States Special Days National Thanksgiving 
Observance Day 
North Dakota x x 
Ohio x x 
Oklahoma x x 
Oregon x x 
Pennsylvania x x 
Rhode Island x 
South Carolina x 
South Dakota x x 
Tennessee x x 
Texas x 
Utah x x 
Vermont x 
Virginia x 
Washington x x 
West Virginia x x 
Wisconsin x 
Wyoming x x 
District of Columbia x 
Puerto Rico x x 
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Those states enumerated in Table 4 accommodate the 
non-Sunday Sabbatarians by seventh-day statutory provisions. 
However/ Rhode Island has a similar provision but goes a 
step beyond by providing: "Every professor of the Sabbatar­
ian faith or of the Jewish religion" to accommodate the non-
Sunday Sabbatarian. This statute also speaks specifically 
to allowing "labor in their respective professions or voca­
tions on the first day of the week"41 but exceptions are 
disallowed for operating shops, etc. The fullness in the 
Sabbatarian doctrines of Rhode Island is strengthened by 
"in case of any dispute shall arise respecting 
the persons entitled to the benefit of this 
section/ a certificate from a regular pastor or 
priest of any of the aforesaid churches or soci­
eties or from any three (3) standing members of 
such church or society/ declaring the person... 
to be a member of or owned by or belonging to 
such church or society/ shall be received as 
conclusive evidence of the fact" 
41 
Rhode Island/ General Law/ chap. 40/ sec. 11-40-4 
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TABLE 9 
STATES WITH STATUTES SPECIFYING 
JEWISH RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS 






Acts of Mercy/ Charity, or Acts 
of Necessity on Sunday 
The Sabbath observance has its foundation in the 
Fourth Commandment. Jesus added another dimension to the 
. commandment by abating the proscription of labor for Christ­
ians when he defended his disciples for working in cases of 
necessity and justified his own healing of the sick and 
43 
lame on holy days. Jesus said, "the Sabbath was made 
44 for man, and not man for the Sabbath".-
Seven states currently incorporate this Christian con­
cept in their statutes where Sunday work is proscribed but 
excepting acts of mercy/ charity,or acts of necessity on 
Sunday (See Table 10). 
This chapter indicates that each of the fifty states, the 
District of Columbia,and Puerto Rico have some statutory pro­
vision for religious observance for public school employees 
on their Sabbath and other religious observances. 
43Solberg, p. 10 
44Mark 2: 27-28. 
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TABLE 10 
States with Statutes Allowing Acts 
of Mercy/ Charity, or Acts of 










LEGAL ASPECTS OP SCHOOL BOARD AUTHORITY TO 
ACCOMMODATE RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE 
BY EMPLOYEES: A NARRATIVE 
Questions of religion in the workplace have frequented 
the court room of the United States. It is not unusual for 
employee's religious observance to come into sharp conflict 
with the work rules of the employer. During the past two 
decades/ the pace of legal activity has increased over issues 
raised under the First Amendment guarantees of religious 
freedoms and the free exercise thereof by employees in the 
public and private sectors of the American workplace. The 
courts have addressed/ often without clarity/ the mean­
ing of the free exercise and establishment clause of the 
First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
In the 1960's/ Congress attempted to address employees' 
and even prospective employees' religious guarantees from 
discrimination by employers in legislating the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act. Responding to the lack of clarity in the Supreme 
Court's decision regarding religious observance and the 
employer's accommodation/ the United States Congress/ in the 
1960's and 1970's amended the original 1964 legislation. 
Along with the amendments/ Congress authorized the 
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creation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
(EEOC) in 1972 to administer laws that '.assure equal pro­
tection under the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The legislative and administrative procedures 
changed the concept of religious discrimination from the 
negative on the employer's part to a positive aspect by re­
quiring employers to make affirmative accommodation for 
religious observance short of an undue hardship on the 
conduct of business. 
The courts have continued to consider the free exercise 
and establishment clauses guaranteeing religious freedom in 
the private and public sector. Many of the judicial decisions 
draw upon the church-state separation issues under the First 
Amendment guarantees of free exercise. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, amended/ has attempted to spell out/ by legislative 
means/ the duty of employers/ private and public/ to make 
reasonable accommodation for employees' religious beliefs 
and practices when they come into conflict with workrules of 
the employers. 
To focus upon school board authority to accommo­
date religious practices of employees/ a review of the First 
Amendment guarantees and court decisions addressing those 
guarantees is necessary. In reviewing the legislation re­
quiring reasonable accommodation for employees and 
constitutionality of that legislation/ it is necessary to 
consider criteria to be applied to rules established 
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by public and private employers. 
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test for 
legislation/ policies/and rules adopted by employers to 
judge the constitutionality of such action. School boards, 
in providing policies for employee^ religious accommodations/ 
can adopt the three-part test to determine whether the poli­
cies are secular in nature, do not violate free exercise 
guarantees or establishment prohibitions, or create excessive 
entanglement with government and religion. 
First Amendment 
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab­
lishment of religion..."^" The Amendment was proposed by 
James Madison on June 8/ 1789/ in the House of Representa-
2 
fives. The first draft introduced by Madison read: 
"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on 
account of religious belief or worship, nor shall 
any national religion be established, nor shall 
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any 
manner, or on any pretext, infringed."3 
•'••U.S. Constitution, amend. I. 
^McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420, 434 (1961). 
^1. Annuals of Congress, 434. 
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Madison is credited with adding the word "national" to meet 
approval of states which had an established church. 
Madison reasoned that the language in the first draft 
meant that Congress should not establish a religion# nor 
enforce the observance of religion by law nor compel citizens 
to worship God in any manner contrary to conscience. 
Madison further reasoned that the citizens feared one 
sect might obtain a pre-eminence* or a edition of several 
might join to establish a national religion and compel 
4 others to conform. 
On September 9, 1789, the Senate passed a version of 
the amendment to read in part: 
"Congress shall make no law establishing articles 
of faith, or a mode of worship. 
Sentiment among the members of the Congress was that 
the "real object of the amendment was...to prevent any 
national ecclesiastical establishment/ which should give to 
an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national govern­
ment."^ The First Amendment, in its final form, not only 
barred a congressional enactment establishing a church; it 
. . 7 
forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion. 
^McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 (1961) 
^Records of the United States Senate 1A-C2 (U.S. Nation­
al Archives) 
6McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 (1961) 
7Ibid. 
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Thus, the Courts have given the Amendment a "broad interpre­
tation...in light of its history and the evil it was design-
Q 
ed forever to suppress..." 
A most extensive discussion dealing with the "Estab-
9 
lishment" Clause is found in the Everson decision: 
"The establishment of religion clause of the First 
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor 
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither 
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all 
religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
Neither can force nor influence a person to go 
to or to remain away from church against his will 
or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in 
any religion. No person can be punished for enter­
taining or professing religious beliefs or dis­
beliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. 
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied 
to support any religious activity or institution, 
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they 
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither 
a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or 
secretly, participate in the affairs of any reli­
gious organizations or groups or vice versa. In 
the Words of Jefferson, the clause against estab­
lishment of religion by law was intended to erect 
•a wall of separation between church and state'"1® 
The neutrality of the free exercise and establishment 
clauses of the First Amendment has been addressed by the 
United States Supreme Court and in inferior courts a number 
of times since the adoption of the United States Constitution. 
8Everson v. Board of Education at the Township of Ewing, 
330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) 
^McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 (1961) 
*°Everson v. Board of Education 330, U.S. 1 (1947) 
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In 1870, the Ohio Superior Court Judge Alphonso Taft, father 
of the revered Chief Justice, in an unpublished opinion 
stated the ideal of our people as to religious freedom as 
one of: 
"Absolute equality before the law, of all religious 
opinions and sects...The government is neutral/ and, 
while protecting all/ it prefers none, and it dis­
parages none"H 
Judge Taft's views, expressed in dissent, prevailed on 
appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court held that: 
"The great bulk of human affairs and human interests 
is left by any free government to individual enter­
prise and individual action. Religion is eminently 
one of these interests/ lying outside the true and 
legimate province of government".^ 
In a 1925 case dealing with religious issues arising 
from First Amendment questions, Justice Sanford contend­
ed in Gitlow v. New York that: 
"For present purposes we may and do assume that 
freedom of speech and of the press- which are pro­
tected by the First Amendment from abridgment by 
Congress- are among the fundamental personal rights 
and "liberties" protected by the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the 
States".13 
The interrelationship of the establishment and free exercise 
clauses was touched upon by Justice Roberts for the court 
•^Minor v. Board of Education of Cincinnati, 23 Ohio 
St. 211, 253 (1872). 
12Ibid. 
^Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 66 (1925). 
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in Cantwell v. Connecticut where he said that their "inhibi­
tion of legislation" had: 
A double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls 
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed 
or the practice of any form of worship. To 
adhere to such religious organization or form of 
worship as the individual may choose cannot be 
restricted by law. On the other hand, it safe­
guards the free exercise of the chosen form of 
religion. Thus the amendment embraces two con-
cepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. 
The first is absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be."^-^ 
Moreover, in a landmark note, the court intervened in the 
concepts of due process and liberty of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment with the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
15 religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...". 
Justice Roberts reasoned, "The Fourteenth Amendment has 
rendered the Legislatures of the states as incompetent as 
Congress to enact such laws...". 
The United States Supreme Court in Schempp, speaking 
to the concept of neutrality of the First Amendment, did not 
accept a state 1 s requiring a religious exercise with the con­
sent of the majority of those affected by using the state 
action to deny the rights of free exercise to anyone. The 
*4Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
1C . 
U.S. Constitution, amend. 1 
^Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 266 (1940). 
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court reasoned that the'free exercise clause never meant 
that a majority could use the machinery of the state to 
17 
practice its beliefs. in West Virginia v. Barnette/ 
Justice Jackson addressing the question of religion 
within the Bill of Rights contended: 
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to with­
draw certain subjects from its Vicessitudes of 
political controversy to place them beyond the 
reach of majorities and officials and to establish 
them as legal principles to be applied by the 
courts. One's right to...freedom of worship... 
and other fundamental rights may not be submitted ^ 
to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections". 
19 
Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson delivered 
the opinion of the Court on "released time" for students 
to attend religious instruction. Drawing upon the intent 
of the First Amendment which has impact upon the accommoda­
tion of employees to attend religious observances/ he cited 
20 21 
Everson and McCollum in reasoning that "released time" 
in the Zorach22 case did not establish a religion. He 
l^Abington School District v. Schempp/ 374 U.S. 664/ 
668 (1970) 
^•®West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette/ 319 
U.S. 624/ 638 (1943) 
•^Zorach v. Clauson/ 343 U.S. 306 (1952) 
^Everson v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 1 (1947) 
^McCollum v. Board of Education 333 U.S. 203 (1948) 
22Zorach v. Clauson/ 343 U.S. 306 (1952) 
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further reasoned that: 
"There is much talk of the separation of church 
and state in the history of the Bill of Rights 
and in the decisions clustering around the First 
Amendment. There cannot be the slightest doubt 
that the First Amendment reflects the philosophy 
that church and state should be separated and so 
far as interference with the "free exercise" of 
religion and an "establishment" of religion are 
concerned/ the separation must be complete and 
unequivocal. The First Amendment within the 
scope of its coverage permits no exception; the 
prohibition is absolute. The First Amendment/ 
however/ does not say that in every and all 
respects there shall be a separation of church 
and state. Rather/ it studiously defines the 
manner/ the specific ways/ in which there shall 
be no concert or union or dependency one on the 
other. That is the common sense of the matter. 
Otherwise the state and religion would be aliens 
to each other - hostile/ suspicious/ and even 
unfriendly. Churches could not be required to 
pay even property taxes. Municipalities would 
not be permitted to render police or fire pro­
tection to religious groups."^ 
He further reasoned that policemen who assisted parish­
ioners to their places of worship,or prayer in the legisla­
tive halls/ the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a 
holiday or "so help me God" in the courtroom oaths would be 
flouting the First Amendment. He further contended: 
23lbid at 312 
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"we are a religious people whose institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being. We guaranteed the 
freedom to worship as one chooses. We make 
room for as wise a variety of beliefs and creeds 
as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. 
We sponsor an attitude on the part of government 
that shows no partiality to any group and lets 
each flourish according to the zeal of its ad­
herents and the appeal of its dogma. When the 
state encourages religious instruction or 
cooperates with religious authorities by adjust­
ing the schedule of public events to sectarian 
needs/ it follows the best of our traditions. 
For it then respects the religious nature of 
our people and accommodates the public service 
to their spiritual needs. To hold that it may 
not would be to find in the constitution a re­
quirement that the government shows a callous 
indifference to religion groups. That would be 
preferring those who believe in no religion over 
those who do believe... But we find no constitu­
tional requirement which makes it necessary for 
government to be hostile to religion and to throw 
its weight against efforts to widen the effective 
scope of religious influence...it can close its 
doors or suspend its operation as to those who 
want to repair to their religious sanctuary for 
worship or instruction. No more than that is 
undertaken here."24 
In 1961, Chief Justice Earl Warren, speaking for a 
unanimous court on the First Amendment questions in McGowan 
v. Maryland, said: 
"But, the First Amendment in its final form, did not 
simply bar a congressional enactment establishing 
a church; it forbade all laws respecting an estab­
lishment of religion. Thus, this court has given 
the amendment a broad interpretation... in the 
light of its history and the evils it was designed 
forever to repress."25 
^Ibid.at 314 
^McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 441-442 
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In 1962/ the United States Supreme Court/ without the 
citation of a single case and over the sole dissent of 
Justice Stewart reaffirmed earlier discussions regarding the 
First Amendment establishment and free exercise clauses by 
saying: 
"Although these two clauses may in certain 
instances overlap; they forbid two quite 
different kinds of governmental encroachment 
upon religious freedom. The Establishment 
clause/ unlike the Free Exercise clause/ does 
not depend upon any showing of direct govern­
mental compulsion and is violated by the enact­
ment of laws which establish an official reli­
gion whether those laws operate directly to 
coerce non-observing individuals or not. This 
is not to say/ of course/ that laws officially 
prescribing a particular form of religious 
worship do not involve coercion of such indivi­
duals. When their power/ prestige and financial 
support of government is placed behind a particu­
lar religious belief/ the indirect coercive 
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to 
the prevailing officially approved religion is 
plain."26 
In 1963, Mr. Justice Clark speaking for the court in 
Schempp reasoned that: 
"The Establishment clause advances a wholesome 
'neutrality' stemming from a recognition of the 
teaching of history that powerful sects might 
bring about a fusion of government and religious 
factors or a concert or dependency of one upon 
the other to the end that official support of 
the state or federal government would be placed 
behind the tenets of one or all orthodoxies. 
And a further reason for neutrality is in the 
Free Exercise clause which is cognizant of the 
value of religious teaching and observance and/ 
more particularly/ the right of each person to 
freely follow his conscience in religion matters/ 
26Engle v. Vitale 370 U.S. 424 (1962) 
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free of any compulsion from the state. The Free 
Exercise clause guarantees. 
The Schempp Court reinterpreted that the Supreme Court in 
the preceding twenty years had held that the estab­
lishment clause withheld all legislative power respecting 
religious belief or the expression thereof and provided a 
test for enactments: 
"What are the purpose and the primary effect of 
enactment" If either is the advancement or inhibi­
tion of religion then the enactment exceeds the 
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by 
the Constitution".28 
The Supreme Court reasoned that the free exercise clause 
withdraws from legislative power/ state and federal/ the 
exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. 
"Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the indivi­
dual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil 
29 
authority." The test of enactment on the "free exercise" 
clause is a showing that the coercive effect of the enact­
ment as it operates against a citizen in the practice of 
religion. The distinction between the two clauses is that a 
violation of the free exercise clause is predicated on co­
ercion while the establishment clause violation need not be 
so attended.^ 
^Abington v. Schempp 374 U.S. at 222 (1970) 
28Ibid at 222 
29Ibid at 223 
30Ibid at 223 
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Justice Black/ expressing the opinion in the Lemon 
Court on the religious clauses of the First Amendment 
described it as opaque at best when compared with other 
portions of the First Amendment. He reasoned that the 
authors of the First Amendment did not simply prohibit the 
establishment of a state church or a state religion. Instead 
they commanded that there be "no law respecting an establish­
ment of religion:. A law may be one "respecting" the for­
bidden objective while falling short of its total realization. 
A law "respecting" the proscribed result, that is, the estab­
lishment of religion, is not always easily identifiable as 
one violative of the clause. Drawing on the Walz court/ 
Justice Black/ stated that lines must be drawn with 
reference to three evils against which the establishment 
clause was intended to protect: "Sponsorship/ financial 
support/ and actual involvement of the sovereign in 
. . . . 31 religion activity." 
In respect to enactment in the religious area/ the 
court gleaned three tests for First Amendment muster: 
"First/ the statute must have a secular legislation 
purpose; second/ its principal or primary effect 
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; finally/ the statute must not foster 
•an excessive government, entanglement with 
religion•".32 
33-Walz v. Tax Commission/ 397 U.S. 664/ 668 (1970) 
32Lemon v. Kurtzman/ 403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
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Two years later, the Supreme Court again spoke on the issues 
arising from relationships between religion and education. 
The court reasoned that the well defined three-part test had 
emerged for its discussions and to pass muster under the 
establishment clause the law in question# first/ must reflect 
a clearly secular legislative purpose/33 second/ must have 
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits reli­
gion-^ 35, an(j third/ must avoid excessive government entan­
glement with religion.3^ 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act declares that it 
is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to dis­
criminate against any employee/ or prospective employee on 
the basis of his religion.37 This prohibition reflects a 
recognition that freedom of religion has long been considered 
QQ 
a fundamental right. The major issue in the religious 
discrimination cases has been the validity of the Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) guidelines that 
33Epperson v. Arkansas 393 U.S. 97 (1968) 
34McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 (1961) 
3^Abington v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963) 
36Walz v. Tax Commission 397 U.S. 664 (1970) 
37Title VII, sec. 703/ 42 U.S.C./ sec. 2000C-2 
38Zorach v. Clauson 343 U.S. 306 at 313-314 (1952) 
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require employers to make reasonable accommodation for 
employees'religious observance and that place the burden of 
proving undue hardship, if such accommodations are not made/ 
39 upon the employers. 
Prior to the 1972 Amendments 
The act, as originally passed/ did not define the term 
"religion" and consequently/ it was susceptible to incon­
sistent judicial interpretation regarding what constitutes 
40 
religious discrimination. The 1966 EEOC guidelines favored 
employers because they did not require employers to show 
undue hardship to justify work rules that interfered with 
some employees' religious observances; instead/ an employer 
41 
could escape liability by showing serious inconvenience. 
The EEOC changed its giuidelines in 1967 and required employers 
to make reasonable accommodation for employees' religious 
beliefs unless undue hardship for an employer's business 
42 
could be demonstrated. 
3®Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 516 F2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975). 
4®Robert Belton, "Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964: A decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Develop­
ments"/ St. Louis University Law Journal 20 (1976): 286. 
4129 C.F.R. sec. 1605.1 (1967) 
4229 C.F.R. sec. 1605 (1968) 
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A landmark case addressing religious discrimination in 
employment practices prior to the 1972 Amendments was 
43 
Reynolds Metals Co. v. Dewey. In Dewey, the district 
court held that the discharge of an employee because he 
refused to work on Sunday/ his Sabbath/ constituted a 
violation of the act.44 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed the earlier decision/ noting that the 
employee had been discharged in accordance with the 1966 
45 
Guidelines and no violation could be established. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision by an 
46 
equally divided court. 
1972 Amendment to the Act 
In 1972 Congress went a step further in attempting to 
define the term "religion" by amending Title VII to read: 
"The term 'religion' includes all aspects of 
religious observance and practice/ as well as 
belief/ unless an employer demonstrates that 
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employee's or prospective employees' relig­
ious observances or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employers' 
business.4^ 
43Belton, p. 287. 
44Reynolds Metals Co. v. Dewey 300 F Supp. 709 (1968). 
4^Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 429 F2d 324 (6th cir. 
1970). 
4®Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971). 
47Title VII section 701 (j)/ 42 U.S. C. section 2000e-
(3). 
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The first significant decision addressing the validity 
of the EEOC guidelines after the 1972 Amendments was Riley 
v. Bendix Corp,^-8 in which the court rejected the defendent's 
reliance upon the majority opinion in Dewey that questioned 
the constitutional validity of the EEOC guidelines re­
quiring employers to make reasonable accommodation for 
employees' religious beliefs. 
The Sixth Circuit Court, in Reid v. Memphis Publishing 
49 1 
Co./ distinguished the doubts it had expressed in Dewey 
about the constitutionality of the EEOC guidelines. Three 
years later the Sixth Circuit Court in Cummins v. Parker 
50 
Seal Co. gave its rationale that EEOC guidelines were not 
violative of the First Amendment regarding the establishment 
of religion. The Cummins court drew on the 1973 decision of 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
51 
Nyquist in outlining three standards that a law must meet 
to survive a First Amendment establishment clause challenge: 
first/ the law must reflect a clearly secular legislative 
purpose; second/ it must have a primary effect that neither 
advances nor inhibits religion; and third/ it must avoid 
^®Riley v. Bendix Corp/ 464 F2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972). 
49 
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. 468 F2d 346 (1972). 
5°Cummins v. Parker Seal Co./ 516 F2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975). 
^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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excessive government entanglement with religion.52 
Case law has supported the basic validity of the 1972 
Amendments and EEOC guidelines;.however, there still remains 
no reliable definition, either judicial or legislative, of 
the critical terms of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue 
hardship". These standards are highly susceptible to a 
wide range of interpretations in the courts. Moreover, there 
remains the question whether the definition of "religion" 
53 
in the 1972 Amendments is sufficiently precise enough to 
avoid the issues that the courts face in dealing with the 
54 
First Amendment freedom of religion issues. 
Several significant changes were brought about by the 
Amendments to Title VII that were enacted as the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. Employees now may 
file charges of discrimination with the EEOC and if necessary, 
go into federal district court. Moreover, the previous 
exemptions for educational institutions were deleted; thus, 
employers and applicants for employment in teaching, admin­
istration, and clerical positions in both private and public 
55 
school systems are covered by this act. 
52Ibid., pp. 772-73 
5342 U.S.C., sec. 2000e (j) 
5^Belton,p. 289 
55Title VII, sec. 702, 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-l 
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Congress expanded the definition of "employer" to in­
clude the entire field of public employment under Title VII 
provisions. Title VII defines an "employer" as a "person"/ 
and person including government/ governmental agencies/ and 
. . . 56 political subdivisions. 
57 
Section 701(j) of the Equal Opportunity Act requires 
employers to modify generally neutral work policies when 
those policies conflict with the employees'religious belief 
or practice. This requirement is commonly referred to as 
the "reasonable accommodation" rule and can be used by 
religious employees so as to ensure that they do not have 
to work on their Sabbath. Under this rule/ the employer is 
required to attempt to accommodate employees' wishes if they 
do not wish to work on their Sabbath. Moreover/ section 
701(j) requires employers to accommodate the religious 
practices of their employees unless such accommodation results 
58 in undue hardship. 
The establishment clause of the First Amendment provides 
that "Congress shall make no law respecting the establish-
59 
ment of religion." 
"^Title VII/ section 701(a)/ 42. U.S.C. section 2000e-
(a)/ (b). (Supp.,10 1974). 
5742 U.S.C. section 2000(j) (1976). 
^8James L. Beard/ "The Constitutionality of an Employee's 
Duty to Accommodate Religious Beliefs and Practices," Kent Law 
Review 56 (1980): 635. 
U• S• Constitution, amend• I• 
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The United States Supreme Court in Nyquist made an analysis 
of the establishment clause which requires that when govern­
ment action touches on a religious sphere it must reflect a 
clearly secular legislative purpose; it must have a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and it 
. . 60 
must avail excessive entanglement with religion. 
The ban on religious discrimination originated in Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The ban on discrimi­
nation in employment provides that: 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer - "to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise to discrimi­
nate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation^ conditions# or privileges of employ­
ment because of such individual's race# color/ 
religion/ sex or national origin."61 
The original thrust of Title VII was a negative mandate 
for employers requring that they refrain from utilizing 
race, color# religion/ sex> or national origin as a basis 
for granting or withholding employment opportunities. How­
ever/ in 1966/ the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
departed from the negative mandate in the area of religious 
discrimination.^ The 1966 guidelines of the EEOC stipulated 
^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756/ 773 (1973). 
6142 U.S.C. section 2000e(j). 
^Beard p. 636. 
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that private employers not only must refrain from using 
religion as a decision-making factor/ but have an affirmative 
duty "to accommodate religious needs of employees where such 
accommodations can be made without serious inconvenience to 
the employer's business." 
The 1967 Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
guidelines placed a greater burden on private employers by 
compelling the employer "to make reasonable accommodations 
to the religious needs of employees or prospective employees 
where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employers business. The guidelines 
went further in requiring the employers to prove that the 
accommodations would result in undue hardship.®^ in essence/ 
these guidelines went beyond the affirmative obligation to 
equate the failure to accommodate with religious discrimi-
. 66 nation. 
Reasonable Accommodation 
in Public Employment 
The 1972 Amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights act extended 
coverage of its Title VII to all government employees and 
created a potential conflict between the reasonable 
' 
6329 C.P.R. 1605.1(a) (2) U966). 
64Ibid 1605.1 (b) (1971). 
65Ibid 1605.1 (c). 
66 
Beard/ p. 363. 
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accommodation requirement and the First Amendment. In Yott 
67 
v .  North American Rockwell Corporation/ a  Federal District 
Court held the reasonable accommodation requirement to be in 
conflict with the Establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
A new provision of the act/ section 2000e-16/ extended 
coverage to employees of the federal government. It provides/ 
in pertinent part: 
"1. (a) All personnel actions affecting employees 
or applicants for employment in military depart­
ments...in the United States Postal Service and 
the Government of the District of Columbia having 
positions in the competitive service/ and in those 
units of the legislative and judicial branches of 
the Federal Government having positions in the 
competitive service/ and in the Library of Congress 
shall be made free from any discrimination based on 
...religion/..,68 
This amendment made che government subject to nearly the same 
69 
considerations as the private sector. 
In Engel v. Vitale, the Court held that the Establishment 
clause is violated by enactment of laws which establish an 
70 
official religion. The Supreme Court/ in Engel referred to 
the writings of James Madison/ author of the First Amendment/ 
to illustrate the dangers of the "establishment" of religion. 
67 
°'Yott v. North American Rockwell Corporation/ 428 F 
Supp. 763 (D.C. Col. 1977). 
6842 U.S.C. sections 2000e-16. 
®®Roger B. Jacobs "Reasonable Accommodation in Public 
Employment/" Labor Law Journal 29 (November 1978): 712. 
70 
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 424 (1962). 
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"Who does not see that the same authority which 
can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all 
other religions/ may establish with the same ease/ 
any particular sect of Christians/ in exclusion of 
all other sects? That the same authority which 
can force a citizen to contribute three pence 
only of his property for the support of any one 
establishment/ may force him to conform to other 
establishment in all cases whatsoever". 
72 In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company/ the Sixth Circuit 
Court delineated the federal standard for reasonable accommo­
dation. The court held that the accommodation requirement 
promulgated in EEOC Regulations was not embodied in the Civil 
Rights Act. The court commented that acceding to Dewey's 
demands would require Reynolds to discriminate against its 
other employees by requiring them to work on Sunday in place 
of Dewey. "This would constitute unequal administration of the 
collective bargaining agreement among the employees/" the court 
stated. The court held that the employer did not question 
Dewey's right to freedom of religion and the right to practice 
his religous beliefs in it. The court held that no intentional 
discrimination had occurred. In rejecting Dewey's plea for a 
rehearsing en banc, the court further stated that the employee 
ought not to be forced to accommodate each of the varying relig-
73 
IOUS beliefs and practice of his employees. 
^*11 Writings of Madison 183/ In Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, pp. 185-86. 
72 
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company 429 F2d 324 (1970). 
73_, . , 
Ibid. 
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The opinion in Dewey established the framework that later 
cases used in dealing with reasonable accommodation. Congress 
disagreed with the Dewey result and incorporated the EEOC regu­
lations into the 1972 Civil Rights Act Amendment. The employer 
in Dewey was not excused from a duty of accommodation; the ~ 
Court of Appeals only held that the employer had satisfied any 
74 obligation it might have had under the statute. 
The eighth Circuit Court in addressing accommodation of 
employees held that: 
"An employee cannot shirk his duties to try to 
accommodate himself or to cooperate with his 
employer in reaching an accommodation by a mere 
recalcitrant citation of religious precepts. 
Nor can he thereby shift all responsibility for 
accommodation to his employer. Where an employee 
refuses to attempt to accommodate his own beliefs 
or to cooperate with his employees attitude to 
reach a reasonable accommodation/ he may render 
an accommodation impossible."75 
In 1977 the United States Supreme Court considering the 
1972 Amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act in Trans World 
Airlines Inc. v. Hardison held that: 
"in absence of clear statutory language or legis­
lative history to the contrary/ we will not readily 
construe the statute to require an employer to re­
quire an employee to discriminate against some 
employees in order to enable others to observe 
their Sabbath. 
74 
Jacobs/ p. 715. 
75Chrysler Corp. v. Mann/ 561 F2d 1282/ 1285 (8th Cir. 
1977). 
/0Trans World Airlines/ Inc./ v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 
(1977). 
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The Court based its decision on three main points: (1) TWA 
made reasonable efforts to accommodate the religious needs 
of Hardison; (2) TWA was not required to violate collective 
bargaining agreements by violating its non discriminatory 
seniority system; and (3) alternative plans, which would have 
permitted Hardison to avoid Saturday work by working only 
four days per week/ constituting an undue hardship on its 
employer.77 
The Sixth Circuit Court discussed the Establishment 
clause and reasonable accommodation in the private sector in 
78 
Parker Seal v. Cummins. A question arose when Cummins 
refused to work on Saturday, his Sabbath. The employer con­
tended that a "loner" would lead to objections and complaints 
among the supervisors and impeded developing a team. The 
Court held that complaints of employees did not constitute 
undue hardship and must yield to the individual's right to 
practice his religion. 
The Sixth Circuit then considered the constitutional 
issues dealing on the three-part test established in Committee 
79 
on Political Education v. Nyquist. (1) The law must reflect 
a clearly secular legislative purpose; (2) Its primary effect 
must neither advance nor inhibit religion; and (3) It must 
77 
Ibid. 
78Parker Seal v. Cummins 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
79 
"Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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avoid excessive governmental entanglement with religion.80 
The Court of Appeals held that 42 USC 2000e(j) and 29 CFR 
1605.1 met constitutional muster and the primary effect was 
to inhibit discrimination/ not to advance religion. 
The conflict between the establishment clause and reason­
able accommodation was considered by the Yott court and found 
section 42 USC 2000e(j) unconstitutional because it conflicted 
with the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
District Judge Real in Yott ruled that section 2000(e) (j) 
"enjoins an employer to accommodate employment practices to the 
81 
religious beliefs of his employee." The Court suggested, 
since the First Amendment prohibition is expressed in terms of 
"no law," any limitation on the degree of accommodation is 
82 
irrelevant. "Clearly, then, the statute imposes on an em­
ployer the requirement that he adopt or bring into agreement 
his otherwise nondiscriminatory business conduct with the 
religious beliefs of his employee".8^ 
The Yott court further considered a constitutional con­
flict when the employee seeks to be excused from union member­
ship dues or the payment of union dues on a condition of employ­
ment because of his religious objection. Such a procedure 
80Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
83-Yott v. North American Rockwell Corporation, 428 F 
Supp 763 (1977). 
82Jacobs, p. 719. 
8^Yott v. North American Rockwell Corporation, 428 F 
Supp 763 (1977). 
119 
permits an employee a privilege not otherwise available to 
employees whose religious beliefs or lack thereof proclaim 
no such excuse. The Court held that: 
'Government simply cannot make the choice - termed 
reasonable or otherwise - that conduct which lacks 
either discriminatory interest or discriminatory 
application can be circumscribed because religious 
beliefs may oppose its implementations.1,84 
When government is faced with such a decision it must 
declare its neutrality which may result in a sacrifice from 
the individual who sincerely adheres to his religious beliefs. 
"This self-imposed sacrifice has its rewards outside our tem-
Q C 
poral ken."° However well-intentioned governmental action 
may be in an attempt to alleviate the sacrifice/ it cannot 
survive the clear command by the Supreme Court in Committee 
for Public Education v. Nyquist. 
Government may not decide that some action may be cir­
cumscribed because an employee's religious beliefs oppose its 
implementation. The First Amendment commands that public 
employers make no adjustments which give some employees 
preference solely upon religious beliefs. Such accommodations 
87 
would likely be unreasonable and unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court in Walz v. Tax Commission held that 
the First Amendment is not inflexible by deducing the general 
84Ibid. 
85JacobS/ p. 723. 
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
87JacobS/ p. 723. 
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principle that governments may not "establish" or interfere 
with religion. The Court further contended "short of those 
expressly proscribed Government acts there is room for play 
in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which 
will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship 
QQ 
and without interference". 
As far as the constitution is concerned, working in the 
public sector is not a typical situation. The government's 
efforts to support or interfere with religious practices 
may be an impermissible "establishment of religion." Some 
legal observers suggest that accommodation by government 
should be based upon economic factors. Such approaches fail 
to deal with the constitutional issues and ignore the Civil 
Rights Act. Nevertheless/ the act limits accommodations when 
an undue burden is manifested in accommodation and economic 
89 factors could constitute an undue burden. 
Reasonable Accommodation and the Establishment Clause 
A direct constitutional challenge to the accommodation 
rule was suggested in Dewey where the Court of Appeals said: 
"To construe the act as authorizing the adoption 
of Regulations which could coerce or compel an 
employer to accede to or accommodate the religious 
beliefs of all his employees would raise grave 
constitutional question of violation of the Estab­
lishment clause of the First Amendment."®0 
®®Walz v. Tax Commission/ 397 U.S. 664/ 669 (1970). 
®^Jacobs/ p. 725. 
®®Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Company/ 429 F2d at 334 (1970). 
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In Nyquist the Court held that the crux of the Sabbath 
observers problem is routed in the recognition "that tension 
inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Estab­
lishment clauses..."®* and that 
"the Court has struggled to find a neutral course 
between the two religion clauses/ both of which 
are cast in absolute terms/ and either of which/ 
if expanded to a logical extreme/ would tend to 
clash with the o t h e r."92 
Although the criteria used to measure establishment and 
free exercise clause violations have been independently form­
ulated/ judicial efforts to resolve the tension between the 
clauses have focused on the examination of the purpose and 
effect of legislative enactments. To make judicial muster/ 
legislation must survive the three-pronged test set out in 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist; (1) a clearly 
secular purpose; (2) the primary effect of the law 
neutral/ neither advancing nor inhibiting religion/and (3) 
avoidance of excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 
The Free Exercise violation criteria/ not as formally 
articulated/ seem to emphasize legislative purpose and 
effect in view of the Court's observation that: 
Q*| 
^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756/ 788. 
®^Walz v. Tax Commission/ 397 U.S. 664/ 668-69 (1970). 
^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756/ 788. 
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"If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede 
the observance of one or all religions or is to 
discriminate invidiously between religions/ that 
law is constitutionally invalid even though the 
burdens may be characterized as being only 
indirect".^ 
The 1970 Circuit Court decisions finding that reason­
able accommodation undue hardship tests pass muster under 
'the three-pronged establishment clauses9^ concluded that 
judicial trends have rejected the definition set out in Dewey. 
It acknowledged both the purpose and effect of Title VII 
legislation to be rooted in the impact-oriented definition 
of religious constitutional and definitial trends. They are 
interrelated in light of an analysis of the purpose of Title 
VII religion discrimination legislation and the effect on 
96 
the Sabbath-observing employee. 
Senator Jenning Randolph of West Virginia, who sponsored 
the 1972 Amendment/ 42 USC 2000e(j)/ expressed the Congres­
sional intent saying: 
94Braunfield v. Brown/ 366 U.S. 599/ 607 (1961). 
^Hardison v. TWA 527 F2d 333 (8th Cir. 1975); Cummins 
v. Parker Seal Co. 516 F2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975). 
^®Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Company/ 429 F2d 324/ 335 
(1970). 
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"I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended 
to protect the same rights in private employment 
as the Constitution protects in Federal/ State 
or local governments. Unfortunately/ the Courts 
have/ in a sense, come down on both rules of this 
issue. The Supreme Court of the United States/ 
in a case involving the observance of the Sabbath 
and job discrimination/ divided evenly on this 
question. This Amendment is intended/ in good 
purpose to resolve by legislation-and in a way 
I think was originally intended by the Civil 
Rights Act-that which the Courts apparently 
have not resolved.®' 
98 QQ 
The Sixth Circuit Court in Cummins and Dewey con­
tended that government/ by requiring the employer to reason­
ably accommodate the Sabbath-observing employee/ shows a 
favoritism toward religion that is counter to the establish­
ment clause. In Cummins, the Court contended that the 
accommodation requirement discriminates between Sabbath 
observers who receive favorable treatment on the one hand/ 
and atheists and non-Sabbath observers who receive no 
similar consideration on the other. 
The Tripartite Test 
The Secular Purpose Requirement 
The requirement of a secular purpose is the central 
^Congressional Record/ 705-06 (1972). 
®®Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
"Dewey/ 429 F2d 324, (1970). 
*00Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
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question in establishment clause analysis. If the legisla­
tion cannot be justified in secular terms, then the legisla­
tion is inconsistent with the establishment clause. The 
Courts have not had much difficulty in finding a secular 
purpose in values laws and has attached an expansive meaning 
to the term secular. In McGowan v. Maryland/101 the court 
declined to invalidate a Maryland Sunday closing law because 
it happened to coincide with the beliefs of one religion. 
Rather, the court in analyzing the law said that: 
"The present...effect of most of (these laws) is 
to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens; 
the fact that this day is Sunday, a day of parti­
cular significance of the dominant Christian sects, 
does not bar the state from achieving its secular 
goals".^02 
103 
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the court said that "the stat­
utes themselves clearly state that they are interested to 
enhance the quality of the secular education in all schools 
covered by the compulsory attendance laws. There is no 
reason to believe the legislative meant anything else" 
The secular purpose requirement proved controlling in 
105 Epperson v. Arkansas, which involved a law prohibiting the 
101McGowan v. Maryland 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
102Ibid., p. 445. 
10^Lemon v. Kurtzman# 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
104Ibid., p. 613. 
105 
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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teaching of evolution in the public schools. The court 
found "no suggestion—(that) the Arkansas law (could) be 
justified by consideration of state policy other than the 
106 
religious views of some of its citizens". Moreover# the 
court found the absence of a secular purpose controlling: 
"The overriding fact is that (the law) selects 
from a body of knowledge a particular segment 
which is proscribed for the sole reason that 
it is deemed to conflict with a particular 
religious doctrine; that is# with a particu­
lar interpretation of the Book of Genesis by a 
particular religious group". 
If the court is able to find any secular purpose/ even 
if the law evolved from purposes that are nonsecular# it 
will probably rely upon the secular purpose and apply the 
two remaining prongs of the establishment clause analysis. 
The Secular Effect Requirement 
The requirement that a law have a primary effect that 
neither assists nor inhibits religion is central to estab-
109 
lishment clause analysis. However, the primary effect 
analysis poses questions as to when the effect 
106Ibid., p. 107. 
107Ibid./ p. 103. 
10®Beard# p. 651. 
Committee for Public Education and Religion Liberty 
v. Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756/ 738-843 (1973). 
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is primary and when it is incidential. Laws or ordinances 
that provide for general municipal services have the effect 
of aiding religious institutions; however, these laws or 
ordinances are not ruled invalid merely because the purely 
secular effect happens to be realized in a sectarian context. 
If such laws were invalidated because they fortuitously 
benefited religious activities,the state would be applying 
hostile treatment in violation of the First Amendment. 
When a specific state program has both religious and 
secular effects, the courts must determine which effect is 
dominant.111 
In 1973, the court in Nyquist avoided an inquiry into . 
which effect is "primary" and which is "secondary." Instead 
the court applied a metaphysical approach: 
"Our cases simply do not support the notion that 
a law found to have a 'primary' effect (that pro­
motes) some legitimate (secular goal) is immune 
from further examination to ascertain whether it 
also has the direct and immediate effect of ad­
vancing religion".11^ 
The anti-establishment analysis focuses on whether the relig­
ious effects are indirect or incidental as opposed to 
113 
whether the secular effect is primary. 
110Beard., p. 651. 
111-.. . 
Ibid t 
11^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756. 
113Beard./ p. 652. 
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In School District v. 'Schempa}*4 a distinction was 
made that even when a state program has a secular purpose 
and secular effects, the establishment clause will prohibit 
the program when the religious benefits are inseparable from 
the secular benefits. This analysis may not allow Bible 
readings in public schools because the secular benefit of 
promoting a broad educational program is inseparable from 
115 the sponsorship of religious activities. 
If the secular and religious effects are separable, the 
government program may still be unconstitutional because the 
benefited class is essentially religiously oriented. In 
Nyquist the narrowness of the benefited class was the key 
factor in funding the program in violation of the establish­
ment clause. The court struck down a tax relief program 
where over eighty percent of the benefited class was relig-
116 
iously oriented. 
1 1 7  
However, in Walz v. Commissioner, ' the other end of the 
spectrum was laid open in that the court ruled that the 
state had not singled out religion for preferential treat­
ment but instead had granted religious organizations the same 
^^Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
^^Beard,p. 652. 
**^Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 412 U.S. 756 (1973). 
*^Walz v. Tax Commission, (1970). 
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tax status as other non-profit, quasi-public organizations. 
The court reasoned that if religious organizations are grant­
ed benefits only as a part of a program that benefits a 
larger group of organizations/ the effects are incidential 
rather than direct. 
The Requirement of No Excessive Entanglement 
The third prong of the anti-establishment analysis is 
that government avoid any excessive entanglement with sec­
tarian activity from the intent to minimize government intru­
sion into the religious realm. The first analysis appeared 
in Walz v. Commissioner?-^ when the court upheld a law ex­
empting religious organizations from property tax in avoid­
ing excessive government entanglement in sectarian affairs. 
Proponents of the requirement contend that the secular effect 
analysis is substantial, while the entanglement analysis 
focuses on procedural involvement of a government program in 
sectarian affairs.*20 
121 
The Court in Engel v. Vitale contended that whether 
118Ibid. 
119Ibid. 
•L20Beard, p. 654, citing Roehmer v. Maryland Board of 
Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). 
121Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
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the anti-entanglement analysis is procedural or substantive, 
it is clear that the analysis reaffirms the principle that 
the First Amendment was intended to inhibit "a union of 
government and religion that tends to destroy government and 
122 degrades religion. 
The concept of administrative entanglement seems appli­
cable in an analysis of religious employment discrimination 
because any suit brought under Title VII necessarily in­
volves an inquiry into whether the alleged discrimination 
was based on religion. Entanglement of this sort is the 
proscription of excessive government surveillance and evalu­
ation of religious institutions. For example, in evaluating 
tax exemptions for religious bodies, the Supreme Court em­
phasized that eliminating the exemption would lead to "tax 
evaluation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, 
and direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the 
123 train of those legal processes." 
The Court noted the difficulty in separating the secu­
lar and religious aspects of a teacher's style of instruction 
in invalidating state salary supplements to teachers in 
religious schools. The Court reasoned that the state would 
be required to ascertain that "subsidized teachers do not 
122Ibid. 
^2^Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
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inculcate religion".124 To enforce such a statute* the state 
would have had to be involved in "comprehensive/ discrimina­
ting/ and continuing state surveillance" of the teacher's 
activities/ w h i c h  w o u l d  h a v e  r e s u l t e d  i n  " e x c e s s i v e  a n d  
126 
enduring entanglement between State and Church. 
The United States Supreme Court's 
Analysis of the Reasonable Accommodation Rule; 
Dewey/ Cummins and Hardison 
The employer's duty to accommodate an employee's reli­
gious practices and beliefs first appeared in the 1966 Equal 
Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) guidelines on 
religious discrimination; however/ the scope of the employer's 
obligation remained unsettled. The United States Supreme 
Court/ in three cases, confronted the issue of how far an 




In Dewey v. Reynolds Metals and Cummins v. Parker 
129 
Seal Company, an equally divided court affirmed the appel­
late court decision without an opinion. jtn third case/ 




l2®Dewey v. Reynolds 402 U.S. 689 (1971). 
129Cummins v. Parker Seal Company/ 429 U.S. 65 (1976). 
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Transworld Airlines v. Hardison,130 the United States Supreme 
Court rendered its opinion on the scope of the employer's 
duty to accommodate religious observance by the employee. 
In Dewe^/131 the employee/ Dewey, was discharged because 
of a conflict between the employer's work policy and his 
Sabbath. Even though the employer offered to find a replace­
ment to fill Dewey's position on his Sabbath/ Dewey held that 
finding a replacement and working on his Sabbath were sins 
and urged the court to allow him to observe his Sabbath and 
retain his employment. Dewey's argument was rejected by 
the Sixth Circuit Court in holding: 
"The reason for Dewey's discharge was not discrimi­
nation on account of his religion; it was because 
he violated the provisions of the collective bar­
gaining agreement entered into by his union and 
his employer/ which provisions were equally appli­
cable to all employees...To accede to Dewey's 
demands would require Reynolds to discriminate 
against its other employees by requiring them to 
work on Sundays ,in place of Dewey/ thereby re­
lieving Dewey of his contractual obligation. This 
would constitute unequal administration of the 
collective bargaining agreement among employees/ 
and could create chaotic personnel problems and 
lead to grievances and additional arbitrations." 
The courts reasoning was that l' to require the employer 
to do more than permitting the religious adherent to find a 
replacement would cause the employer to distribute employ­
ment opportunities on an unequal basis" in violations of 
130Tr.answor2<3 Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
l^Dewey v. Reynolds Co., 429 F2d 324/ 330-31 (1970). 
132Ibid. 
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Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.133 
In granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
was unable to reach agreement on the meaning of the reason­
able accommodation rule.*3^ 
In 1976/ the United States Supreme Court affirmed the 
135 Sixth Circuit in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. Cummins, a 
Sabbatarian observer/ claimed that his religious practices 
conflicted with otherwise mutual work policies. After the 
employer attempted to find a replacement/ the plan proved 
unworkable causing Cummin^ counterparts to work seventy-two 
hours a week while Cummins only worked forty hours a week. 
This unbalance resulted in numerous complaints and the 
«• 
employer dismissed Cummins. The Sixth Circuit Court held 
that the employer had not satisfied its obligation to 
accommodate the religious practices of the employee. The 
court stated that "if employees are disgruntled because an 
employer accommodates its work rules ito the religious needs 
of one employee, under the reasonable accommodation rule, 
such grumbling must yield to the single employee's right to 
136 
practice his religion". Moreover/ the court held that 
133iIbid. 
( * 
134Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co./ 402 U.S. 689 (1971). 
135Dunjmins v> Parker Seal Co./ 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
136lbid. 
133 
only if morale problems caused chaotic personnel prob­
lems could ithe Sabbath observer be discharged. After 
granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirm-
137 ed the Sixth Circuit Court's decision. The central pre-
138 
cedent case of Trans World Airlines v. Hardison addressed 
"reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" under Title 
VII. Hardison/ the Sabbath observer and employee of Trans 
World Airlines/voluntarily changed jobs in a maintenance 
shop that operated seven days a week. The new job provided 
less seniority under the collective bargaining agreement. 
Hardison/ being unable to bid for shifts allowing him time off 
on Saturday/ his Sabbath/ took off on Saturdays after the 
company refused to allow him to work only four days a week. 
TWA rejected Hardison's proposal because it would impair 
critical functions in the airlines maintenance operations/ 
hold that no accommodation was available and discharged 
Hardison for his refusal to work on Saturday. 
Hardison instituted action under the 1967 EEOC guide­
lines and the 1972 Amendments to Title VII contending that 
reasonable accommodation was not made. The district court 
ruled in favor of the union and TWA holding that the senior­
ity system could not be ignored and that TWA had satisfied 
137 
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 429 U.S. 65 (1976). 
*^8Trans World v. Hardison/432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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its obligation to accommodate Hardison's religious beliefs. 
The Sixth Circuit Court affirmed the judgment for the union 
but reversed as to TWA. 
The Sixth Circuit Court reasoned that TWA could have 
fulfilled its obligation to accommodate Hardison's religious 
beliefs by: 
"(1) permitting Hardison to work a four-day week 
and replacing Hardison by a superior or another 
employee on duty elsewhere, even though this 
would cause shop functions to suffer/ (2) 
filling Hardison's Saturday shift from another 
available personnel, although this would have 
required TWA to bear the cost of premium over­
time pay; or (3) arranging a "swap" between 
Hardison and another employee for another shift 
for the Sabbath day, although this would have 
been a breach of the collective bargaining 
agreement".139 
TWA and the International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers Union challenged the Sixth Circuit's 
decision on statutory and constitutional grounds. In a 
seven to two decision, the United States Supreme Court 
held that the defendants had satisfied their obligations to 
the employee and had met the statutory intent. 
The United States Supreme Court considered the arguments 
against Hardison's assertion that the express will of Con­
gress required employers to accede to employees' religious 
*39Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
140 
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 76 (1977). 
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demands absent of finding an undue hardship. The court 
found for the employer and the union. Mr. Justice White 
speaking for the court acknowledged that "public policy 
favored industrial stability realized through collective 
bargaining and indicated that a seniority system represents 
an accommodation to both religious and secular needs of 
employees"!^ contending that "the seniority system repre­
sents a neutral way of minimizing the number of occasions 
when an employee must work on a day he would prefer to have 
142 off. Justice White concluded that in the absence of a 
discriminatory purpose the seniority system should not be 
set aside in order to accommodate an employee's religious 
practices and the Title VII statute "does not require 
employers to deny the shift and job preference of some 
employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual 
rights# in order to accommodate or prefer the religious 
143 
practices of some other employees". Moreover/ the court 
held "that to require an employer to bear more than a de 
minimis cost in accommodating religious practices is equiva-
144 lent to undue hardship." 




Ibid., p. 84. 
136 
Supreme Court Justices Marshall and Brennan in dissent/ 
declared that the majority decision may well have struck a 
"fatal blow to efforts under Title VII to accommodate work 
. . . 145 
requirements to religious practices". Even though the 
Trans World decision limits the scope of an employee's duty 
to accommodate/ it appears that the outcome was necessary 
146 by the establishment clause of the First Amendment. 
The Trans World decision rests upon two basic policies: 
"(1) that collective bargaining/ and in particular 
a negotiated seniority system/ should not be dis­
turbed/ absent a showing of discriminatory purpose/ 
and (2) that regulating private conduct to the 
extent of mandating preferential treatment on the 
basis of a religion raises serious constitutional 
questions". 
If the court had construed the Title VII statute broad­
ly so as to have required accommodation/ then the court would 
have faced the question of whether or not accommodation of 
religious practices contravened the First Amendment. However/ 
by narrowly construing the statute/ the Court avoided this 
dilemma and followed the proposition that legislation should 
not be construed to impose this duty unless such interpreta­
tion is unavoidable.^® 
In Trans World, the court made the distinction from 
previous decisions that regulating private conduct to the 
145Cummins v.Parker Seal Co./ 429 U.S. p. 86. 




extent of granting religious preferences to some employees 
was inconsistent with the purposes of Title VII. The court 
emphasized that the "unequivocal emphasis of both the lang­
uage and the legislative history of Title VII is to elimina­
ting discrimination in employment and such discrimination 
is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as well 
. . 149 
as minorities..." 
In holding that the seniority system barred accommoda­
tion of Hardison's religious beliefs, the court stated that 
"to...give Hardison Saturdays off, TWA would have had to 
deprive another employee of his shift preference at least 
in part because he did not adhere to a religion that observed 
150 
the Saturday Sabbath". 
Justice Byron White in concluding for the majority 
opinion stated: 
"The paramount concern of Congress in enacting 
Title VII was the elimination of discrimination 
in employment. In the absence of clear statutory 
language to the contrary, we will not construe the 
statute to require an employer to discriminate 
against some employees to enable others to ob­
serve their Sabbath, "-^l 
*49Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. p. 81. 
150Ibid. 
151Ibid., p. 85. 
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The Court in Trans World implicitly recognized that a 
reasonable accommodation requirement is essentially sound 
for affirmative action regarding religious beliefs. As in 
an affirmative action program, the obligation to accommodate 
requires preferential treatment of a protected class without 
judicial determination of an illegal employment practice. 
The court was in an uncomfortable position of having to 
choose between the narrow construing of the reasonable accom­
modation rule or mandating religious preference. The court 
choose the narrow construction. If the reasonable accommo­
dations rule had favored mandating religious preference, 
152 serious constitutional questions would have been raised. 
Test of Reasonableness; 
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta 
In 1981, the Ninth Circuit Court in Tooley v. Martin-
Marietta^^ applied the reasonableness^-^ and tripartite' 
155 . 
tests involving the payment of funds equal to the union 
dues being donated to the employee's religious charity in lieu 
of the payment of union dues. The company and the union had 
refused to accommodate the employee's request and sought his 
•'"^Beard, p 647. 
•'••^Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F2d 1239 (1981). 
1 C A  
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1971). 
I C C ,  
•'•-'•'Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
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dismissal. The District court ordered his reinstatement with 
the Ninth Circuit Court affirming the lower court's decision. 
The claim of the employee/ Tooley, was anchored on the 
provision of section 701(j), 42 U.S.C. 2000e (j), which pro­
hibits discrimination in employment by union and employers 
on the basis of religion. The codes define religion to in­
clude all aspects of religious observance..."unless an 
employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accom­
modate an employee's... religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employers 
business."156 
Reasonableness 
The steelworkers union argued that the substituted 
charity which exempted Tooley from union dues was unreason­
able and resulted in impermissibly unequal treatment. Cit­
ing the Brown v. General Motors Corporation,-*-57 the Tooley 
Court held that disparate treatment of employees is not 
necessarily unreasonable.^® The religious accommodation 
provision of section 701 (j) does not authorize preferential 
treatment of employees nor does it require an employer or 
15642 U.S.C. 2000e (j) section 701(j). 
157Brown v. General Motors Corporation/ 601 F2d 956 (1979). 
"^^Tooley v. Martin-Marietta, 648 F2d 1239 (1981). 
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union to abrogate the contractual rights of some employees 
or to incur substantial costs of accommodation for the bene-
159 
fit of those to be accommodated. 
The Tooley court/ using the reasoning in Hardison, 
found that the substituted charity accommodation did not 
allow preferential treatment and the plaintiff suffered the 
same economic loss as the union member; therefore/ the 
accommodation was reasonable. 
Undue Hardship 
The union contended that allowing the substitute char-
1 gl 
ity was inconsistent with the "de minimis" cost/ contend­
ing that reference to using surplus funds in the union's 
reserve departed from the de minimis standard. Ninth 
16? 
Circuit Court Judge Farris/ citing the 1978 Anderson 
decision/ acknowledged that in determining an "undue hard­
ship" the particular factual context of each case must be 
considered. A claim of undue hardship must be beyond a 
conceivable or hypothetical hardship and be supported by 
proof of "actual imposition of co-workers or disruption of 
the work routine".163 
•^9Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. at 84 (1977). 
16^Tooley v. Martin-Marietta/ 638 p F2d 1239 (1981). 
161Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1971). 
I 
Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Divi­
sion, 589 F2d 397, 400 (1978). 
163Ibid., pp. 406-407. 
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Constitutionality of Section 701 (j) 
of Title VII 
The steelworkers union further argued that section 701 
(j) appealed in the case violated the Establishment Clause. 
Relying on Nyquist,164 Yoder, 165 walz,166 Zorach167 and 
Lemonthe Tooley court reasoned that government can ac­
commodate the beliefs and practices of minority religious 
groups without contravening the prohibition of the estab­
lishment clause and in the face of religious differences/ 
reflect neutrality. Using Lemon and Nyquist^^ as a 
background/ the court found section 701 (j) constitutional 
in its legislative purpose by prohibiting discrimination in 
employment and securing equal economic opportunities to 
171 
members of minority religions. The secular purpose of 
section 701 (j) is legitimate by "promoting equal employment 
i64Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty 
v. Nyguist/ 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
^•^Wisconsin v. Yoder/ 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
^"^Walz v. Tax Commission/ 397 U.S. 664» 669 (1970). 
•^^Zorach v. Clauson/ 343 U.S. 306. 
"^^Lemon v. Kurtzman/ 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
^"^Tooley v. Martin-Marietta/ 648 F2d 1239 (1981). 
*7®Lemon v. Kurtzman/ 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee 
for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nvauist/ 413 
U.S. 756 (1973). 
171 
U.S. Congress/House/ H 763/ 11 February 1980/ Con­
gressional Recora# vol. 126. 
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17 2 opportunities for members of all religious faiths"; 
As to primary purpose/ the union contended that the substi­
tute charity had the primary effect of advancing the plain­
tiff's religion by securing alleged economic benefits. The 
court reflected the contention and made the discernment 
between ancillary and primary benefits in the substitute 
charity in that the plaintiff was allowed to work without 
violating his religious beliefs at a cost equivalent to 
that paid by his co-workers without similar beliefs. It 
neither increased nor decreased the advantages of membership 
17 *3 
in the Seventh-Day Adventist faith. Concerning government 
entanglement/ the Tooley Court reasoned that the substitute 
charity required only a minimal amount of supervision and 
administrative cost. After establishing the sincerity of 
the religious objector's belief/ the only burden involves 
an agreement on a mutually acceptable charity. In the 
absence of an establishment burden on the union# the court 
174 found no excessive government involvement. 
172 Rankms v. Commission on Professional Competence^ 24 
ca. 3d 167, 177-78, 154 cal- Rptr. 907, 913, 14. (1979). 
^•^Tooley v. Martin-Marietta, 648 F2d 1239 (1981). 
174Ibid. 
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Definitional Problems of Religion 
While Title VII proscription against religious discrim­
ination in employment states what the term "religion" 
175 • 
includes/ it does so without precisely defining what is 
1 7fi 
meant by religion. Lack of statutory definition has 
allowed the courts to interpret the meaning of religion 
broadly. Finding the traditional concepts of religion 
too narrow/ the United States Supreme Court in Welsh v. 
177 
United States, a case involving the exemption of con­
scientious objectors from the draft, defined "religious 
belief" by stating: 
"If an individual deeply and sincerely holds 
beliefs which are purely ethical or moral in 
source and content but which nevertheless 
impose upon him a duty of conscience to re­
frain from participating in any war at any­
time/ those beliefs certainly occupy in the 
life of that individual a place parallel to 
that filled by...God in traditionally religi­
ous persons". 
Welsh deals with a statute which is very different from 
179 
the Civil Rights Act but legislative history and recent 
case law suggest that Title VII contemplates a definition 
175 
42 U.S.C., sec. 2000e(j) 
v 
176Sue Gordon/ "Up Against the Accommodation Rule," 
University of Missouri-Kansas City Law Review 45 (February 
1976); 59. 
177Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
178Ibid./ p. 340. 
*7®Universal Military and Selective Service Act, Statutes 
at Large 61, sec. 6 (j) (1967). 
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similar to the one in Welsh.180 Title VII is broad enough 
to encompass atheistic beliefs in which the Fifth Circuit 
Court held that an atheist was the victim of religious 
181 
discrimination. However, Title VII's protection does 
182 
not include all beliefs. The courts are beginning to 
exclude certain ideological beliefs from the religious cate-
183 
gory. In Bellamy v. Mason Stores, Inc., a Title VII suit 
alleging religious discrimination in discharging Bellamy 
because he was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, the district 
court dismissed the case stating: 
"the proclaimed racist and anti-semitic ideology 
of the organization to which Bellamy belongs takes 
on/ as advanced by that organization/ a narrow/ 
temporal and political character inconsistent 
with the meaning of "religion" as used in sec­
tion 2000e",184 
The beliefs of the complaining party must, not only be 
183 religious/ but also must be found to be sincere. Since 
belief is subjective/ the mere claim of sincerity by the 
employee is virtually impossible to disprove, and the 
plaintiff's simple assertion of sincerity may constitute 
180Gordon, p. 59. 
181 
Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan, 509 F2d 140 
(1975). 
"L82Gordon/ p. 59. 
T O O  
Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan/509 F2d 140 
(1975). 
184Ibid#/ p. 142. 
185Ibid./ p. 143. 
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a prima facie case of its truth.3-86 Except for matters of 
church attendance/ financial aid, historical tenets/or other 
facets of traditional religious beliefs# there are few ob­
jective criteria by which to determine whether all religious 
beliefs are sincere. The burden of proof increases as the 
religious belief becomes less traditional and almost impos­
sible when religious beliefs approach the frontiers suggested 
in Welsh. The courts have not faced this problem/ but merely 
noted in their decisions that the petitioners' beliefs are 
187 188 
sincere. In Welsh, the court stated that the "task is 
to decide whether the beliefs professed by a (religious 
practitioner) are sincerely held and whether they are, in 
189 
his own scheme of things/ religious." 
The Welsh case suggests a two-pronged inquiry: "(1) 
whether the belief is sincerely held/and (2) whether the 
IS 
belief/ judged by the claimant's own standard/ is religious". 
Inquiry by the courts should be carefully limited. An in­
quiry into sincerity involves the fact-finders' use of a 
reasonableness standard/ because the more reasonable a 
belief appears, the more likely it will be accepted as 
*®®Edwards and Kaplan,"Religious Discrimination and the 




188Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970). 
189United States v. Seeger 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965). 
190Beard,p. 657. 
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sincerely held. The ultimate inquiry would really be an 
inquiry into the employee's subjective beliefs. But to the 
extent that the entanglement analysis insures religious 
liberty by prohibiting judicial involvement in religion, 
courts should play a limited role in analyzing asserted 
religious beliefs. Thus, the administrative entanglement 
principle does not bar adjudication of religious discrimi­
nation claims, but it does circumscribe the courts* role in 
191 
religious cases of doctrine. 
Reasonable Accommodation in Public Education 
In 1969, Clayborn Umberfield, a teacher in School Dis­
trict #11, Joint Counties of Archuleta and La Plata, Colorado, 
since 1965 had been a member of the World Wide Church of God, 
and had absented himself from his teaching duties to attend rel 
ious assemblies for the period of September 26 through Octo­
ber 3, after being denied leave. The school district charged 
Umberfield with breach of contract and neglect of his duties. 
On May 29, 1970, a hearing was held by a panel of three at­
torneys in compliance with the Colorado Teacher Tenure Act 
(1967 Perm. Supp.). Upon recommendation of the Teacher Tenure 
Panel, the school district dismissed Umberfield. 
147 
In August 1970 Umberfield filed a complaint with the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission which alleged that the school 
district had violated the Colorado Antidiscrimination Act and 
ordered his reinstatement. The school district sought relief 
in district court seeking to have the Civil Rights Commission's 
decision overturned and order vacated. The district court 
ruled that since Umberfield did not seek judicial review of 
the school district's action, his dismissal was not subject 
to collateral attack in another forum or before another agency. 
The court ruled that the Civil Rights Commission's conclusion 
that the board's action was discrimination and unfair employ­
ment practice was not supported by evidentiary findings. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals* in interpreting the Colo­
rado Antidiscrimination statute,ruled that the statute vests 
the Civil Rights Commission with the power to conduct find­
ings whether the statute has been violated; no other remedy 
is provided by the statute for the commission of such a 
192 
practice. Moreover/ the court of appeals held that the 
review by the Teacher Tenure Panel and the Civil Rights Com­
mission findings must stand judicial review before "discrimi­
natory or unfair employment practice"/ as defined in the 
Colorado Antidiscrimination Act/ has occurred,inasmuch as the 
l^School District #11 v. Umberfield/ Colorado/ App. 
512 P2d 1166 (1973). 
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issue is not one for an administrative panel to determine* 
A review by the tenure hearing panel does not involve deter­
mination of the school district's committing "a discrimina­
tory or unfair employment practice" under the act by discharg­
ing Umberfield; he was entitled to initiate a complaint 
before the Civil Rights Commission; subject to judicial 
review. In noting the lower court's error ruling, the Court 
of Appeals agreed with the lower court's ruling that the 
• . 193 commission's determination was not supported by findings. 
Though the issues in this case centered primarily around 
procedural points, it is worthy to note that the Civil Rights 
Commission's hearing officer supported his finding, though 
reversed by the commission, that the school district had not 
committed a "discriminatory or unfair labor practice" by 
stating: 
"There was evidence adduced and reason dictates 
that in a small school system, a regularly em­
ployed teacher is far superior to the substitute 
teachers, and that even though lesson plans are 
prepared"in advance, there is no substitute for a 
teacher who has been with the class throughout 
the year, and that the students will not progress 
as well under the substitute teacher as under the 
regularly employed teacher".194 
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and held 
that where a tenured teacher, who had a full adversary hearing 
l93Ibid. 
194Ibid., p. 1169. 
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before the teacher tenure panel which had power to determine 
his claims of religious discrimination, did not seek judicial 
review of adverse recommendation of the panel and his dis­
missal by the school district/ but instead sought a new pro­
ceeding before the Civil Rights Commission/ the doctrine of res 
judicata served as a bar to relitigation of issues raised 
or could have been raised by the teacher before the panel and 
on judicial review.The Colorado Supreme Court modified 
and affirmed the Appeal Court's decision. 
In 1977/ Roberta Waldman/ a Jewish teacher, sought relief 
from her school district for an unpaid leave of absence to 
celebrate Rosh Hashanah. The California Education Code^® 
allowed the school district to adopt rules governing teacher 
absences falling in categories of personal necessity. Leaves 
for religious reasons are not included in paid leaves of 
absence in enumerating circumstances of personal necessity. 
The California Superior Court, San Bernardino, held 
for the school district and reasoned that religion in the 
abstract is not a necessity. 
In addressing the question of religion, the court 
pointed out that a certain percentage of the American popula­
tion are atheists or agnostics or fall into broad groups 
^•^^Umberfield v. School District #11# Colorado, 522 
P2d 730 (1974). 
196Education Code, California, Section 13468.5. 
*®^California Teacher's Association v. Board of Trustees# 
138 Cal. Rptr.# 817 (1977). 
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with vague Christian origins. Those persons falling into 
groups with no religious faith—atheists, agnostics and 
indifferents —lead happy, productive lives. They are not 
anti-religious/ simply non-religious, and are not accorded a 
status under the Constitution. Because of accident of 
history, ours is a culture based on Christian practices. 
Thus business, industry, and government observe the five-day 
week, allowing a Christian to attend his religious obser-
198 
vances on the two remaining days of the week. Within 
this setting, a Christian who works in occupations of seven-
day necessity (fire, police, transportion, medical services) 
and who wants Sunday off must make some accommodation to that 
effect with his employer. He has no constitutional right 
to a day of paid leave of absence to attend church on Sunday. 
If his religious beliefs require his appearance on Sunday to be 
a personal necessity, he must pursue other occupations.^"99 
The issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to a day 
of paid leave of absence to attend a religious observance. It 
is clear that it was not an abuse of discretion by the school 
board in denying her that privilege. Citing Cummins, the 
court held that the school board afforded her "reasonable 
accommodation"2°° within the scope of its discretion by not 
198Ibid. 
199Ibid. 
2®°Cummins v. Parker Seal Company, 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
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disciplining Waldman and denying a day's salary. The court/ 
upon invitation declined to address the establishment clause 
of the federal and state Constitutions plus article 26, sec­
tion 5 of the California Constitution which provides in sub­
stance that no school district shall pay any money for any 
religious purposes; it rendered a purely advisory opinion, 
In 1979, the Supreme Court of California reversed the 
lower court's decision in upholding the dismissal of Edward 
Byars, a member of the World Wide Church of God, for being 
absent from his duties attending holy day assemblies. Byars 
was employed by the Ducor Union School District in 1969 and 
joined the World Wide Church of God in 1971. In accommo­
dating his Sabbath observance, the district excused Byars 
from Saturday activities and permitted his absence on two 
holy days in 1971. 
In subsequent years, Byars was absent after being denied 
leave for religious reasons, notwithstanding his advance 
request and preparation of detailed lesson plans for the 
substitute. In 1973, Rankings, the district superintendent, 
issued Byars a letter of reprimand, stating the district's 
disapproval of the unexcused absences with warning that their 
continuance would justify his dismissal. By the same letter 
the district rehired Byars as a permanent employee. 
2°lcalifornia Teacher's Association v. Board of Trustees, 
138 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1977). 
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The school district notified Byars in 1975 of its 
intent to dismiss him for "persistent violation of or 
refusal to obey the school laws of the state or reasonable 
regulations prescribed for..the public schools"202/ as noted 
in the California Education Code/ basing the charges solely 
on the absences.2®^ At Byars' request, a hearing was con­
ducted by the California Commission on Professional Compe­
tence/ at which time the district superintendent testified that 
"a substitute cannot equal a good teacher because the substi­
tute takes time to become acquainted with the pupils' 
abilities and discipline problems and...to provide continuity 
of instruction."204 T^e commission held that Byars'absences 
had no substantial detrimental effect on the educational pro­
gram and that the district's denial of his request for reli­
gious leave and threats of dismissal for such absences inter-
205 
fered with his free exercise of religion. The commission 
further contended that the district's practice violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article 1/ Section 4, of the California Constitution/ and that 
therefore he had not failed to obey a valid school law or 
202Education Code, California/ Section 44932. 
203Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence of 
Ducor/ 154 Cal. Rptr. 907. 
204Ibid./ p. 909. 
205Ibid. 
153-
regulation. 206 «rhe trial court ruled that Byars'i discharge 
was proper on the record of the commission. 
In overturning the lower court/ the California Supreme 
Court held that Section 8 of the California Constitution for­
bids not only overt religious discrimination but also quali­
fications for employment that are discriminatory in effect 
despite the fact that the stated reason for the dismissal was 
for Byars' religion but nonattendance at school in accordance 
with district rules. 
The court cited the fact that no published opinion 
seems to have construed Article 1/ Section 8 of the California 
Constitution prohibition of religious discrimination but 
pointed out that tasks whose requirement by the employer 
would constitute unlawful religious discrimination have 
most frequently been drawn under the federal Civil Rights Act 
of 1964/ Section 703 (a)(1), which make it unlawful for any 
employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual 
with respect to his compensation/ terms/ conditions/ or 
privileges of employment/ because of such individual... 
20ft religion...." ° The implementation of this provision was 
206Ibid. 
207Ibid./ p. 910 
20842 U.S. C. 20000 2(a)(1). 
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provided by the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
in 1967 with guidelines declaring "that the duty not to 
discriminate on religious grounds includes an obligation to 
make reasonable accommodation to employees'religious needs 
insofar as possible without undue hardship on the employer's 
.. 209 business". 
These guidelines became a part of the 1972 Amendments 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act/ and five years later the United 
States Supreme Court in Trans World Airlines v. Hardison2^ 
upheld the statute as a "defensible construction of the pre-
1972 statute".The Rankins court in rendering its deci­
sion cited the earlier federal district court decision of Griggs/ 
p i  o  
Yott, Dewey and Reid giving approval of the guidelines 
requirement of reasonable accommodation without undue hard­
ship as a proper application of the principle that discrimi­
nation may be established by showing the disproportionate 
impact of an employment practice not justified by "business 
necessity". 
20929 C.F.R./ 1605.1. 
210Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
211Ibid./ p. 76. 
212GriggS Vm DUke power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971);Yott v. 
North American Rockwell Corp/ 501 F2d 398 (1974); Dewey v. 
Reynolds Metal Co./ 429 F2d 324 (1970); Reid v. Memphis Pub­
lishing Co, 521 F2d 512 (1975). 
2^Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. p. 431. 
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The Rankins court contended that the school district 
failed to make reasonable accommodation to Byars1 desire to 
observe his church's holy day assemblies. Citing a compari­
son with Hardison,214 the court held that accommodations in 
Rankins were not as extensive; thus the school district could 
adjust to Byars' absences without comparable burden. There 
were no shortages of fully qualified substitute teachers who 
could be called in to replace Byars at no additional cost to 
the district. 
Accordingly, the merits of the district's claim of undue 
hardship must stand on substantial evidence supporting a 
substantial detrimental effect on the educational program 
not the district; the California Supreme Court held that 
finding not thus supported. The Court held that there is 
evidence that instruction by a regular teacher is preferable 
to instruction by a substitute teacher; however, such evidence 
fails to show that Byars' absence for five to ten holy days 
imposed a hardship sufficiently severe to warrant dismissal 
from employment. In citing the California statute, the 
Court pointed out that each teacher is allowed at least ten 
(10) days of paid leave each year for illness or personal 
necessity and a district unwilling to pay for leave for 
214Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, (1977). 
215 
Rankins v. Commission, p. 911. 
156 
religious purposes as a personal necessity must then accommo­
date those purposes by allowing a reasonable amount of unpaid 
leave. The unpaid leave required by Byar^ religious obser-
2] g 
vances would not be unreasonably burdensome. 
In citing Walz v. Tax C o m m i s s i o n /the Court held that 
the neutrality commanded by the establishment clause did not 
require the school district to extend its accommodation for 
Byars? religious observance to other employees who seek time 
for secular purposes. Without violating the establishment 
clause/ governments may lighten the burden consequent on 
religious practices through laws that are secular in purpose/ 
218 
evenhanded in operation/and neutral in primary effect. 
The Rankins Court/ in concluding/ held that the effect 
of the accommodation is to lessen the discrepancy between the 
conditions imposed on Byars' religious observances and those 
enjoyed by adherents of majority religion as a result of the 
five-day week and the Christmas and Easter vacations or 
regular school calendars. The Court in interpreting Article 
1/ Section 8 of the California Constitution held that it did 
not require full equality of treatment of all employees' 
religious practices under all circumstances; it does require 
2*^Walz v. Tax Commission/ 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
218Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971). 
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whatever reduction of inequality of treatment is possible 
through reasonable steps that do not impose undue hardship 
as employers.219 
In a case involving a teacher whose dismissal was sought 
by the school district because of his unauthorized absence 
from school for two periods on December 1/ 1978, the plaintiff 
sought relief; charging his dismissal deprived him of both 
his First Amendment rights to free exercise of religion and 
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. During 
the hearing process# it was noted in testimony that the plaintiff 
Niederhuber/ a member of the World Wide Church of God/had 
submitted a written request to the school superintendent to 
take personal leave on October 2 and 11/ 1978 to observe the 
religious holy days of Feast of Trumpets and Day of Atonement. 
The request was approved with one day with pay and one day 
without pay. Later/ on October 4 he filed a second request 
for leave to enable him to observe the Feast of the Taber­
nacles which extended from October 16 to October 23, 1978/ 
causing him to be absent six days. The request was denied 
with the explanation that granting it would "start a bad 
precedent"; however/ upon inquiry Niederhuber was assured 
that his job would not be in jeopardy when he returned. 
Niederhuber absented himself for the requested period and was 
disallowed salary for the days missed. 
219 
Rankins v. Commission/ p. 914. 
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On November 30, 1978/ the plaintiff notified his supervisor 
that he must be excused from the last two periods on the 
following day for "very personal business". Niederhuber left 
school with the understanding that his classes would be cover­
ed via a customary practice of the school. 
Following a memorandum from the supervisor to the super­
intendent regarding the plaintiff's absence from the last 
two periods on December 1, 1978/ the superintendent at the 
next board meeting made his recommendation that Niederhuber 
be dismissed. The following day the plaintiff was informed 
by letter that his "services were no longer needed". 
Niederhuber was represented before the board by a repre­
sentative of the New Jersey Education Association who accused 
the board of committing a misdemeanor under New Jersey law 
and immediately following that/ the board terminated the 
plaintiff without a written statement of the reasons. 
The district court hearing the evidence reasoned from 
the plaintiff's contention that even if his two-period ab­
sence was a factor contributing to the board's decision to 
terminate his contract/ the btoard would never have reached 
the same decision if it had not taken into account the 
religious absence in addition to Neiderhuber's two-period 
220 001 . 
absence. Citing Mt. Healthly v. Doyle/ x the District 
^^Niederhuber v. Camden/ 495 F. Supp 273 (1980). 
221Mt. Healthly v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
159 
Court reasoned that: 
"We find that plaintiff's eight days of religious 
absences was a 'motivating factor in the superin­
tendent's recommendation that plaintiff be dis­
charged and that the superintendent and Board of 
Education would not have reached that decision 
had they relied exclusively on his two-period 
absence ".2 22 
The Court was not convinced by the Board's insistence 
that the distinguishing factor was the plaintiff's request 
and refusal to divulge reasons for the two-period absence. 
Moreover* the court reasoned that the evidence/ though cir­
cumstantial/ links the superintendent's recommendation of 
dismissal to his religious absences/ and the tie between the 
unauthorized religious absence and the unauthorized two-
period absence is unmistakable.223 Senior District Court 
Judge Cohen noted that the court found the plaintiff's 
dismissal was related to his religious absence ; it did not 
discern any evidence of discriminatory intent. He further 
noted that even if the board did not deliberately discrimi­
nate against the plaintiff's religion/ or even if the dis­
charge was motivated by secular concerns/ citing Wisconsin 
v. Yoder/224 that 
000 
Niederhuber v. Camden/ 495 F. Supp. 273 (1980) 
223Ibid 
224 
Wisconsin v. Yoderf 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
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"Government action, neutral on its face may, 
in its application nonetheless offend the 
constitutional requirement for governmental 
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free 
exercise of r e l i g i o n " .^25 
Moreover, he stated: 
"The Civil Rights Act of 1964 proscribes not 
only overt discrimination but also practices 
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in 
operation. The touchstone is business neces­
sity".226 
Thus, the critical inquiry is the coercive effect of govern­
ment action as it operates against an individual in the 
practice of his or her religion.227 
The defendant board urged the court* should it find that the 
plaintiff's contract terminated for exercise of his religious 
beliefs/that it did so to protect the "efficient functioning 
of the educational process",22® citing Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, amended 1974,229 Jordan230 and Hardison,231 
and that so accommodating "the plaintiff would constitute an undue 
225Ibid. 
226Niederhuber v. Camden, 495 F. Supp. 273 (1980). 
227Ibid.,citing Abington v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
Niederhuber v. Camden 495 F. Supp. 273 (1980). 
22942 U.S.C. 2000e(j). 
230Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank, 565 F2d 72 
(1977). 
23*Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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burden.232 
The District Court disagreed and found the cases to be 
distinguishable from the case at bar. In contrast/ Nieder-
huber's religious demands were much less substantial a 
burden. Unlike the Trans World Airlines case/ the difficulty 
in finding a replacement at comparable rate of pay was not 
compelling. There was no shortage of competent substitute 
teachers. The Court contended that hiring substitute teachers 
would not add cost to the Hoard since the plaintiff was will­
ing to take his religious leave without pay and/in contrast 
to the facts in Trans World Airlines/excusing the plaintiff 
for religious purposes would not force the employer to violate 
any existing union agreements.233 
In response to the Board's contention that substitute 
teachers would abate a "stable and structured learning environ-
ment"234# court cited the analysis employed by the Rankins235 
court and cited the purpose underlying the duty of accommoda­
tion for teachers: 
"It is simply to lessen the discrepancy between 
the conditions imposed...plaintiff's religious 
observances and those enjoyed/ say, for observance 
by adherents of majority religions as a result of 
the five-day week and the Christmas and Easter 
vacations or regular school calendars".236 
232Niederhuber v. Camden/ 495 F. Supp. 273 (1980). 
233ibid. 
234Ibid. 
235Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence of 
Ducor, 154 Cal Rptr. 907 (1979). 
236jbid. , j p .  914 
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Moreover/ the court recognized/as did the Rankins court/ 
that the constitutional right to exercise one's religion does 
not require "full equality of treatment of all employees* 
237 
religious practices under all circumstances." 
In concluding/ the District Court found the Board failed 
to demonstrate sufficiently compelling reasons for the 
plaintiff's dismissal or that accommodating his religious con­
viction would result in undue hardship and found for the 
plaintiff. 
Answering the defendent's contention of deprivation of 
procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment/ the 
court found his dismissal violating the First Amendment and 
the procedural due process of the decision irrelevant. 
Though not a case involving accommodation for religious 
observance/ the Hunterdon v. Hunterdon decision has implica­
tions to be considered by school boards in policy making and 
negotiations with teacher associations giving rise to granting 
paid leave for religious observance. 
The Hunterdon Central High School Board of Education 
petitioned the New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commis­
sion to rule on the scope of negotiations determinations of 
granting public school teachers paid leave of absence for 
237 
Ibid./p. 914 
^®Niederhuber v. Camden/ 495 F. Supp 273 (1980). 
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religious purposes which otherwise would qualify as a term 
and condition of employment/ and which would nevertheless be 
in violation of the establishment clause of the First Amend­
ment of the United States Constitution and outside the scope 
of collective negotiation and not arbitrable. 
The action arose following the request of a teacher in 
the Hunterdon School District for permission to take December 
8/ 1978 as a "religious" leave day. The board's personnel 
director granted the request stipulating that the leave could 
be taken without pay or charged against the allowable number of 
leave days for personal reasons as provided in the negotiated 
contract with the Hunterdon Central High School Teachers' 
Association. The teacher claimed discrimination on religious 
grounds and after unsuccessfully gaining redress through the 
contractual grievance procedure and through the association 
availed himself of the arbitration provision in the contract 
and served notice upon the board for two demands for arbitration 
One demand alleged a unilateral change in the leave policy of 
loss of religious holidays/ and the second complained of im­
proper denial of religious holidays.239 
Arbitration was stayed when the board filed its petition 
with the Public Employment Relations Commission. After 
2^9Hunterdon Central High School Board of Education v. 
Hunterdon Central High School Teacher's Association/ N.J. 
Super. A.D. 416 A2d 980 (1980). 
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considering the petition, the Commission issued a Decision 
and Order in which it stated that "interpreting matters of 
constitutional law is not within our area of expertise" 240 
but nevertheless held that: 
"granting of additional days off with pay, i.e./ 
not charged to personal days, vacation, or any 
other leave available to all employees, specifi­
cally for the observance of religion does vio­
late the constitutional prohibition against the 
establishment of religion. These are additional 
leave days that can only be granted for religious 
observance; and a benefit that non-religious 
employees can never enjoy. 'It aids all religions 
as against non-believers'. Accordingly, the 
commission finds that the demand for arbitration 
herein is outside the scope of collective nego­
tiation and is neither negotiable nor arbitrable. 
The request for permanent restraints of arbitration 
is granted".241 
On appeal to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellat 
Division, the teacher association disputed the jurisdiction 
of the Public Employment Relations Commission to rule on the 
scope issue on a constitutional basis, contending the commis 
sion usurped the function of the courts. The Superior Court 
citing the New Jersey statute) ruled that the commission 
had jurisdiction in the issue subject to review by the 




New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act., N.J.S.A 
34: 13A-1 Section 5.4(d). 
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board and the association, the parties had a contractual 
obligation to negotiate, but, preliminarily, the Commission 
had to make a scope determination because matters which can 
not legally be negotiated in the first place cannot be arbi­
trable. 
The school board argued that an administrative agency 
can make decisions within its area of competence and not 
exceed its jurisdiction merely because it applies relevant 
law, in this case the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The court agreed holding that the commission's 
authority is broad enough to enable it to apply laws other 
than those which it administers and should be censured "so as 
I  
permit the fullest accomplishment of the legislative in-
244 
tent". Further, in response, the court stated: 
"We discern no sound reason to deprive PERC of 
the power to declare a proposal non-negotiable 
on the ground that its acceptance would be con­
stitutionally objectionable. It has been said 
that 'administrative agencies are competent to 
pass upon constitutional issues germane to pro­
ceedings before them; and that 'such action is 
necessary so as to better focus the issue for 
judicial review, if such action is later neces­
sary. '1,245 
In ruling on the correctness of the commission's action, 
the Court held that the commission correctly concluded that 
243 
Hunterdon v. Hunterdon, p. 983. 
244Plainfield Board of Education v. Plainfield Education 
Association, 366 A2d 703 (1976). 
245Hunterdon v. Hunterdon p. 983. 
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the granting of paid leaves of absence for religious purposes 
would be violative of the establishment clause of the First 
Amendment of the Constitution which requires strict 
246 
governmental neutrality with respect to religion. 
The Superior Court took the view that agreements by a 
board of education to grant paid leaves of absence for 
religious purposes would not meet the requirements of the 
tri-partite test which holds that the action have a secular 
purpose/ a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion,an<a mUst not foster an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.24® Here, the court concluded 
there would be no secular purpose and the sole purpose would 
be to permit certain teachers to be absent for religious 
reasons, even though the number of days might be limited. 
Moreover/ the effect would enhance religion at the exclusion 
of those having no religious persuasion. Since teachers 
availing themselves of such leave of absence would be paid 
from tax money/ the action would be so intertwined with 
religion as to foster excessive government entanglement with 
religion.249 
24®Resnick v. East Brunswick Tp. Bd. of Ed.# 389 A2d 944 
(1978). 
2 4 ^ A b i n g t o n  school District v. Schempp, 374 U.S.203 (1963). 
24®Walz v. Tax Commission/ 397 U.S. 664 (1970). 
249Hunterdon v. Hunterdon/ p. 985. 
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The court affirmed the Public Employment Relations 
Commission's action and noted there was no issue of the 
boards duty to reasonably accommodate an employee's desire 
to observe or practice his religious beliefs by allowing 
unpaid leave without penalty or permitting such absences to 
be charged against allowable paid leave for reason of personal 
necessity.250 
In 1981, the United States Court of Appeals/ Fourth Cir­
cuit, heard a claim brought against the School Board of the 
City of Norton, Virginia by a teacher's aide, Ruby Edwards, 
alleging that the school board failed to accommodate her 
religious practices under provisions of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
When Edwards began work for the school board as a 
teacher's aide, her duties ranged from collecting lunch money 
to grading papers. Gradually, she assumed more responsibility 
and began providing instruction to educable students who were 
mentally retarded or slow learners. Because of the special 
and individualized nature of her work, no substitutes were 
available. During the 1969 school year she was absent for 
29 and one-half days. In 1970 and 1971, Edwards missed 45 
days. 
OCf) 
'-'"Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence of 
Ducor, 154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979). 
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In the fall of 1971/ Edwards was informed that her ab­
sences for holy day observance by the World Wide Church of 
God would no longer be permitted. She was told that due to 
the increased teaching duties# the unavailability of substi­
tutes aides required her daily presence. Despite the board's 
admonition/ she was allowed to observe the holy days in 
1971. 
The board denied the request/ in September of 1972/ to 
attend a religious convocation in observance of the holy 
days. Nevertheless/ Edwards followed her previous practice 
and abstained from her duties to observe the holy days. 
Following the board's dismissal/ she filed a complaint with 
the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission and received 
a right to sue letter in April/ 1977 and sought reinstatement 
and back pay from the date of discharge/ alleging she had 
been unable to find employment except for several months in 
1975. 
The district court held that the school board failed to 
show that accommodation would create an undue hardship on 
the conduct of the school's operation. It concluded that the 
board had violated the provisions of the Civil Rights Act.2^ 
In proceeding to the Court of Appeals/ the board did not ap-
252 
peal the lower court's ruling of violation of the provision. 
251 
42 U.S.C., 2000e-z (a) (1). 
252Ibid. 
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The District Court limited Edwards' back pay and denied 
reinstatement based on two points: (1) Edwards was untenured 
and had no property interest at stake beyond the one year 
contract and (2) the school board would not have rehired 
Edwards for another year regardless of religious practices 
because of her excessive absences that were not related to 
her religion.253 
The Fourth Circuit Court supported its conclusion that 
Edwards was required to prove a property interest in her job 
254 
beyond the current year by citing Board of Regents v. Roth^ 
a noncontrolling case/ but nevertheless one showing 
that the due process clause affords procedural prohibition to 
a person's property interest/ but it does not create this 
255 interest. 
In contrast to procedural rights secured by the due 
process/ Title VII creates a substantive right "to assure 
that freedom from religious discrimination in the employment 
256 of workers is for all time guaranteed by law". To remedy 
an illegal discharge/ Congress intended that the Civil Rights 
Act permits the courts to award back pay and reinstatement/ 
^"^Edwards v. Norton/ 658 F 2d 951/ 953 (1981). 
2^Board of Regents v. Roth# 408 U.S. 562 (1972). 
255Ibid. /•,p. 577. 
2^6Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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but it did not authorize restricting the back pay to an un­
paid balance for the remaining period of an employee's 
contract.^57 Moreover, the court reasoned that Congress 
modeled the back pay provision of Title VII on the provision 
in the National Labor Relations Act which provides that back 
pay for "an unlawfully terminated employee begins with the 
date of discharge and continues until the employer makes a 
O C Q 
valid offer of reinstatement." 
The Appeals Court found that the District Court's con­
cluding that Edwards had no property interest in the job 
beyond the current year by finding that; regardless of her 
religious absences, the school board would not have renewed 
her contract for 1973-74 was in error. 
In viewing the record as a whole, the higher court con­
cluded that the conflict between the school board and Edwards 
was her observance of her religious holy days for which it 
discharged Edwards. The higher court noted that the school 
board had not proved that it could not accommodate the 
religious absences. Moreover, the higher court noted that 
the judgment of the lower court could not suffice as a basis 
for the decision. 
Citing Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter's opinion in 
257Edward v. Norton,658 F2d 951 (1981). 
2^®Polynesian Cultural Center, 222 NLRB 1192 (1976) 
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SEC v. Chenery,2^ "a reviewing court should not substitute 
its judgment for a decision which the agency alone is author­
ized to make".The court reasoned that the principle of 
law applied/and the lower court exceeded the bounds of dis­
cretion when it limited back pay and denied reinstatement 
because it concluded the school board would not rehire 
Edwards.261 
The higher court supported its findings by saying that 
Edwards' entitlement to back pay and reinstatement would not 
necessarily survive every change of circumstance. If/for 
example# the board abolished the position for either educa­
tional or financial reasons, Edwards'right to relief would 
cease at the time the change occurred. 
Title VII provisions allow back pay awards with reduc­
tion allowable for "interim earnings or amounts earnable with 
reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated 
against.... 263 Thus an improperly dismissed employee may not 
remain idle and recover lost wages from the date of discharge. 
After unlawfully discharged employees produce evidence in 
support of their claims for back pay# with contention that 
they were unable to find comparable work/ the employer has 
259sec V. Chenery Corp./ 318 U.S. 80 (1943). 
260Ibid. 
261Edwards v. Norton/ 658 F2d 951 (1981). 
262Ibid. 
26342 U.S.c./ 2000c 5(g). 
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the burden of showing that reasonable efforts were exerted 
264 
to mitigate the damages. 
The Appeals Court found that the lower court in limit­
ing back pay found it unnecessary to consider mitigations 
of damages and made no finding of fact on the issue other 
than expressing the opinion that Edwards' efforts were in­
sufficient.^®^ Thus, the Appeals Court held that the lower 
court's opinion was a misapprehension of the law concerning 
the burden of proof on the issue of mitigation. In view of 
the finding/ the Fourth Circuit Court vacated and remanded 
the decision. 
In 1982/ the United States District Court/ South Dakota/ 
rendered its decision on a claim by an Industrial Arts 
teacher in the Watertown School District No. 14-4 of Codington 
County/ South Dakota/ that the teacher had established a prima 
facie case of religious discrimination after the school board 
refused to accommodate his religious practice by permitting 
his leave of absence and asserting that no substitute 
teachers were available. After being denied the religious 
leave in 1973 to observe the Feast of Tabernacle^ which is 
observed annually in the fall by the World Wide Church of 
264Tayior v. Philips Industries/ Inc. 593 F2d 783 (1979). 
265E(jwar(g Norton/ 483 F Supp. 620/ 629. 
^^Edward v. Norton 658 F2d 951 (1981. 
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God, plaintiff Orley B. Wangsness prepared detailed lesson 
plans for his classes and absented himself from'his teaching 
duties despite the board's denial of the leave and warning 
that he would be terminated should he attend the religious 
feast. 
Following the termination of his contract/ Wangsness 
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission which referred the complaint to the South Dakota 
Commission on Human Rights. On or about the same time# 
Wangsness filed a separate complaint with the South Dakota 
Division of Human Rights. The Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission found probable cause to believe that the plaintiff 
had been discriminated against on account of his religion 
and concluded that the defendant school board did commit an 
act of religious discrimination against Wangsness by dis-
. . 267 
missing him. 
Nearly three years (1977) later/ the EEOC issued a 
Notice of Right to sue. Thereupon/ Wangsness commenced his 
action under 42 U.S.C./ 2000e of the Civil Rights Act. 
The United States district Court/ South Dakota,held that 
Wangsness had established, a prima facie case of religious 
^6^Wangsness v. Watertown, 541 F Supp. 332 (1982). 
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discrimination under the provision of the Civil Rights Act2®® 
as enumerated in the Brown v. General Motors Corp.269 deci­
sion which requires the following elements: 
(1) a bona fide belief that compliance with an 
employment requirement is contrary to plaintiff's 
religious faith; 
(2) plaintiff informed his or her employer about 
the conflict; and 
(3) plaintiff was discharged because of his or 
her refusal to comply with the employment require­
ment .270 
The Court in determining that a prima facie case of 
religious discrimination had occurred, shifted the burden to 
the defendent school board to show it had made a good faith 
effort to accommodate the religious beliefs of Wangsness. 
The school board was unable to show that accommodation would 
result in an undue hardship. The Court applied the reasoning 
shown in Yott27^- after the employee had informed the employer 
of his religious beliefs and the conflict resulting from the 
work rules.272 Moreover, the court cited the provisions of 
42 U.S.C., 20003(j) which requires the employer to demon­
strate the hardship on the conduct of business as explained 
by the United States Supreme Court in Hardison;27^ 
26842U.S.C., 2000e-z(a)(i)(j). 
26^Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F2d 956 (1979). 
270Ibid.,|p. 959. 
271Yott v. North American Rockwell Corp., 602 F2d 904 
(1979). 
272Ibid., 907. 
27^Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison,432 U.S. 63 
(1977). 
175 
"The intent and effect of this definition was 
to make it an unlawful employment practice 
under section 2000e-2 (a)(1) for an employer 
not to make reasonable accommodation short of 
undue hardship for the religious practices of 
his employees and prospective employee".274 
District Court Judge Donald J. Porter/ after finding 
insufficient evidence of reasonable accommodation/ examined 
the defendant's defense of undue hardship and reasoned that 
the school board failed to demonstrate an undue hardship. 
Despite the fact that the school board held that a qualified 
substitute was not available/ the court found that the class 
had made more than satisfactory progress from the lesson 
plans left by Wangsness and under the substitute's supervision. 
The school board's claim of hardship was reasoned to spring 
from the "position that all substitute teachers perform a 
role more akin to that of a babysitter than an educator".275 
Judge Porter characterized the hardship asserted by the 
board to be more hypothetical which the Brown276 court re­
jected : 
274Ibid.,p. 74. 
^^Wangsness v. Watertown ,\ 541 F Supp 332 (1982). 
276Brown v. General Motors/ 601 F2d 956 (1979) . 
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"If an employer stands on weak ground when ad­
vancing hypothetical hardships in a factual 
vacuum# then surely his footing is even more 
precarious when the proposed accommodation has 
been tried and the postulated hardship did not 
arise'." ̂ 7 
The defendant board, relying on the District Court's 
278 decision in Edwards, sought to compensate Wangness only 
the amount equal to wages for the contractual year of his 
probationary status. Judge Porter cited 'the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruling "that a district court does not have 
discretion to limit a back pay award under Title VII to the 
279 
period of the claimant's current employment"i He noted 
the opinion in Norton280 that "the due process clause secures 
procedural right whereas Title VII creates a substantive 
281 282 
right". Further relying on the Edwards Court/ Judge 
283 Porter held that "under the 'Labor Act'/ the back pay 
period for an unlawfully limited employee commences with the 
date of discharge and continues until the employer makes a 
284 
valid offer of reinstatement". 
277Ibid., p.; 960. 
27®Edwards v. Norton,483 F. Supp 620 (1980). 
279j«;dwards v. Norton, 659 F2d 951 (1981). 
280Ibid., p. 954. 
281Ibid. 
282Ibid., p. 951. 
28329 U.S.C., 160(c). 
284gdwards v. Norton, 658 F2d 951 (1981). 
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In the findings of the Court/ Wangsness was entitled to 
back pay from the date of his unlawful discharge to the date 
of the judgment of the District Court, less interim wages. 2®^ 
Because teachers are likely to have different religions 
and different degrees of devotion to their religions/ a 
school district cannot be expected to establish or negotiate 
leave policies broad enough to suit every employee's religion 
needs perfectly.286 In a case appealed to the Tenth Circuit 
Court by Gerald Pinsker, a Jewish School teacher* alleging 
that the school district's leave policy discriminated against 
him and other Jewish teachers on the basis of religion and 
unconstitutionally burdened his right to free exercise of 
religion. The Tenth Circuit Court affirmed the lower court's 
findings that the teacher did not have to violate his reli­
gious beliefs for the sake of continued employment or re-
287 linguish employment to obey a tenet of faith. 
28ft 
The lower court reasoned from Rankin in stating: 
"It is patently clear that no person may constitutionally be 
put in the dilemma of choosing between employment and religion"/ 
2®5wangness v. Watertown, 541 F Supp. 341 (1982). 
286pinsker v. Joint District/ 735 F2d 388 (1984). 
287Ibid/ 544 FSupp. 1049 (1983). 
288Rankins v. Commission or Professional Competence/ 
593 p.2d 852 (1979). 
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pQQ ?QO 
and from Brown"017 and T o o l e y " i n  r e m i n d i n g  e m p l o y e r s  w h o  
punish employees by placing the latter in a position in which 
they must ignore a tenet of faith to retain employment/ is 
291 
in violation of the Civil rights Act. 
Citing these standards/ the court found that such was 
292 
not the case with the plaintiff/ Pinsker. The claim arose 
because the school district's leave policy did not permit the 
plaintiff paid leave to attend all religious services he would 
like to attend on the holy days of Yom Kippur and Rosh Hashanah. 
Further/ the plaintiff contended that the school calendar per­
mits Christian teachers to observe their religious services 
without resorting to their two days of personal leave. 
The defendant contended that the leave policy did not 
impair the teacher's religious freedom as he was free to take 
unpaid leave to attend religious services. The defendant 
further contended that the policy permits two personal leave 
days with pay for each teacher each year and these day may 
be used for any number of personal reasons/ including attend­
ance at religious services. 
2®9Brown v. General Motors/ 601 F2d 956 (1979). 
290 
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta corp./ 648 F2d 1239 (1981). 
29142 U.S.C./ 2000e - 2(a) (i). 
292 
Pinsker v. Joint District/ 544 F Supp 1049 (1983). 
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The Appeals Court/ in review, cited 42 U.S.C./ 2000e 
293 
(j) which provides: 
"The term 'religion' includes all aspects of 
religious observance and practice/ as well as 
belief/ unless an employer demonstrates that 
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
employees or prospective employees religious 
observance or practice without undue hardship 
on the conduct of the employer's business." 
and using Hardison^^ in holding that the Supreme Court ruled 
that the intent and effect of this definition of "religion" 
is to make a violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) "for an 
employer not to make reasonable accommodation short of undue 
hardship/ for the religious practices of employees..."^95 
The Tenth Circuit Court held that Title VII requires 
reasonable accommodation and does not require employers to 
accommodate the religious practices of an employee in exactly 
the way the employee would like to be accommodated/ nor does 
Title VII require employers to accommodate an employee,'s re­
ligious practices in a way that spares the employee any cost 
whatsoever.^96 
Moreover/ the circuit court held that the defendant's 
policy and practice jeopardized neither Pinsker's job norl his 
293Titie VII/ Civil Rights Act/ 1964.. 
294^rans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
295Ibid. 
296Pinsker v. Joint District/ 735 F2d 388 (1984). 
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observation of religious holidays,and the policy, although 
it may require teachers to take occasional unpaid leave, 
was not an unreasonable accommodation of teachers' religious 
practices.297 
A Connecticut teacher, alleging that the school board's 
leave policy of allowing three days paid leave for religious 
purposes and not allowing the three days of paid leave for 
personal business to be used for religious observance/con­
flicted with his religious beliefs which prohibited him from 
engaging in secular employment on church holy days, more than 
three of which occur during the school year. 
For a period of time, Ronald Philbrook/an employee of 
the Ansonia school board and a member of the World Wide Church 
of God, refrained from his teaching duties more than the per­
mitted three days for religious reasons, taking a loss of pay 
for the days in excess of the religious days provision. How­
ever, in 1976, Philbrook ceased taking the unauthorized leaves 
for religious reasons, contending that his family could not 
sustain the financial strain of the docked salary.298 
VJith a "right-to-sue" letter from the Equal Employment 
Opportunities Commission (EEOC) the appellant filed his com­
plaint in federal district court, alleging the school board's 
297Ibid., p. 391. 
29®Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education, 757 F2d 476 
(1985). 
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prohibition from using personal business leave for religious 
observance violated Title VII2" and the First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 
The Federal District Court held that the appellant had 
failed to prove religious discrimination and concluded that 
the school board's policy had not placed Philbrook in a 
position of violating his religion or losing his job.300 
Upon review by the Second Circuit, the court held that 
the appellant had established a prima facie case of discrimi­
nation by his request to be allowed to use the personal busi­
ness days for religious observance and the offer to pay the 
full cost of a substitute instead of being docked the larger 
pro rata salary deduction for observing religious days in 
excess of the three allotted by the bargained contract. 
Moreover, he had agreed to supervise the substitute and to 
make up days missed by performing other school-related work 
at other times. The school board had rejected the offers 
of accommodation by the appellant. Further, the appeals 
court held that discharge is not required to make a prima 
facie showing of religious discrimination,and where employer 
and employee propose a reasonable accommodation to the 
employee's religious need, Title VII requires the employer to 
299Title VII, 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). 
300Philbrook v. Ansonia,757 F2d 476 (1985). 
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accept the proposal employees prefer unless it can demonstrate 
that such accommodation causes undue hardship on the employer's 
conduct of his business.30^ 
In reversing and remanding the case to the lower court/ 
the ADDeals Court cited standards in determining prima facie 
case of religious discrimination as established in Brown/ 
Anderson, and Redman; 
(1) he or she has a bona fide religious belief 
that conflicts with an employment requirement; 
(2) he or she informed the employer of this 
belief; 
(3) he or she was disciplined for failure to 
comply with the conflicting employment require­
ment.^03 
The Appeals Court held that the record showed that plain­
tiff had satisfied this prima facie standard and went on to 
hold that the crucial issues to be determined were the meaning 
and relationship between the terms of "reasonable accommoda-
304 
tion" and "undue hardship". 
Citing the central precedent case of Hardison,30^ the 
court reasoned that Philbrook's job was not as crucial as 
that of Hardison with Trans World Airlines since the cost 
30142 U.S.C. 2000e(j). 
302grown v> General Motors, 601 F2d 956 (1979); iAnderson 
v. General Dynamics Conair Aerospace Division, 589 F2d 397 
(1978); Redman v. GAF Corp./ 574 F2d 897 (1978). 
303Ibid. 
3°4philbrook v. Ansonia,757 F2d 476 (1985). 
305Trans world Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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of Philbrook's substitute would not present additional cost 
to the school board/ and further/ accommodation for Philbrook 
would not disturb seniority rights enunciated in a collective 
bargaining agreement. Using Anderson,30^ the Court rejected 
"any hypothetical hardship", noting that "undue" means some­
thing greater than hardship. Undue hardship cannot be proved 
307 by assumption nor by opinions based in hypothetical facts. 
Further citing Brown/308 the court held that speculative costs 
to the employer could not discharge its burden of proving un­
due hardship.309 
The school board argued that the court accept its long­
standing accommodation of paid leave and unpaid leave for 
religious observance as a reasonable accommodation. Citing 
the Pinsker3*0 decision/ the board held that a policy allowing 
two days of paid leave for religious reasons and additional 
days of unpaid leave satisfied the duty to accommodate. How­
ever/ the Second Circuit held that the Ansonia school board's 
policy was also "reasonable" but duty to accommodate could 
not be defined without reference to undue hardship. "Where 
the employer and employee each propose a reasonable 
30®Anderson v. General Dynamics/ 589 F2d 397 (1978). 
307Ibid. 
30®Brown v. General Motors/ 601 F2d 959 (1979). 
309Ibid. 
3^°Pinsker v. Joint District/ 735 F2d 388 (1984). 
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accommodation/Title VII requires the employer to accept the 
proposal the employee prefers unless that accommodation causes 
311 
undue hardship on the employer's conduct of his business". 
On remand/ the appeals court instructed the lower court to 
"determine whether accepting either of appellants proposed 
accommodations would cause undue hardship."312 Noting the 
record, the court reasoned that it appeared that neither of 
the accommodations would lead to greater than "de minimis" 
costs to the school board.313 
The Philbrook 314 court set aside the school board's claim 
that accommodating the appellant would constitute preferential 
treatment by citing Hardison.315 "Appellant's proposal for 
use of personal business leave for religious observance is 
not one seeing preferential treatment."316 Appellant has 
asked to be treated differently; he has not asked for privi­
leged treatment. In exchange for additional days off/ he is 
willing to make up for time off and pay for the substitute. 
Differential treatment cannot be equated with privileged 




315Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63. 
316Philbrook v. Ansonia/ 757 F2d 476 (1985). 
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treatment.317 The court held that accepting the school 
board's argument" would preclude all forms of accommodation 
318 
and defeat the very purpose behind section 2000e(j): 
"The term 'religion' includes all aspects of reli­
gious observance and practice/ as well as belief/ 
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable 
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or ... 
religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer's busi­
ness" . 319 
Summary 
Reasonable accommodation for an employee's religious obser­
vance has continued to be litigated since the passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act/ amended in business/ industry/and 
public education. The United States Supreme Court has estab­
lished a broad interpretation for religion and the employer's 
duty to accommodate for the employee's practice of such beliefs 
short of an undue hardship on the employers conduct of busi­
ness. In light of the broad interruption/ inferior courts 
continue to rely on the broad parameters set by the Supreme 
Court but nevertheless/ examine the individual case find­
ings to render decisions/ often times different/ in maintain­
ing a separation of church-state relations. 
317Ibid. 
3*8Brown v. General Motors/ 601 F2d 962 (1979). 
•^lQ 
42 U.S.C. 2000e(j). 
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OP SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS 
Introduction and Overview 
In most of the more advanced nations there is a common 
civil calendar which takes into account the solar and lunar 
cycles with considerable accuracy. This calendar/ the Gre­
gorian/ was worked out under the patronage of Pope Gregory 
XIII and adopted in 1582. England adopted the calendar 170 
years later and the American colonies followed suit at the 
same time. This is the calendar used in civil and business 
affairs of all Christian nations and many other nations. 
Although Christmas was established as December 25th and many 
of the events of the Christian Church year fall on fixed 
calendar dates in relation to Christmas/ neither the Christ­
ian Church calendar nor that of any other religious group 
coincides exactly with the civil calendar.^" 
The public school calendar varies from state to state. 
It is usually governed by some fundamental legislative re­
quirement for the number of days school is to be in session 
"''Donald E. Boles/ et al., "Religion In the Public Schools: 
A Report by the Commission on Religion in the Public Schools". 
American Association of School Administrators/ (Reston/ Va 
1964): pp. 38-39. 
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as well as by other statutes which require the schools to 
observe some special days# some by closing. In contrast to 
a calendar of working days in business and industry/ the 
typical public school calendar is established not so much by 
enumerating the holidays/ as it is by designing a schedule 
of days on which school shall be in session to meet the 
state requirements and to be compatible with the civil and/ 
2 in some cases, church calendars. The public school calendars 
in the fifty states/ District of Columbia/and Puerto Rico 
conform to the five-day work week/ thus/ very seldom posing 
a problem for the Sunday Sabbatarian. 
The courts have been called upon to decide conflicts 
between the employee's religious beliefs and practices and 
the employer's work schedules where accommodation was sought 
outside the established work schedule. 
School boards now find themselves in a position of hav­
ing to show that accommodating the beliefs and practices of 
majority and minority religious employees does not work an 
undue hardship on the conduct of their business. 
As a review of the cases will indicate/ the courts have 
been maintaining the wall of separation between church and 
state in providing reasonable accommodation of employees' 
religious beliefs and practices while requiring the school 
boards and other employers to accommodate those religious 
2 
Ibid., p. 41. 
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beliefs and practices short of an undue hardship. In recent 
decisions, the courts have applied a test for employers' 
policies on religious accommodation which has evolved from 
the United States Supreme Court decision ensuring (1) that 
the policies have a secular effect; (2) that the policies 
neither advance nor prohibit ^religion; and (3) that the 
3 
policies do not involve excessive governmental entanglement. 
Organization of Cases Selected for Review 
Cases chosen for review in this chapter were selected 
because they met one or more of the following criteria: 
(1) The case is considered to have been a landmark case 
in the broad constitutional area of church-state relations 
with questions on the free exercise and establishment clauses 
of the First Amendment. 
(2) The case helped to establish legal precedent or 
"case law" in reasonable accommodation and/or undue hardship 
in religious accommodation by business and industry. 
(3) The case helped to establish legal precedent or "case 
law" for reasonable accommodation for public school employees 
and school boards. 
The first series of court cases selected for review are 
those United States Supreme Court landmark decisions relating 
to the broad constitutional issues of church-state relations 
3Lemon v. Kurtzman,403 U.S. 602, 612-13. 
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speaking to the free exercise and establishment clauses of 
the legal precedents for decisions in cases involving secular 
policies/ prohibition or advancement of religion,and excessive 
entanglement between religion and government. Included in this 
category are the following cases: 
(1) Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 
(2) Everson v. Board of Education (1947) 
(3) Zorach v. Clauson (1952) 
(4) Engel v. Vitale (1962) 
(5) Abington v. Schempp (1963) 
(6) Epperson v. Arkansas (1968) 
(7) Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 
The second category of cases reviewed in this chapter 
consists of those United States Supreme Court decisions that 
have significantly contributed to the establishment of pre­
cedent or "case law" in reasonable accommodation by employers 
to employee religious needs and undue hardship on the employer 
by accommodating, and those United States District Court and 
Circuit Court of Appeals cases that were decided under the 
precedentual Supreme Court Cases. Cases selected for review 
in this category are the following: 
(1) McGowan v. Maryland (1961); 
(2) Trans World Airlines v. Hardison (1977); 
(3) Dewey v. Reynolds (1970); 
(4) Cummins v. Parker Seal (1975); 
(5) Reid v. Memphis Publishing (1975); 
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(6) Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank (1977); 
(7) Redmond v. GAF Corp. (1978); 
(8) Brown v. General Motors (1979); 
(9) Tooley v. Martin-Marittea (1981). 
The third category includes selected cases from both 
state and federal courts relating to reasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship for public school employees and school 
boards. 
Most of the decisions in the cases reported in this 
category were based on legal precedent established by the 
United States Supreme Cour.t landmark cases cited in the first 
and second categories above or on "case law" established by the 
federal District and Circuit Court decisions in the cases 
cited above. 
Even though the major thrust of this study concerns the 
school boards' authority to accommodate religious observances 
by employees/ it is not possible to consider accommodation 
without reviewing cases in which religious discrimination 
is charged. Therefore, the following key court cases in the 
areas of accommodation and discrimination of employees are 
reviewed in this section of the study: 
(1) Unberfield v. School District No. 11 (1974); 
(2) California Teacher's Association v. Board of 
Trustees (1977); 
(3) Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence 
(1979); 
191 
(4) Niederhuber v. Camden (1980); 
(5) Hunderdon v. Hunderdon (1980); 
(6) Edwards v. Norton (1981); 
(7) Wangsness v. Watertown (1982); 
(8) Pinsker v. Joint District (1984); 
(9) Philbrook v. Ansonia (1985). 
United States Supreme Court Landmark Decisions 
Relating to First Amendment Religion 
Clauses of Free Exercise 
and Establishment 
Cantwell v. Connecticut 
310 U.S. 299 (1940) 
Overview 
This landmark decision ended speculation that the 
Fourteenth Amendment— holding that 
"All persons...in the United States,...are citizens 
of the...State wherein they reside. No state shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States; nor shall a state deprive any person of 
life, liberty.../ without due process of law, nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws"4 — 
did not bind the states to the establishment clause of the 
First Amendment with respect to religion. Many later 
decisions about the states' enactments of laws regarding 
religious activities have been based on the concept of liberty 
4U.S. Constitution/ Amend. XIV. 
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embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces all 
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment. Thus the states 
are rendered as incompetent as Congress in enactment of laws. 
regarding religion. 
Facts 
The United States Supreme Court received this case on 
appeal from and certiorari to the Supreme Court of Errors of 
Connecticut. The case involved the alleged violation of a 
Connecticut statute by Newton Cantwell and his two sons in 
conducting religious activities on the streets of New Haven. 
The provision of the statutes required a certificate from 
the state to solicit for religious causes. Cantwell's con­
tention was that his activities were not within the statute 
but consisted only of distribution of materials under free 
exercise of religion guarantees. 
Decision 
The Supreme Court ruled that the statute as applied to 
Cantwell deprived them of their liberty without due pro­
cess of law and in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In setting aside the conviction of breaching the peace/ the 
court ruled that the free exercise of religion and the 
freedom to communicate information and opinions be not 
abridged by state statutes.5 
^Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 299 (1940). 
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Discussion 
In holding the Connecticut statutes violative of freedom 
to act» the Supreme Court held that a state may regulate 
religious activities by general and nondiscriminatory 
legislation insofar as the time/ the places/ and manner of 
soliciting upon the streets with respect to safeguarding the 
peace/ but in no way deny the right to disseminate religious 
views. The regulation in requiring an agent of the state to 
ascertain whether activities were of a religious nature blurs 
the line between discretionary and ministerial functions. The 
discretionary action by the state involves appraisal of facts/ 
the exercise of judgment and a formation of opinion/ and the 
right of survival and denies the liberty protected by the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments/ whereas acts subsequent to 
ministerial authority are subject to judicial remedy and are 
not violative of guaranteed religious liberties. 
Prior to 1940 the First Amendment prohibition^ of ,reli-
gion were restraints on only the federal government. This 
landmark decision held that these limitations on religion 
were part of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment to the Federal Constitution/ and thus applicable to the 
states and their subdivisions. Since this landmark decision 
most of the litigation alleging violation of the First Amend­
ment "free exercise" or "establishment" clause has involved 
state action rather than federal action. The interrelationship 
194 
of the establishment and free exercises clauses were touched 
upon by the court in this case. It said that their "inhibi-
bition of legislation" had a double aspect. On the one hand 
it forestalls the compulsion of law on the acceptance of any 
religion or the practice thereof. On the other hand/ it 
safeguards the free exercise of a chosen religion and the 
practice thereof. The court held that the First Amendment 
embraces two concepts/ freedom to believe and freedom to act. 
The first is absolute/ but the second cannot be.® 
Everson v. Board of Education 
330 U.S. 1 (1947) 
Facts 
This case on the religion clause of the First Amendment 
arose from litigation of a New Jersey statute authorizing local 
school boards to fund transportation of children to public and 
Catholic schools. (The statute had exclusionary:language on pri­
vate schools operating for profit and is not applicable 
in this case.) The United States Supreme Court heard this 
case on appeal after the New Jersey Court of Errors and 
Appeals reversed the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling that 
the legislation was without power to authorize funds under 
7 the state constitution. 
6ibid./ pp. 303-304. 
^Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
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Decision 
The Supreme Court affirmed the New Jersey Court of Errors 
and Appeals holding that public funds may be used to transport 
children to nonpublic schools.® 
Discussion 
In reaching this decision the court framed the due process 
argument in two phases. The first phase insists that the state 
cannot tax one to the benefit of another respecting religion. 
However/ the New Jersey statute allowed tax funds to be used to 
transport children to public and parochial schools in the in­
terest of satisfying a public need. The fact that the legis­
lation's act coincided with the personal desires of a few 
is not to say that the legislation erroneously appraised the 
public need. 
Insofar as the second phase of the due process argument 
differs with the first it is by alleging that public transpor­
tation to church school constitutes support of a religion by 
the state. The law would violate the First Amendment. 
Second, the New Jersey statute was challenged as a law 
respecting an establishment of religion. The Court essentially 
rejected the establishment clause violation and drew on the 
scope of the free exercise provision by insisting that legis­
lation enacted to promote the public welfare should not exclude 
®Ibid. 
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the members of any faith from receiving the benefits of pub­
lic welfare legislation. 
The court insisted that cutting off church schools from 
this service would frustrate the general interest of the pub­
lic welfare in much the same manner as if state-paid police­
men could not protect children going to and from church schools 
or if publicly paid firemen could not extinguish a church fire. 
Mr. Justice Burger insisted that this was not the purpose of 
the First Amendment but rather/ it required that the state be 
neutral in its relations with religious believers and non-
believers; it did not require the state to be their adversary. 
Finally/ the Court reasoned that; 
(1) The New Jersey statute was valid in its requiring 
compulsory school attendance; the parochial schools 
met that requirement; 
(2) The state contributed no money to the schools 
(3) The legislation did no more than provide a general 
program to help parents# regardless of their 
religion...; 
(4) The First Amendment has erected a wall between Church 
and State; that wall must be kept high and impregnable; 
(5) We cannot approve the slightest breach. 
9Ibid./ p. 18. 
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Zorach v. Clauaon 
343 U.S. 306 (1952) 
Facts 
The United States Supreme Court received this case on 
appeal from the Court of Appeals of New York. The case in­
volved a challenge to a New York law allowing students to be 
released from the public schools to go to religious centers 
for religious instruction or devotional exercises. The 
parents challenging the law contended that the weight and 
influence of the school was put behind a program for religious 
instruction. 
Decision 
The Supreme Court affirmed the New York Court's finding 
that there was neither supervision nor approval of religious 
teachers and no solicitation of pupils to be released. The 




This decision differed from the McCollum case where 
10Zorach v. Clauson7343 U.S. 306 (1952). 
nlbid. 
"^McCollum v. Board of Education 343 U.S. 203 (1948). 
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classrooms were used for religious instruction and the force 
of the public school was used to promote that instruction. 
In holding that release time was constitutional/ the court 
reasoned that such a program has made a law respecting an 
establishment of religion within the meaning of the First 
Amendment/ and as for interference with the "free exercise" 
of religion and an "establishment" of religion,the court held 
that separation must be complete and unequivocal. The Court 
held that the First Amendment does not say that in every 
respect there shall be a separation but stresses the fact 
that "there shall be no concert or union or dependency one 
13 
on the other"/ otherwise/ the state and religion would be 
14 aliens to each other. 
Engel v. Vitale 
370 U.S. 421 ' (1962) 
Facts 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed this case on 
certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York. Prior to 
this case Bible-reading and prayer were common practices in 
the public schools/and most states courts found Bible-reading 
to be a nonsectarian activity and thus constitutionally 
•^3Zorach v. Clauson/ p. 312. 
14Ibid p. 312, 
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permissible. The New York State Board of .Regents had pre­
scribed the following prayer be said aloud by each class in 
the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school 
day: 
"Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon 
Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents, 
our teachers, and our Country."l5 
This daily procedure was adopted on the recommendation of the 
State Board of R'egents, a governmental agency created by the 
state donstitution to which the New York Legislature had 
granted broad supervisory, executive, and legislative powers 
over the state's public schools.16 
Decision 
The Supreme Court invalidated the use of the prescribed 
prayer, holding that use of the prayer violated the First 
Amendment's prohibition against the enactment of any law 
"respecting an establishment of religion" which is made 
17 applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Discussion 
This landmark decision set the tone for later First 
Amendment cases with respect to the establishment and :free 
15Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422 (1962), 
16Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), 
l^xbid. 
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exercise issues by the following: 
(1) its insistence that prayer was religious in nature 
(2) prayer in public schools was inconsistent with the 
establishment clause of the First Amendment 
(3) no part of Government may compose official prayers 
for any group to recite as a part of a religious program 
carried on by government 
(4) public schools are government institutions.*® 
In finding the New York law inconsistent with both the 
purpose of the establishment clause and the establishment 
clause itself, the court held that its finding was not to 
indicate a hostility toward religion or toward prayer but that 
the First Amendment tried to put an end to governmental 
control of religion so as not to destroy government or reli­
gion. Recognizing the brevity and general nature of the Regent 
prayer and its unseeming danger to religious freedoms/ the 




"It is proper to take alarm at the first experi­
ment on our liberties...who does not see that the 
same authority which can establish Christianity/ 
in exclusion of all other Religions/ may establish 
with the same ease any particular sect of Christ­
ian/ in exclusion of all other Sects? That the 
same authority which can force a citizen to con­
tribute. .. for the support of any one establishment/ 
may force him to conform to any other establish­
ment in all cases whatsoever."I® 
Abington School District v. Schempp 
374 U.S. 203 (1963) 
Facts 
Edward Schempp/ on behalf of himself and his family/ 
brought suit to enjoin enforcement of a Pennsylvania statute 
requiring the reading of Bible verses each day at the opening 
of school/ contending that their rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment had been and would continue to be violated unless 
the statute be declared unconstitutional as violative of the 
First Amendment prohibition on establishment and free exer­
cise of religion. This case reached the United States 
Supreme Court on appeal from the.District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Along with a companion 
case from the Maryland Court of appeals in which the peti­
tioner/ Mrs. Madalyn Murray and her son/ William J. Murray, III 
both professed atheists/ objected to the daily reading of 
portions of the King James Version of the Bible as provided 
19 Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religion Assessments/ 
II Writings of Madison 183 at 185-186 
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The United States Supreme Court found in both cases the 
statutes required religious exercises and were conducted in 
direct violation of the rights of the appellees and peti­
tioners. The required exercises were not mitigated by the 
fact that individual students may absent themselves upon 
21 parental request. 
Discussion 
The Court was once again called upon to consider the 
scope of the First Amendment respecting laws on establish­
ment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. 
In so doing the court held that the place of religion is an 
exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance 
on the home/the church/ and the inviolable citadel of the 
heart and soul. In the relationship between man and religion# 
the state is committed to a position of neutrality. 
The free exercise Clause withdraws from legislative 
power the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of 
20 
Abington School District v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
203 
religion. Applying the establishment clause to these cases; 
the Court found that requiring Bible reading for those stu­
dents was in violation of the Establishment Clause. 
The distinction drawn between the two clauses by this 
' landmark decision is twofold: 
(1) a violation of the free exercise clause is predicated 
on coercion/ 
(2) the establishment clause violation need not be so 
attended.22 
Epperson v. Arkansas 
393 U.S. 97 (1968) 
Facts 
The United States Supreme Court heard this landmark case 
after a hiah school bioloav teacher, ioined bv a parent/ 
litiqated the state statute prohibitinq the teachinq of 
Darwin's theory of evolution in the public elementary and 
secondary schools in Arkansas. The teacher was scheduled to 
use a newly adopted biology textbook that included a chapter 
concerning the Darwinian theory of evolution. Violation of the 
state statute carried a misdemeanor punishment and teacher 
dismissal. 
Susan Epperson, plaintiff/ sought action in the Chancery 
22Ibid p. 223 . 
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Court of Arkansas challenging the constitutionality of the 
anti-evolution statute which was an adaptation of the 1925 
Tennessee "monkey law". The Arkansas Chancery Court ruled 
the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti­
tution. On appeal/ the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the 
decision, maintaining that the statute was a legitimate exer­
cise of state authority in governing the curriculum in the 
public schools of the state.^3 
Decision 
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Arkansas Supreme 
Court on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds. Justice Abe 
Fortas/ in speaking for the Court/ maintained the following: : 
(1) State and National government must be neutral in 
matters of religious theory, doctrine/ and practice. Govern­
ment may not be hostile to any religion/ to the advocacy of 
non-religion, nor aid or foster one religion or religious theory 
against another. 
(2) The Courts are reluctant to interfere with the daily 
operations of public school. However/ where there is a vio­
lation of basic constitutional values/ the court must intrude 
(3) There is no doubt that the First Amendment does not 
permit the state to enact any law that favors the principles 
or prohibition of any religious sect or dogma; 
^Epperson v. Arkansas#393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
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(4) The state may not use tax-supported property for 
religious purposes/thereby breaching the "wall of separation" 
which,according to Jefferson/ the First Amendment was intend­
ed to erect between church and state. 
(5) The state may not adopt programs or practices in its 
public schools or colleges which aid or support any religion. 
"This prohibition is absolute". It forbids the preference 
of one religion or prohibition which is deemed antagonistic 
to a particular dogma. 
(6) The states may not impose upon the teachers in the 
schools any conditions it chooses# however restrictive they 
may be of constitutional guarantees.24 
Discussion 
The Epperson decision is an example of the Supreme 
Court's response to the state's law's imposition on the basic 
constitutional rights respecting religious freedom. Though 
this case speaks specifically to censorship of material in 
the public schools/ the fundamental right given by the free 
exercise and establishment clauses are also applicable to 
school board policies regulating teachers' religious belief 
and practices. This landmark decision drew on antecedent 
decisions which are rooted in the fundamentals of freedom 
within the First Amendment's broad command.2^ 
24Ibid. / p. 106. 
25lbid., p. 104. 
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Lemon v. Kurtzman 
403 U.S. 602 (1971) 
Facts 
This landmark decision arises from two states'(Rhode 
Island and Pennsylvania) statutes allowing public funds to 
flow to private schools for secular instruction. The Penn­
sylvania statute authorized the State Superintendent of Pub­
lic Instruction to "purchase" certain "secular educational 
services" from nonpublic schools/ directly reimbursing those 
schools soley for teacher salaries, textbooks/and instruc­
tional material. The Rhode Island statute permitted a salary 
supplement to be paid to teachers in nonpublic schools for using 
only material in the public schools and agreeing not to teach 
courses in religion. 
The Pennsylvania statute was litigated when appellant 
Lemon challenged the constitutionality of the statute claim­
ing that he was paying a specific tax supported religion. A 
three-judge federal court held that the statute neither vio­
lated the establishment nor the free exercise clause of the 
First Amendment. 
The Rhode Island statute was litigated when citizens, 
appellees of the state,brought suit to have the statute de­
clared unconstitutional and its operation enjoined as vio­
lative of the establishment and free exercise clauses of 
the First Amendment. 
26Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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Deciaion 
The United States Supreme Court heard the Rhode Island 
suit affirming the District' Court's ruling that the statute 
violated the establishment clause and holding that it fostered 
"excessive entanglement" between government and religion. In 
ruling on the Pennsylvania statute/ the Court reversed the 
District Court holding that the statute violated neither 
the establishment nor the free exercise clause.27 
Discussion 
Chief Justice Warren Burger writing for the Court held 
the language of the religion clauses of the First Amendment 
opaque at best when compared with the other portions of the 
Amendment. Mr. Justice Burger insisted that the authors of 
the First Amendment simply did not prohibit the establishment 
of a state church but commanded that there shall be "no law 
respecting an establishment of religion".2® Mr. Burger went 
further to emphasize that a given law may not establish a 
state religion but nevertheless respect that end in the 
sense of being a step that could lead to an establishment 
and hence offend the First Amendment provisions. 
The Court held that in the absence of precisely stated 
constitutional prohibitions,lines must be drawn with reference 
27Ibid. 
28Ibid./ p. 612. 
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to three main evils against which the establishment clause 
was intended to afford protection: sponsorship/ financial 
support/ and active involvement of the sovereign in religious 
activities. An analysis in this area must consider the 
cumulative criteria developed by the Court since Everson. 
The Court gleaned three tests to be applied to enactments 
in order for the laws to make constitutional muster: 
(1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
(2) its principal or primary effect must be one that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion; 
(3) the statute must not foster an excessive government 
29 
entanglement with religion. 
The Court conceded that the statute had secular legisla­
tive purposes/ and it acknowledged that restriction had been 
placed on the program to insure that the funds were used only 
for secular purposes. Consequently/ it did not decide whether 
the programs advanced religion. However/ the court found the 
program unconstitutional on grounds that the relationship 
arising under the statute in each state involved excessive 
entanglement between government and religion. 
Finally/ the Court acknowledged the long-standing role 
of church-related schools over the past 200 years but insisted 
that a dangerous progression existed in these statutory 
provisions unlike tax exemptions. Not to demean the role of 
29Ibid., pp. 612-613. 
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the schools, the Court insisted that lines be drawn to square 
the aid to nonpublic schools with the dicates of the Religion 
Clauses.30 
Cases Contributing Significantly to the Establishment 
of Case Law in Areas of Reasonable Accommodation 
for Religious Observance by Employees and 
Undue Hardship on the Employer's 
Conduct of Business 
McGowan v. Maryland 
366 U.S. 429 (1961) 
Facts 
This case was an appeal by employees of a large Maryland 
department store of a ruling by the state court of Maryland 
and the Court of Appeals of Maryland. The lower Court ruled 
that a Maryland statute prohibiting the sale of certain items 
was constitutional and did not violate the establishment 
clause of the First Amendment. The employees were convicted 
and fined by the state court for selling on Sunday certain 
items prohibited under the Maryland statute. The signifi­
cance of this case rests with its interpretation of the 
seventh-day rest as being secular, a day of rest and being in 
the interest of the public welfare. The appellants were not 
granted standing to challenge the state statute on religioup 
freedom since they alleged only economic injury to themselves. 
30Ibid p. 625. 
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However/ since they suffered direct economic injury allegedly 
due to the imposition on them of the tenets of the Christian 
religion/ they were granted standing to challenge the statute 
31 
in respect to an establishment of religion. 
Decision 
The United States Supreme Court reviewed the case from 
the Court of AAppeals of Maryland ruling that the case dealt 
only with the constitutionality of the Maryland statute regu­
lating the sale of goods on Sunday. In affirming the lower 
court's ruling that the statute did not violate the equal pro­
tection or due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or 
constitute a law respecting an establishment of religion/ 
within the meaning of the First Amendment# which is made 
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
Supreme Court held: 
"We do not hold that Sunday legislation may not be 
a violation of the Establishment Clause if it can 
be demonstrated that its purpose—evidenced either 
on the face of the legislation in conjunction with 
its legislative history or in its operative—is to 
use the states coercive power to aid religion".32 
^McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
32Ibid p. 453. 
211 
Discussion 
While Sunday closing laws had their genesis in religion/ 
it becomes apparent that government concern apart from their 
original purpose/has focused on the purpose and effect of 
most of them to provide a uniform day of rest for all citizens. 
The fact that the day is Sunday/ a day recognized by Christians 
with religious significance does not bar the state from enact­
ing laws to provide a day of rest for all citizens; to con­
strue otherwise would give a constitutional interpretation of 
hostility toward the public welfare rather than of church-
33 state separation. 
Chief Justice Earl Warren/ in delivering the Court's 
decision/ noted that previous courts rejected the contention 
that Sunday closing laws interfered with religion liberty 
holding that the law.;'s purpose was to provide a day of rest 
from a mere physical standpoint. Considering the legislative 
intent and operative effect of the statute/ the Court insisted 
that a blanket prohibition against Sunday work was not present. 
In light of the other Maryland statutes/ the Sunday closing 
laws coupled with the general proscription of other types of 
work, the court held that the intent was a day of rest rather 
34 
than one respecting an establishment of religion. 
33Ibid., p. 445. 
34Ibid . / pp. 448-452. \ 
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Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Company 
429 F2d 324 (6th Cir. 1979) 
Facts 
In 1960 and 1965 Reynolds Metal Company and the union 
entered into an agreement which allowed the company to estab­
lish schedules for straight time and overtime from employees 
in order to meet production schedules. The agreement speci­
fied that an employee was to work the overtime or secure a 
qualified replacement. Kenneth Dewey/ an employee of Reynolds 
since 1951/ was a die repairman. He joined the Faith Reformed 
Church in 1961 after which he refused to work on Sunday/ his 
Sabbath/ or secure a qualified replacement consistent with the 
negotiated agreement between the union and Reynolds. Despite 
due notice of overtime requirements by the company and the 
collective bargaining agreement/ Dewey refused to perform 
scheduled overtime work on Sunday and assumed the position 
that continued employment and following his religious belief 
without interference were absolute rights. 
Dewey was dismissed by Reynolds and subsequently sought 
relief through the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 
(EEOC),35 
3^Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Company/429 F2d 324 (1979). 
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Decision 
The District Court of Michigan entered judgement for 
the employee and Reynolds appealed. The Sixth Circuit Court 
reversed the District Court holding that even if regulations 
adopted by EEOC subsequent to employee's discharge permit-
ed ;an employee, by a replacement/ to observe Sunday as 
his Sabbath/ this constituted a reasonable accommodation to the 
needs of an employee. In so doing/ the employer had the 
right to dismiss an employee for refusal to make replacement 
arrangements for overtime work scheduled on Sunday.36 
Discussion 
The applicable statute is 42 U.S.C./ section 2000e-2(a), 
of which the pertinent part provides: 
"(a) it shall be unlawful employment practice for 
an employer -
(1) ...to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect 
to...terms...of employment/ because of ... 
religion..." 
The reason for Dewey's dismissal was not discrimination 
on account of religion but rather because he violated the 
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between 
his employer and the union. The violation consisted of not 
only refusing to work overtime on Sunday but also of his 
refusal to arrange for a replacement which was an alternate 
36XbicL 
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procedure. Dewey did arrange for replacements five times but 
later refused to cfo this, "-claiming it was a sin.^' 
i 
The Sixth Circuit Court insisted that to accede to Dewey's 
demands would require Reynolds to discriminate against its 
other employees by requiring them to work on Sunday in place 
of Deweyi thereby relieving Dewey of his contractual obligation. 
Upon denying petition for rehearing, Sixth Circuit 
Judge Weick contended that the court had adopted a broad 
construction of the Civil Rights Act and EEOC Regulation by: 
(1) maintaining that the legislative history of the Act 
expressed a congressional intent to inhibit only discrimina­
tion against an individual because of his ...religion.... 
(2) maintaining the Act did not intend to coerce or 
compel one person to accede to or accommodate the religious 
beliefs of another. 
(3) maintaining that the collective bargaining agreement 
was equally and uniformly applied to all employees and 
discriminated against none. 
(4) maintaining that to coerce or compel an employee 
to accede to or accommodate the religious beliefs of all his 
employees would raise constitutional questions of violation 
of the establishment clause of the First Amendment; therefore, 
government in its relation with religious believers and 
37Ibid./ p. 330. 
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non believers, must be neutral.38 
Reid v. Memphis Publishinq Company 
468 F2d 346 (1972) — 
521 F2d 512 (1975) 
Facts 
McCann Reid was a Seventh Day Adventist who,according 
to the tenets of his religion/refused to work as a copyreader 
on Saturdays for the Memphis Publishing Company. As a result 
of Reid's refusal he was not hired by the company on the 
grounds that it was company policy to assign new copyreaders 
to Saturday work and give preference for weekday work to more 
senior copyreaders. Reid filed under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C., 2000e claiming that the com­
pany failed to hire him because of his religion (Seventh Day 
Adventist) which observed Saturday as Sabbath.39 
Decision 
The first time the Sixth Circuit Court heard prospective 
Reid's appeal it reversed the district court which had relied 
40 
on Dewey f concluding that religious discrimination had not 
3®Ibid., p 335 (citing Schempp, Engel, and Everson). 
39Reed v. Memphis, 468 F2d 346 (1972). 
40Dewey v. Reynolds, 429 F2d 324 (1979). 
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been established. The Court of Appeals distinguished the 
facts from the Dewey decision on the grounds that the 1967 
41 
EEOC Regulation was in effect when Reid was denied employ­
ment^ and the district court had not considered whether the 
employer had made an effort to reasonably accommodate the 
42 
employee's religious beliefs and practices. 
On the second appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed its 
decision holding that the accommodation was reasonable and 
the hardship undue. Discrimination as defined by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 was not supported by substantial 
evidence. 
Discussion 
The Reid I - Reid II dichotomy would seem to focus on 
the narrow issue of whether the 1967 EEOC Regulation as 
applied to Sabbath observer was in concert with the legisla-
44 
tive history of Title VII. In finding of Reid II, the 
Appeals Court noted that the District Court offered the view 
that Reid should have been hired in order to determine whether 
it would work out, notwithstanding the District Court's finding 
4129 C.F.R. 1605.1 (1975). 
42 
Reed v.Memphis Publishing Co., 468 F2d 346 (1972). 
43Reed v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F2d 512, 517 (1975). 
44 
M.L. Wright, "Title VII—Sabbath Observer Discrimination, 
Reasohable Accommodation, Undue Hardship Standard, Establish-
, ment Clause: Reed v. Memphis Publish Co.," New York Law School 
j Review 22'(1976):151. 
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that: 
(1) employing Reid as a copyreader which required regular 
working on Saturday, his Sabbath'/ would work an undue hardship; 
(2) assigning other senior copyreaders undoubtedly would 
violate their seniority/ require overtime'pay of the hiring of 
two copyreaders when only one was needed; ; 
(3) the involuntary assignment of senior copyreaders to 
substitute for Reid would create serious morale problems. 
In a dissenting opinion/ circuit Judge Edwards noted 
that the Reid I decision upheld the applicability and con­
stitutionality of the EEOC Regulation and remanded the case 
to the District Court to determine facts concerning "undue 
hardship". Noting the distinction between Dewey and Reid, 
he took cognizance that the employer had offered an accommo­
dation to Dewey prior to dismissal whereas Memphis Publishing 
Company was unwilling to offer an accommodation in the form 
of being allowed off for religious purposes. 
Cummins v. Parker Seal 
516 F2d 544 (1975) 
Facts 
Paul Cummins, an employee of the Parker Seal Company 
since 1958/was made shift supervisor in 1965. In 1970 he 
joined the World Wide Church of God which forbade work on its 
Sabbath (Friday sundown to Saturday sundown) and certain 
holy days. Shift supervisors were salaried and required to 
45Reed v. Memphis, 521 F2d 512 (1975). 
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work the scheduled hours including Saturday. After Cummins 
joined the World Wide Church of God/ he refused to work on 
Saturday# thereby causing other company supervisors to sub­
stitute for him on Saturdays. After complaints arose from 
fellow supervisors who were involuntarily assigned to substi­
tute for him/ Cummins was discharged 
The appellant filed charges of religious discrimination' 
with the United States Equal Employment Opportunities Commis­
sion (EEOC) and the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights (KCHR). 
The charges were dismissed by the Kentucky Commission on Human 
Rights. However/ the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter in 
September of 1972.^ 
Decision 
The District Court reviewed the KCHR transcript as 
agreed upon by the parties/ and found that a full and fair 
hearing was granted, holding that: 
(1) Parker Seal's attempt to accommodate Cummins reli­
gious needs was causing an undue hardship; 
(2) a reasonable accommodation was made to the appellant's 
religious beliefs, and no further accommodation could be made 
at the time of dismissal without creating an undue hardship 
on the employer's business; 
4®Cummins v. Parker Seal/ 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
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(3) the defendant was justified in discharging the 
plaintiff. 
On appeal/ the sixth Circuit reversed the District Court 
47 and remanded the case for further proceedings. 
Discussion 
In finding for Cummings/the Appeals Court rejected the 
lower court's decision on the doctrine of res judicata/ 
holding that a party is not foreclosed from pursuing his 
federal remedy under Title VII because he has first been 
party to a state proceeding. 
The reasonable accommodation complaint by the appellant 
was on the provision of 42 U.S.C. 2000e as it existed before 
the 1972 Amendment. Section 2000-2/which has not been amended/ 
states in relevant part: 
"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice 
for an employer - (1) ... to discharge any individ­
ual ...because of such individual's ... religion..." 
The EEOC Regulation/ 29C.F.R. 1605.1 (1974)/ "Observation 
of the Sabbath and Other Religious Holidays"/ which was in 
force at the time of the appellant's discharge/ provides: 
(1) that the duty not to discriminate on religious 
grounds includes an obligation on the part of the employer 
to make reasonable accommodation to the religious needs of 
employees and prospective employees where accommodation can 
220 
be made without undue hardship • 
(2) the employer has the burden of providing that an 
undue hardship renders the accommodation to the religious 
needs of the employee unreasonable; 
(3) the Commission will review each case on an individual 
basis to seek an equitable application of the guidelines due 
to the pluralistic religious practice of the American people.48 
The Appeals Court in finding that Title VII/ Civil Rights 
Act of 1964/ was constitutional/ held that: 
(1) Cummins did suffer discrimination by his discharge 
and that 
(2) Parker Seal did not show that accommodation would 
49 
have imposed an undue hardship on the conduct of business. 
In rejecting Parker Seal's contention that 42 U.S.C./ 
2000e (j) and the EEOC Regulation 1605.1 (1974) were laws 
"respecting an establishment" and violation of the Religious 
Clause of the First Amendment/ the Sixth Circuit Court con­
cluded that the legislation and regulation satisfied the 
three standards for any law to meet in order to survive an 
establishment clause challenge: 
(1) The secular aspect of Regulation 1605 and 42 U.S.C. 
2000e(j) was adequate. The reasonable accommodation rule was 
intended to prevent discrimination in employment/ not to 
46 
29 C.F.R. 1605.1 (1974). 
49Cummins v. Parker Seal/ 516 F2d 544 (1975), 
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establish a religion.50 
(2) Regulation 1605 and 2000e (j) did not advance nor 
prohibit religion. The reasonable accommodation rule restrains 
employers from enforcing uniform work rules thought facially 
neutral that discriminate against employees'holding certain 
religious convictions despite the fact that some religious 
institutions will derive incidental benefit from Regulation 
1605 and 2000e(j).51 
(3) Regulations 1605 and 2000e(j) do not raise the 
spectre of excessive government entanglement with religion. 
The reasonable accommodation rule will not subject religious 
institutions to government surveillance that the Supreme Court 
finds impermissable. Secondly, EEOC and the courts will have 
to determine whether a reasonable accommodation has been made and 
whether an undue hardship results. These issues will be considered 
in 'a labor relations context and do not require government 
entanglement with religion.^2 
The First Amendment religion issues raised in this case 
were found invalid and supported by the McGowan53 Court in 
holding that the statute's purpose and effect were not to aid 
religion but to set aside a uniform day of rest and recreation. 
Section 2000e(j) requires a reasonable accommodation of an 
50Ibid., p. 552. 
^Ibid., p. '553. 
52Ibid. / p. 55'4. 
^McGown v. Maryland,366 U.S. 420 (1961). 
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employee^ religious practices short of an undue hardship on 
the employer's business. The Court juxtaposed the effect of 
2000e(j) with Sunday closing laws in McGowan to hold that 
2000e(j) had no tendency toward establishment of religion 
but only to insure a common day of rest in the public 
interest. 
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison 
432 U.S. 63 (1977) 
Facts 
Hardison worked for Trans World Airlines for more than 
a year before he became deeply involved with the World Wide 
Church of God whose tenets hold that no work may be performed 
on Saturday (Friday sundown to Saturday sundown). His problem 
with the work schedule arose after being voluntarily transferred 
to another department where he had lower seniority and could 
not have Saturdays off. The union contract which governed 
shift and job assignment was not violated to accommodate 
Hardison's religious practices. TWA rejected Hardison's 
proposal to work a four-day week, and subsequently Hardison 
refused to work on Saturday.. Hardison was dismissed, and he 
brought action for injunctive relief against TWA and the 
union claiming that his discharge was religious discrimination 
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
^Cummins v. Parker Seal, 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
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which provides in pertinent parts: 
"It shall be an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge 
any individual... to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation 
terms, conditions/ or privileges or employment 
because of such individual* . .religion...1,55 
"The term 'religion' includes all aspects of 
religious observance and practice/ as well 
as belief/ unless an employer demonstrates 
that he is unable to reasonably accommodate 
to an employee's or prospective employee's 
religious observance or practice without undue 
hardship on the conduct of the employer's 
business.1,56 
Hardison also claimed religious discrimination under 
the 1967 EEOC guidelines requiring an employer to make reason­
able accommodation to an employee's religious needs short of 
undue hardship.$7 
Decision 
The District Court ruled for the union/ holding that the 
union was not required to ignore a seniority system as a part 
of its accommodation duty. Further, TWA was found to make 
reasonable accommodation. 
The Eighth Circuit reversed the latter ruling holding that 
TWA had rejected reasonable accommodation by 
55Civil Rights Act of 1964/ Title VII, 703(a)(1), 42 
U.S.C., 2000e-2u)(l) 1970). 
^6Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, 701(j)/ 42 U.S.C./ 
2000e(j) (1975). 
S^Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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(1) by disallowing a four-day work week/ 
I i 
(2)' by declining to make a shift change between Hardjison 
^ind another employee/ or 
(3): by not filing the Saturday shift from a pool of"1 avail-
! 
able and competent employees. 
The court found TWA and the union at fault for not con­
sidering the variance from the seniority system. The Supreme 
Court reversed the decision in a 7-2 decision holding that 
58 
TWA had made reasonable accommodation. 
Discussion 
Associate Justice Byron White delivered the 7-2 decision 
(Justice Brennan and Marshall dissenting) that to r.equire TWA to 
bear more than ̂ e minimis costs in accommodating Hardison 
would constitute undue burden, and that, absent clear legislative 
intent, TWA need not deprive other employees of their rights 
under the union contract in order to accommodate his religious 
beliefs. 
Justice White* in reviewing both legislative and judicial 
history, insisted the effort had been directed toward "elimi­
nating discrimination in employment«..with regard to... 
religion...." In reviewing the EEOC 1967 guidelines which 
required employees to make reasonable accommodation to the 
religious needs of employees , Justice White cited historical 
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CO 
ambivalance. The 1971 Dewey case focused on Reynolds Metals 
discharge of an employee who refused to work on Sunday. 
Reynolds Metals argued that EEOC lacked authority to adopt 
the 1967 guidelines, and that/ furthermore/the guidelines were un­
constitutional by virtue of advancing religion—a First Amendment 
violation. The Supreme Court split on a 4-4 vote with no 
written opinion. 
In 1976 the Supreme Court heard Parker Seal Company v. 
60 
Cummins from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in which 
it found for the employee and insisted the statute did not 
violate the First Amendment establishment clause.6^- Again 
the Supreme Court affirmed the lower Court's decision with a 
4-4 split and no written opinion.62 
A narrow reading of Hardison is a long line of case-by-
case/ fact-based determination of reasonable accommodation 
and undue hardship. Considered in a narrow reading/ Hardison 
idefends religious accommodation when anything more than de mini-
63 
mis cost to the employer as undue hardship under Title VII. 
The Hardison court accepted the existence of employer's duty 
to accommodate/ and that duty seemed to be directed toward 
®®Dewey v. Reynolds;429 F2d 324 (1979). 
6®Parker Seal v. Cummins/ 429 U.S. 65 (1976). 
6*Cummins v. Parker Seal/ 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
^Parker Seal v. Cummins, 429 U.S. 65 (1976). 
6^Penni Johnson/ "Religious Accommodation in Employment— 
The Eleventh Commandment? Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/" 
432 U.S. 63 (1977) Ark&nsas Law Review 32 (Fall 1978): 589. 
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employer neutrality rather than conferring employee privilege 
Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank 
565 F2d 72 (1977) 
Facts 
Jordan brought suit against North Carolina National Bank 
charging religious discrimination in violation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964/ Title VII/ 42 U.S.C. section 2000e. 
Before voluntarily leaving employment with the bank in 1969 
she had adopted the tenets of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
religion and in May 1970 sought reemployment with NCNB. She 
charged that failure to gain reemployment was the result of 
the bank's refusal to allow her to observe her Sabbath on 
Saturday. 
Decision 
The District Court/ Judge James B. McMillan presiding/ 
held that North Carolina National Bank violated the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 by refusing the plaintiff employment on 
her unwillingness/ for religious reasons/ to work on Saturday 
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was not violated when Jordan insisted upon a guarantee that 
64 
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
6^Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank 565 F2d 72 
(1977). 
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she would not be called upon to work on Saturday* reasoning 
that such a guarantee would constitute "undue hardship on 
66 
the conduct of the employer's business". 
Discussion 
The Appeals Court held that Jordan's pre-requirement of 
never having to work on Saturday was so unlimited and 
absolute in scope that it speaks its own unreasonableness and is 
thus beyond accommodation. In reviewing the testimony given 
in the District Court, the Appeals Court found that/ in fact/ 
employment was never denied/ only the absolute guarantee of 
never having to work on Saturday. Citing Hardison, the 
Appeals Court held that the guarantee to Jordan would obli­
gate the bank to provide it for all its employees and entail 
extra expense/ thus constituting an "undue hardship." Jordan, 
in citing discrimination/ alluded to another NCNB employee/ 
Elizabeth Woods/ also a Seventh-Day Adventist/ who had secured 
a promise not to have to work on Saturday. However/ the ap­
pellant showed that Woods had agreed to work on Saturday 
68 
sometimes if employment was a possibility. 
66Ibid. 
®^Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
®®Jordan v. North Carolina National Bank,565 F2d 72 
(1977). 
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Redmond v. GAF Corporation 
574 F2d 897 (1978) 
Facts 
Rodgers Redmond/ an employee of GAF Corporation since 
1952 became a member of the Jehovah's Witness in 1958. 
Redmond was appointed as a leader of a Bible study class by 
the elders of the church in 1959. In 1974 the class schedule 
was changed to Saturday by the ruling body. This change 
resulted in a conflict between the infrequent overtime 
scheduled on Saturday and Redmond's religion needs. After 
this change in his religious needs, he did not work the over­
time schedule#and the record indicated that he had been ex­
cused from Saturday with GAF's cognizance of the conflict 
between work and religion. 
Following Redmondb suspension for one day after his 
failure to return for annual inventory during his vacation 
he was scheduled to work overtime on Saturday. Redmond re­
fused to work the overtime on Saturday. After advising his 
superiors of his religious obligation and his earlier excused 
absence on the Saturday overtime/ he was told that either he 
agreed to work or he would loose his job; subsequently# he 
was terminated. 
Redmond brought charges alleging race discrimination# 
harrassment, and retaliation for filing discrimination and 
termination. He sought relief through the District Court of 
229 
the Northern District of Illinois alleging discrimination 
because of his inability to work on Saturday even though his 
religious practices prevented him from doing so.6® 
Decision 
The District Court concluded that Redmond's discharge 
discriminated against him in exercise of his religion. On 
appeal by GAF, the Seventh Circuit Court affirmed the lower 
courts decision by holding: 
(1) the employee's participation in the Bible class was 
a religious obligation with statutory protection offered to 
all aspects of religious observance and practices. 
(2) the employer made no effort to accommodate the employee's 
religious need and did not demonstrate it would suffer undue 
70 hardship in accommodating the employee. 
Discussion 
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on religion 
but the Act did not define the term until the 1972 Amendment 
added the following definition, "The term 'religion' includes 
all aspects of religion observance and practice as well as 
belief... 
69 
Redmond v. GAF Corporation, 574 F2d 897 (1978). 
70Ibid. 
7142 U.S.C., 2000e(j). 
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The statute makes it clear that congress attempted to 
protect subjective belief and practices in carrying out such 
beliefs and the legislation did not aid the courts in deter­
mining the breadth of the belief and practice other than to 
72 
say they must be religious. Despite the fact most cases 
litigated under Title VII dealt with Sabbararian practices, 
73 
the statute embraced both categories. 
Once the plaintiff established" his practice which pre­
vented him from working Saturday overtime, it became religious 
under provision of section 2000e(j)/and the burden shifted to 
the employer to demonstrate that reasonably accommodating the 
employee constituted undue hardship on the conduct of business 
In its reasoning, the court held that the employee had 
established a prima facie case of religious discrimination, 
and the employer had made no effort to accommodate the 
plaintiff. 
The record of this case shows that Redmond had advised 
GAF of his religious needs but that the only alternative 
presented was to work on Saturday or lose his job. There 
was no effort shown to accommodate the employee by transfer 
to another division or arranging for replacement on the 
Saturday shift. In this absence of fact the court reviewed 
72Redmond v. GAF Corporation,574 F2d 897, 900 (1978). 
73Ibid. 
74Ibid., pi 901. 
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the following points to support its reasoning: 
(1) GAF showed no inconvenience to its business; 
(2) the District Court did not have the Hardison deci­
sion on Accommodation and undue hardship,but the applicable 
standards were nevertheless applied; ' 
(3) GAF would not have suffered the extra pay for over­
time as all Saturday employees were on overtime rate; 
(4) there was no showing of loss of efficiency since the 
work was unskilled and could be performed essentially by any 
employee; 
(5) there was no union or collective bargaining contract 
75 
which would prevent changing the plaintiff's schedule. 
Brown v. General Motors Corporation 
601 F2d 956 (1979) 
Facts 
Brown began working on the General Motors assembly line in 
Kansas City in 1964. In 1966 Brown transferred to the daytime 
shift. Shortly after his transfer to the first shift he join­
ed the Worldwide Church of God whose tenets proscribe secular 
work on the Sabbath (Friday sundown to Saturday sundown). 
In March of 1970 there was a reduction in the assembly line 
due to economic conditions which resulted in Brown's transfer 
to the second shift (4:00 PM to 12:30 AM) due to his low 
75Ibid p. 904. 
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seniority. From May 25 until August 19 when he was terminated 
for refusing to work after sundown on each Friday, Brown 
sought relief by bringing claim that his discharge violated 
76 
Title VII provision. 
Decision 
The United States District Court/ W.D. of Missouri entered 
judgement for the employer and the plaintiff appealed. The 
77 
Eighth Circuit Court reversed the judgement. 
Discussion 
In reversing the judgement/ the Eighth Circuit Court 
relied on Hardison7® in its findings: 
(1) an employer is required to accommodate the religious 
observance of its employees unless such accommodation con­
travenes the provisions of a valid collective bargaining 
agreement or would cause the employer undue hardship. Since 
there was no collective bargaining agreement/ the question of 
undue hardship was dismissed on grounds that no pay was receiv­
ed by Brown in his absence after sundown on Friday and the 
employer maintained extra men to cover for unscheduled 
employee absences. 
,0Brown v. General Motors Corporation,601 F2d 956 (1979). 
77Ibid. 
78Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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(2) In order to establish a prima facie cause of reli­
gious discrimination under Title VII provision,the employee 
must plead and prove that a) he has a bona fide belief that 
compliance with work requirement is contrary to his religious 
faith; b) inform his employer of the conflict; c) he was dis­
charged because of his refusal to comply with the work require­
ment . 
The facts of the case, undisputed by both parties# clearly 
established a prima facie case of religious discrimination. 
The question as posed by Hardison was whether the proposed 
accommodation (allowing Brown Friday evening off) would cause 
an undue hardship resulting in more than de minimis cost to 
the employer. Holding that the theoretical argument of having 
to hire more men on Friday to maintain efficiency was erroneous, 
the court rejected this question. 
(3) Section 2000e(j) does not require the employer to 
reasonably accommodate the purely personal preference of its 
employees. The cost resulting from accommodating Brown does 
not include those who wish Friday evening off for secular 
reason^. The record showed that only four other Sabba­
tarians were working this shift out of a work force of 1200 to 
1600. 
(4) Accommodating Brown would not discriminate against 
all employees who do not adhere to Brown's religion. 
Citing Hardison, the court held that differential treat­
ment resulting from accommodation violates section 2000e(a)(l) 
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if it: (i) compromises other employees' seniority rights 
secured by collective bargaining or (2). would confer a 
privilege whose cost was more than de minimis/ solely 
on the basis of the recipient's religious belief. Neither 
was present in this case.^ 
Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corporation 
648 F2d 1239 (1981) 
Facts 
Herman O. Tooley and two of his fellow employees« 
members of the Seventh-Day Adventist religion and employees 
of the Martin-Marietta Corporation/brought suit under the' 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, section 701(j) and 42 U.S.C.A./ 
section 2000e( j), claiming religious discrimination in their 
dismissal for refusing to pay union dues under a collective 
bargaining agreement containing a "union shop". Following 
their consciences' under the tenets of the Seventh-Day Adventist 
Church proscribing belonging to and paying dues to a union/ 
they offered to pay an equal sum to a mutually acceptable 
charity. The union refused. 
After exhausting their administrative remedies/ the 
plaintiffs brought action alleging that the company and the 
79 
Brown v. General Motors corporation/601 F2d 956 (1979). 
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union's refusal to accommodate their request constituted re­
ligious discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. They argued that the company and union were required 
to accommodate their request under section 701(j) of the act/ 
42 U.S.C. 2000e(j)tunless an undue hardship resulted for the 
employer and union. The union contended that the substitute 
charity would cause an undue hardship and was unreasonable 
and such an accommodation violated the elstablishment clause. 
The District Court enjoined the union and the company: from 
80 
discharging the plaintiff. 
Decision 
81 
The judgement of the District Court affirmed. 
Discussion 
Federal statutes and codes prohibit discrimination in 
employment by unions and employers on the basis of religion. 
The codes define religion to include all aspects of religious 
observance "unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable 
to reasonably accommodate to an employee1s...religious obser­
vance or practice .without undue hardship on the conduct of 
the employer's business". The court held that the provision 
of section 701(j) applies to unions here as in the Yott 






Reasonableness. The Steelworkers union argued that the 
substituted charity which exempted Tooley from union dues 
was unreasonable and resulted in impermissible unequal treat-
83 
ment. Citing the Brown v. General Motors Corporation , the 
Tooley Court held that desparate treatment of employees is 
not necessarily unreasonable. The religious accommodation 
provision of section 701(j) does not authorize preferential 
treatment of employees nor do they require an employer or 
union to abrogate the contractual rights of some employees 
or to incur substantial costs of accommodation for the 
84 
benefit of those to be accommodated. 
o C 
The Tooley Court/ using the reasoning in Hardison , 
found that the substituted charity accommodation did not 
allow preferential treatment and the plaintiff suffered the 
same economic loss as the union member; therefore/ the accom-
86 modation was reasonable. 
Undue hardship. The union contended that allowing the 
substitute charity was inconsistent with the de minimis cost, 
82 
Yott v. North American Rockwell Corporation/ 602 F2d 
904 (1979). 
83Brown v. General Motors Corporation/ 601 F2d 956 (1979). 
84Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63/ 84 (1977). 
85Ibid. 
86Tooley v. Martin-Marietta/ 648 F2d 1239 (1981). 
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contending that reference to using surplus funds in the union's 
reserve departed from the de minimis standard. Ninth Circuit 
87 
Court Judge Farris# citing the 1978 Anderson decision# 
acknowledged that in determining an "undue hardship"/ the 
particular factual context of each case must be considered. 
A claim of undue hardship must be beyond a conceivable or 
hypothetical hardship and be supported by proof of "actual 
88 
imposition on co-workers or disruption of the work routine. 
Constitutionality of section 701(j) of Title VII. The 
Steelworkers Union further argued that section 701(j) appealed 
in the case violated the establishment clause. Relying on 
89 
Nyquist, Yoder, Walz, Zorach, and Lemon , the Tooley Court 
reasoned that government can accommodate the beliefs and 
practices of minority religious groups without contravening 
the prohibition of the establishment clause and/ in the face 
of religious differences/ reflect neutrality. Using Lemon 
and Nyquist as a background/ the court found section 701(j) 
constitution in legislative purpose by prohibiting discrimi­
nation in employment and securing equal economic opportunities 
®^Anderson v. General Dynamics 589 F2d 397 (1978) 
88Ibid p. 400, 406-407 
89Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist/ 413 U.S. 756; Wisconsin v. Yoder# 406 U.S. 205; Walz 
v. Tax Commission/ 397 U.S. 668; Zorach v. Clauson/ 343 U.S. 
306; Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602. 
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90 
to members of minority religions. The secular purpose of 
section 701(j) is legitimate by "promoting equal employment 
91 
opportunities for members of all religious faiths". 
Section 701(j) was also found constitutional in its 
primary purpose. The union contended that the substitute 
charity had the primary effect of advancing the plaintiff's 
religion by securing alleged economic benefits. The court 
reflected the contention and made the discernment between 
ancillary and primary benefits in the substitute charity/ 
in that the plaintiff was allowed to work without violating 
his religious beliefs at a cost equivalent to that paid by 
his coworkers without similar beliefs. It neither increased 
nor decreased the advantages of membership in the Seven-Day 
Adventist faith. Furthermore, the Tooley Court reasoned that 
the section was free of government entanglement in that the 
substitute charity required only a minimal amount of super­
vision and administration cost. After establishing the 
sincerity of the religious objector's belief/ the only 
burden involves an agreement on a mutually acceptable 
charity. In the absence of an established undue burden 
on the union/ the court found no excessive government 
92 
involvement. 
90126 Congressional Record #763 (1976). 
^^-Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence, 24 
Col 3d 167/ 177-78; 154 Col Rptr. 907, 913-14. 
^Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corporation, 648 F2d 1239, 
1246 (1981). 
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Significant Decisions in Education 
Establishing Precedent for 
Religious Accommodation 
for Teachers 
Umberfield v. School District No. 11 
Colo., 522 P.2d 730 (1974) 
Facts 
Clayborn Umberfield/ a teacher in School District No.11 
since 1954,became a member of the World Wide Church of God 
whose tenets proscribed secular employment on the Sabbath 
(Saturday) and certain holy days. During the period of 
1969-1970 he absented himself from his teaching duties to 
attend a religious assembly after being denied leave from 
his school district. Thereupon/ the school district 




Subsequent to the charges and dismissal proceedings/ 
Umberfield sought relief before the Colorado Teacher Tenure 
Panel which recommended dismissal. Following dismissal by 
the school district/ the teacher filed a complaint with the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which held that discrimina­
tion had resulted from the teacher's dismissal and ordered 
^Umberfield v. School District No. 11 Colo./ 522 P2d 
730 (1974). 
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reinstatement. The district court reversed the Civil Rights 
Commission. On appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals/ 
the court affirmed the district court's action. The Colo­
rado Supreme Court granted certiorari, modifying and affirm-
94 
ing the lower courts. 
Discussion 
The district court/ in upholding the finding of the 
Teacher Tenure Panel for dismissal and reversing the Civil 
Rights Commission/ insisted that the teacher had a right to 
initiate proceedings before the Commission. In affirming 
the district court's decision/ the Appeals Court held that 
the lower court erred in ruling that the teacher could 
seek relief from another administrative panel before judi­
cial review. On certiorari, the Colorado Supreme Court 
affirmed and modified the judgement by addressing the 
following points: 
(1) The doctrine of res judicata applies under the 
Colorado Teacher Tenure Act which sets the procedure for 
dismissal of tenured teachers. It provides a full adversary 
hearing consistent with Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. 
(2) The Civil Rights Commission has a more limited 
function in the area of discrimination in employment. Its 
function is to make find of fact as to whether a statutory 
94Ibid. 
241 
employer has discriminated against an employee because of 
religion. 
(3) Umberfield did not seek judicial review following 
the Teacher Tenure Panel's adverse recommendation and sub­
sequent dismissal by the school district. By seeking new 
proceeding before the Civil Rights Commission/ the court 
could be placed in an anamalous situation of affirming 
opposite results of two administrative bodies. 
(4) The Teacher Tenure Panel had full power to deter­
mine all claims of religious discrimination. 
(5) Therefore/ the doctrine of res judicata bars tha 
relitigation of issues the teacher raised or could have praised 
95 
before the Teacher Tenure Panel and on judicial review. 
California Teacher's Association v. Board of Trustees 
138 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1977) 
Facts 
Plaintiff Waldman/ a teacher in the defendant school 
district and a member of the Jewish faith/ sought relief after 
taking unpaid leave of absence to celebrate Rosh Hashana. 
The school district rules under California codes permitted 
the adopting of rules and regulations governing teacher 
absences in categories of personal necessity. Religious 




The Superior Court of San Bernardino County/ California/ 
entered judgement for the school district/ holding that the 
California Education Code allowed the school district dis­
cretion in determining situations of personal necessity/ 
further holding that religious observances were not of a 




The California Court of Appeals/ upon invitation/ de­
clined to discuss the establishment alause of the federal 
"98 
and state Constitutions_plus the California Constitution , 
which provides in substance that no school district shall 
expend funds for any religious purposes. However/ the 
court discussed the pluralism of the American population 
pointing to the accident of history that made the American 
culture one predominantly of Christian practice. The court 
compared the believers and nonbelievers/ saying that both 
are accorded equal status under the constitution. 
^California Teacher's Association v. Board of Trustees/ 
138 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1977). 
97 
Ibid. 
98California Constitution/art. 26, sec. 5. 
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Business and industry observe a five-day week allowing 
a Christian to attend his religious observances on Sunday. 
However/ those persons employed in an occupation of seventh-
day necessity who want Sunday off must make some accommoda­
tion to that effect with his employer. He has no constitu­
tional right to a paid day of absence to attend a religious 
observance. The central issue raised in this case was whether 
the plaintiff was entitled to a day of paid leave to attend a 
religious observance. In answering the question/ the court 
declared that the school district had the discretion to 
deny the teacher a paid day for religious observance and 
denial of such was not an abuse of discretion. In citing 
c>9 
Cummins/' the court found that reasonable accommodation 
within the scope of discretion was afforded by the teacher's 
not being disciplined and by denial of a day's salary. 
Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence 
154 Cal. iRptr. 907 (1979) 
Facts 
Thomas Byars was employed by the Ducor Union School 
District in 1969 and in 1971 he joined the World Wide Church 
of God whose tenets requires its members to refrain from work 
"cummins v. Parker Seal Company/ 516 F2d 544 (1975). 
"*00California Teachers' Association v. Board of Trustees/ 
138 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1977). 
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on its Sabbath (sundown Friday to sundown Saturday) and on 
certain holy days. The school district had accommodated 
the teacher by excusing him from activities on Friday even­
ings and on two holy days in 1971-1972 and again in 1972-
1973. Though the plaintiff's requests for leave were submit­
ted well in advance/ they were denied. Subsequently over 
the next four school years he was absent 31 days without 
permission. In March of 1973 the district sent him a letter 
of reprimand stating disapproval of his absences with warning 
of dismissal should the unexcused absences continue. By the 
same letter the school district rehired him for 1973-1974 
and made him a permanent instead of a probationary employee. 
In May# 1975/ the district gave notification of intent 
to dismiss for persistent violation of or refusal to obey 
the school laws prescribed for employees/ basing the charges 
on his absences. 
Decision 
Byars sought and received a hearing before a commission 
on professional competence. The Commission of Professional 
Competence ruled that the teacher had not failed to obey a 
valid school law or regulation. The California Superior 
Court entered an order granting writ/ and the Commission and 
teacher appeal. On appeal/ the Supreme Court of California 
*°*Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence/ 
154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979). 
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reversed with directions 
Discussion 
Though the school district's rules were religiously 
neutral on their face, the court held that the effect was 
to exclude Byars for his employment because of his adherence 
to the precepts of his religion. Citing provisions of the 
103 
California Constitution# the court concluded that the 
teacher may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing his 
profession because of his religion, and; (2) the school dis­
trict had not made an effort to reasonably accommodate the 
teacher's religious beliefs under the guidelines of the 1972 
Amendment to 42 U.S.C. 2000e (j) as the Hardison Court 
had held as "defensible construction of the pre-1972 sta­
tute".105 
l nfi 
The Court reasoned that the California constitutional 
provision implied prohibition of religious disqualification 
from employment^ and its adoption in 1974 expressed a deep 
concern for religious freedom that underlies the First 
102Ibid. 
10^California Constitution/ I, sec. 4. 
104Trans World Airlines v. Hardison# 432 U.S. 63 (1977) 
105Ibid. 
106California Constitution, art. 1, sec. 4. 
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Amendment and its historic protection for religious practices 
107 
in the absence of a compelling state interest. 
Citing a comparison with the "reasonable accommodation 
108 short of undue hardship" in Hardison the court found that 
the school district did not demonstrate undue hardship by 
the availability of fully qualified substitute teachers who 
could replace Byars with no additional cost to the district. 
The record revealed that the district/ by statute/ 
allowed each teacher 10 days of paid leave each year for 
illness or personal necessity. The court insisted that a 
district unwilling to pay for leave for religious purposes 
as a personal necessity must accommodate these purposes by 
allowing a reasonable amount of unpaid leave. The unpaid 
leave for Byars' religious observances would not be a burden 
on the conduct of the schools. The school district had con­
tended that accommodating Byars would contravene the estab-
109 lishment clause of the First Amendment; however/ the 
court rejected this contention by insisting that the Califor­
nia constitutional*"'"0 provision met the test prescribed by 
Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence/ 
154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1979). 
108 
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison/ 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
109 
Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence/ 
154 Cal. Rptr. 907 (1970). 
1*°California Constitution/ Article 1/ Sec. 4. 
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Lemon'*'^ and violated 42 U.S.C. 2000e (j) as upheld by 
„ 112 Hardison. 
Niederhuber v. Camden County 
495 F. Supp. 273 (1980) 
Facts 
Ronald Niederhuber/ a member of the World Wide Church 
of God and nontenured teacher in the Camden County School 
District was dismissed by the school district for his unau­
thorized absence from school for two periods on December 1, 
1978. Prior to his dismissal, the teacher had submitted a 
written request to take personal leave on October 2 and 11/ 
1978/ to observe holy days of his church#and on October 4/ 
1978, he submitted a second request to be absent for reli­
gious purposes from October 16 to October 23, 1978, a period 
of six days. The first request was approved with one 
day with pay and one day without pay ; the second request was 
denied. With the denial, the explanation was given that it 
would start a bad precedent. Nevertheless, the teacher 
absented himself for religious observance and was disallowed 
salary for the six day period. On November 30, 1978 
the plaintiff requested that he be excused for the last 
^•'•Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
1 1 2  
Trans World Airlines v.Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). 
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two periods of the next day for "very personal business". 
He left school with the understanding that his classes would 
113 be covered via the customary procedure. 
Decision 
Upon dismissal the plaintiff charged that his First 
Amendment rights to free exercise of religion were denied 
and his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment 
were violated. The United States District Court/ New Jersey, 
ordered reinstatement/ compensatory damages/ and attorney 
114 
fees. This was affirmed by the Appeals Court/ 671 F2d 496. 
Discussion 
Following the dismissal by the school district/ the 
plaintiff requested a public meeting and on January 9, 1979/ 
he and his representative from the New Jersey Education 
Association charged that the dismissal was reached with a 
written statement of the reasons. The school district 
contended that the sole reason for dismissal was the unau­
thorized absence from school for the two periods on Decem­
ber 1/ 1978. However/ the plaintiff contended that his 
dismissal was unrelated to the two-period absence but rather 
based upon his unauthorized absent for the six-day 
period in October. The plaintiff further contended that 
113 
Niederhuber v. Camden County/ 495 F. Supp.273 (1980). 
114ibid. i 
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even if the two period absence was a factor in his dismissal/ 
the school district would not have reached the same decision 
if it had not considered this religious absence in addition 
115 to his two-period absence on December 1/ 1978. 
The court in citing Mt. Healthy guidelines for analyzing 
the evidence in the case found the following: 
(1) the plaintiff's six-day religious absence was a 
"motivating factor" in the dismissal; 
(2) the superintendent and the school board would not 
have reached the same decision had they relied exclusively 
116 on the two-period absence. 
The court insisted that a mid-term dismissal was the 
most severe sanction that could be imposed upon the teacher 
and the alleged loss of efficient functioning of the educa­
tional process to be inconceivable and unsupported by cred­
ible evidence. 
Hunterdon v. Hunterdon 
N.J. Super. A.D., 416 A.2d 980 (1980) 
Facts 
A teacher employed in the Hunterdon School District 
115Ibid. 
116Mt. Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
117 
Niederhuber v. Camden County, 495 F. Supp. 273 (1980). 
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submitted a written request for permission to take a "religious 
leave day." The board's personnel director granted the leave 
on the condition that the leave be taken either without pay 
or be charged against the allowable number of leave days for 
personal reasons, as provided in the collective agreement 
between the teacher's association and the school district. 
The teacher protested/ claiming discrimination in that other 
teachers had been paid for religious absences. After the 
teacher unsuccessfully sought redress through the contractual 
grievance procedure/ the teacher association agreed to arbi­
tration and served two demands on the board for arbitration: 
(1) a unilateral change in temporary leave policy/ and (2) 
l i f t  improper denial of religious holidays. 
Decision 
The New Jersey Public Employment Relations Commission 
ruled that granting additional days off with pay for reli­
gious observances violated the constitutional prohibition 
against the establishment of religion/ and also that the demand 
for arbitration is outside the scope of collective negotiations 
and is neither negotiable nor arbitrable/ accordingly grant­
ing permanent restraints on arbitration. Action of the 
Public Employment Relations Commission affirmed by the 
118 





The Superior Court/ New Jersey/ held that the New Jersey 
statute defines the scope of collective negotiation and 
allows the PERC to make jurisdiction determinations. The 
court took the view that agreements made by a school board 
does not include provisions to grant paid leave for religious 
purposes. Such agreement would not meet the requirement set 
forth in the Lemon decision# which held that the action must 
have a secular purpose/ neither advancing nor inhibiting re­
ligion/ and be free of excessive government entanglement with 
religion.^20 Here/ the court concluded there would be no 
secular purpose and the sole purpose would be to permit cer­
tain teachers to be absent for religious reasons/ even though 
the days may be limited. Moreover/ the effect would enhance 
religion at the exclusion of those having no religious per­
suasion. Since tax money would be used to pay the religious 
121 
teachers/ the action would be intertwining with religion. 
^^Hunterdon v.Hunterdon/ N.J. Super. A.D./ 416 A2d 980 
(1980). 
120 
Lemon v. Kurtzman/ 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
* ̂Hunterdon v. Hunterdon/ N.J. Super. A.D./ 416 A2d 
980 (1980). 
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Edwards v. Norton 
658 P.2d 951 (1981) 
Facts 
Ruby Edwards, a teacher aide for the Norton school 
board beginning in 1967, was initially assigned to prepare 
teaching material, collect lunch money,and grade papers. 
Later her duties evolved to instructing mentally retarded 
students and slow learners. The plaintiff/ a member of the 
World Wide Church of God whose doctrines prohibited secular 
work on certain holy days, was reemployed for 1968-1969 and 
the 1969-1970 school terms. During these school terms, the 
district accommodated Edwards' religious practices by allow­
ing her to abstain from work and observe her church's holy 
days. In the fall of 1971, Edwards was advised that her 
observances for holy days would no longer be permitted with 
the explanation that her increased duties and unavailability 
of substitute aides required her daily presence. Her employ­
ment was reviewed for 1971-1972 and despite the admonition, 
she was allowed to observe the holy days. Subsequently, her 
1972-1973 employment was granted, and in September, 1972, her 
request for religious leave was denied. Following her pre­
vious practice, she absented herself from work. The school 
district terminated her employment because of the unauthor­
ized leave. 
After her discharge, the plaintiff filed a complaint 
253 
with the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission charging 
discrimination under provisions of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and received a right-to-sue letter. 
Timely action was initiated in the United States District 
122 
Court of Virginia. 
Decision 
The United States District Court held that the school 
district failed to prove that accommodating Edwards' religious 
practices would create an undue hardship on the school's 
operation as provided under provision of 42 U.S.C. 2000e 
(2)(1) and limited back pay with denial of reinstatement. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the denial of 
123 
reinstatement and amount of back pay. 
Discussion 
The issue in appeals was whether the District Court 
remedy for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964/ 42 U.S.C. 2000e 2 (a)(1) is legally adequate. The 
fcourt limited the back pay to the balance of the amount due 
for the contract year of 1972-1973 and denied reinstatement. 
In contrast to procedural rights of the due process 
clause/ Title VII creates a substantive right. The Circuit 
122Edwards v. Norton, 658 F.2d 951 (1981). 
123Ibid. 
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Court stated that the legislation was in part enacted to 
assure that freedom from religious discrimination in the 
employment of workers is for all time guaranteed by law. 
Congress authorized reinstatement and back pay/but it did 
not authorize restricting the award of the unpaid balance 
of the salary for the remaining period of an employee's 
current contract. 
Wangsness v. Watertown School District No. 14-4 
541 F. Supp. 332 (1982) 
Facts 
Plaintiff/ Orley B. Wangsness, a member of the World 
Wide Church of God whose tenets require its members to 
attend a religious festival known as the Feast of Tabernacles 
which is observed annually in the fall for seven days, was 
hired by the Watertown School District as junior high school 
industrial arts teacher for the 1973-1974 school year. In 
the early part of September, 1973, Wangsness requested in 
writing, a leave of absence from October 11, 1973 through 
Friday, October 19, 1973 to attend the Feast of Tabernacles. 
The request was denied by the principal and superintendent. 
Thereupon, Wangsness appealed to the school board. The 
school board denied the request and informed the plaintiff 
that his contract would be terminated if he took the leave. 
124Ibid. 
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Wangsness subsequently took the leave and was discharged by 
the defendent school board. 
Following the termination of his contract/ Wangsness 
filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunities 
Commission (EEOC) and about the same time/ filed a complaint 
125 with the South Dakota Commission on Human Rights. 
Decision 
After filing his complaint with the EEOC alleging reli­
gious discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1)/ 
the EEOC determined that there was reasonable cause to believe 
that the defendent school board had violated Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Thereafter/ Wangsness pursued 
action in the United States District Court of South Dakota. 
The district court/ upon review of the evidence/ held for the 
plaintiff.126 
Discussion 
In holding for the plaintiff/ the court adjudged; 
(1) that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of 
religious discrimination under 42 U.S.C./ 2000e-2(a)(1); 
(2) that the school board failed to make a good faith 
effort to accommodate the plaintiff's religious needs; 




(3) that the school board failed to show that any reason­
able accommodation would have resulted in undue hardship on 
127 the school system. 
In addressing the prima facie aspect/the court cited 
Brown v. General Motors in outlining the elements: 
(1) a bona fide belief that compliance with work re­
quirements is contrary to the plaintiff's religious faith; 
(2) the plaintiff has informed the employer about the con­
flict; and 
(3) the plaintiff was discharged because of refusal 
128 
to comply with the work requirement. 
After establishing a prima facie case of discrimination/ 
the burden shifts to the employer to accommodate the employee 
and if the efforts are unsuccessful/ to demonstrate that to 
accommodate/ an undue burden exists. This was not evident in 
the action of the defendent school board. In addressing the 
school board's hardship/ the court deduced from the evidence 
that Wangsness had left detailed lesson plans with satisfac­
tory instructions to the replacement teacher; the school 
board was unable to demonstrate that accommodating Wangsness 
would result in undue hardship.*^9 
127Ibid. 
i 28 
Brown v. General Motors Corporation/ 601 F2d 956 (1979). 
•^^Wangsness v. Watertown/ 541 F. Supp. 332 (1982). 
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Pinsker v. Joint District No. 28J 
554 F. Supp. 1049 (1983) 
735 F. 2d 388 (1984) 
Facts 
Gerald Pinsker# a Jewish teacher,brought suit under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claiming that the 
school year in the district was arranged so that in most 
school years Christian teachers need not use their personal 
leave days to observe religious holidays; but as a non-Christian/ 
he claimed the school calendar interferred with the free exercise 
of his religion.^0 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado entered judgement for the school district and the 
teacher appealed. On appeal the Tenth Circuit Court affirmed 
131 
the findings for the school district. 
Discussion 
The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff was aware 
of the school board's policy at the time of his employment 
and did not then consider the leave provisions an impediment to 
his religious beliefs and practices. The contract 
1 
Pinsker v. Joint District No. 28J., 735 F2d 388 (1984). 
131Ibid. 
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governing employment of teachers was one regularly negotiated 
between the defendent and the bargaining unit representing 
the teachers and was not one where employment was religiously 
tolerable and then became unacceptable by change of condi­
tions. In fact/ the leave provisions had become more liberal 
since the plaintiff's employment. The court held that the 
limitation of two days paid personal leave for teachers had 
tones of arbitrariness but the allowance of two days paid 
leave was a creature of negotiations which had a legitimate 
compelling public interest at the base. Moreover# the court 
held that a line had to be drawn in order to serve the stu­
dents for whose benefit the school system exists. In finding 
for the school board/ the court reasoned that the policy and 
practices neither jeopardized the teacher's job nor his 
observation of religious holidays. The policy/although it 
may require teachers to take occasional unpaid leave/ is 
not an unreasonable accommodation of teachers' religious 
practices. Loss of a day's pay for time not worked does not 
constitute substantial pressure on a teacher to modify his or 
her behavior. The trial correctly determined that a prima 
132 
facie case of religious discrimination did not exist. 
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Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education 
757 F.2d 476 (1985) 
Facts 
Ronald Philbrook/ a teacher in the Ansonia School Dis­
trict and a member of the World Wide Church of God whose 
tenets prohibited secular work on church holy days,brought 
suit under Title VII/ alleging that the school board's policy 
of allowing only three days of paid leave for religious 
observance and not allowing three days of paid leave for 
personal business to be used for religious observance con-
133 
flxcted with his religious beliefs. 
Decision 
The United States District Court for the Division of 
Connecticut held that the teacher failed to prove religious 
discrimination. On appeal by the teacher/ the Second Circuit 
134 Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. 
Discussion 
In finding for the plaintiff/ the Circuit Court drew on 
the Brown v. General Motors case in deducing from the evidence 
that Philbrook had satisfied the tests of proving a prima 
^••^Philbrook v. Ansonia Board of Education/ 757 F2d 476 
(1985). 
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facie case of discrimination by the bona fide religious 
belief/ informing the employer of the belief/ and suffering 
1 QC 
for failure in complying with the employment requirements. 
The appeals court in finding that the teacher had established 
religious discrimination held that Title VII requires that 
an employer accommodate an employee's religious needs short 
of an undue hardship. In this case, the teacher had offered 
to notify the school board well in advance and work alternate 
hours for makeup time missed from the regular school day. 
In addition/ offer was made to meet with the substitute to 
ensure the quality and continuity of his student's education. 
The appeals court declared that under such circumstance it 
was unreasonable under Title VII for the school board not to 
accommodate the teacher's need for up to six days per year 
136 
of paid leave for religious purposes. 
l^Brown v. General Motors Corporation/ 601 F2d 956 
(1979). 








Early American settlers brought to this country their 
religious beliefs and practices centering around the Sabbath 
observances that had emerged from the Protestant Reformation. 
Their laws reflected the majority's attitude toward the 
Sabbath with beliefs and practices to insure its proper 
observance. 
In this pluralistic religious environment, the consti­
tutional writers did not attempt to define religion; but 
insisted that the federal government should not aid religion 
or prohibit its practice by the citizens. The several states 
remained free to enact legislation respecting religion until 
1940 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adjudged to embrace 
all the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, rendering 
the states as incompetent as the federal government respect­
ing religion. 
The years since the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 represent a period of unprecedented judicial activity 
concerning religious accommodation and discrimination com­
plaints resulting from employment practices by private and 
public employers. The courts have considered and ruled on 
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cases brought under First Amendment guarantees and provisions 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that required the employer to 
make reasonable accommodation for religious beliefs and prac­
tices short of undue hardship on the conduct of business. 
Judicial decisions arising from litigation of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and its amendments have found the provi­
sions to be constitutional. The private or public employee 
is assured the right of free exercise of religion compatible 
with employment work rules. The employee and the employer 
share a responsibility to make accommodation for religious 
observances within these guidelines that although the Federal 
Constitution is neutral in respect to the establishment of a 
particular religion, the several states have statutes respect­
ing religion in providing for employment schedules apart from 
the Sunday Sabbath. 
All states provide for a sabbath observance in various 
ways. 
Twenty-five states# the District of Columbia, and Puerto 
Rico have statutes granting public employees Sunday as a 
legal public holiday. 
Twenty-five states have statutes inferring Sunday as a 
holiday by enumerating the work week exclusive of Sunday. 
The states of Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
Vermont, and Washington treat Sunday as the Sabbath in their 
statutes. 
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Ten states enumerate religious observance for the non-
Sunday Sabbatarian. 
Thirteen states have statutes granting religious obser­
vance for Good Friday. 
North Carolina is the only state granting Easter Monday 
as a legal public holiday. 
All fifty states/ District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico* 
have statutes granting December 25th (Christmas) as a legal 
public holiday. 
Arkansas# Georgia, South Carolina/ and Wisconsin have 
statutes granting December 24th or a portion of the day as a 
legal public holiday. 
Florida/ Minnesota/ and South Carolina have statutes 
providing December 26th as a legal public holiday. 
All fifty states, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico 
have statutes allowing the Governor or President of the 
United States to grant a special day or the last Thursday 
in November as a legal holiday for public worship and thanks­
giving . 
North Carolina is the only state to provide Yom Kippur 
as a legal holiday. 
Rhode Island is the only state to provide for a Jewish 
Sabbath. 
Kentucky, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, Oklahoma, 
Rhode Island, and South Carolina currently proscribe Sunday 
work excepting acts of mercy, charity, or acts of necessity 
264 
Questions and Answers 
In the introductory material in Chapter 1/ some basic 
questions relating to the topic of this dissertation were 
proposed. Discussion developed around those six questions 
will provide insight concerning reasonable accommodation for 
religious observance by public school employees. 
1. What constitutes reasonable accommodation for 
religious holiday observance by employees? 
The major judicial decisions have focused on the reason­
able accommodation/undue hardship dichotomy to consider any­
thing more than a de minimis cost to the employer as an 
undue hardship on the conduct of business. The duty to accom­
modate falls upon the school board with neutrality rather than 
conferring employee privilege. Hardship by the employer can­
not be hypothetical or conceivable but must be by demonstra­
tive evidence that in so accommodating/ the school board suf-
ferred more than a de minimis cost. A de minimis cost in­
cludes an incidental burden such as administrative cost or 
temporary disruption of the work schedule. 
2. When does religious accommodation (either short term 
or leave of absence for religious observance) for an employee 
place an undue hardship on the school board? 
The school board/ after being notified that the employee's 
religious requirements conflicts with the work schedule/ 
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suffers an undue hardship after demonstrating that a qualified 
substitute is unavailable. The school board has the responsi­
bility to find a replacement for a teacher's taking a religious 
leave of absence in the same manner as other reasons for leaves 
of absence/ consistent with its jurisdictional authority to 
grant leaves of absence. 
3. What is the legal authority of the school board to 
establish policy concerning religious holiday observance by 
the employee? 
The common civil calendar (Gregorian) adopted by the 
more advanced nations takes into account the five-day work 
week leaving the Sabbath (Seventh-day and First-Day) free 
for the majority religions to observe their beliefs and 
practices. Moreover/ the fifty states/ District of Columbia/ 
and Puerto Rico provide by statute the number of days school 
is to be in session as well as other special observances. 
School boards must accommodate employees' religious needs 
that conflict with the work week providing that in so accom­
modating those needs the conduct of the school's operation is 
not impaired. Policy governing that accommodation must meet 
constitutional muster by being secular in nature/ neither 
promoting nor inhibiting the free exercise of religion/ and 
being free from excessive entanglements with religion. 
4. What are the legal aspects in implementation of 
policy by the school administration? 
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The Supreme Court's tripartite test applies to any policy 
respecting leaves of absence for religious purposes that the 
school board may adopt. The assurance of First Amendment 
religious rights of employees should be safeguarded by the 
school administration. Moreover/ the administration should 
be aware of the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
which guarantees a nondiscrimination in employment practices. 
Receiving the employee's announcement of his religious needs 
conflicting with the work schedule and seeking mutual accom­
modation is essential in avoiding discrimination on grounds 
of religion. 
5. Based on the results of recent court cases, what 
specific issues relating to religious holidays observance 
by employees are being litigated? 
The Hardison case represents a reasonably clear model 
for establishing reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. 
A review of cases since Hardison reveals that criteria set 
forth there are used by inferior courts in litigation of rea­
sonable accommodation. 
The issue of discrimination on religious grounds in 
employment practices is being litigated in frequent occur-
ances. In establishing a prima facie case of discrimination! 
the Brown case established three elements to be used/ as 
follows: 1) Did the employee notify the employer that he 
held a bona fide belief that compliance with work requirements 
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is contrary to his religious faith? 2) Did the employee in­
form the employer about the conflict? 3) Was the employee 
discharged because of his refusal to comply with the work 
requirement? 
6. Based upon the established legal precedents, what 
are the legally acceptable criteria for policy making con­
cerning religious accommodation? 
The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals/ relying on 
the Supreme Court landmark cases# have established criteria 
for policy making by the Lemon tripartite test. The judicial 
decision has affirmed the constitutionality of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 in employment practices intended to elimi­
nate discrimination on grounds of religion and avoid a breach 
of the wall between church and state as set forth in Everson. 
Conclusions 
Based on review and analysis of major judicial decisions, 
the following conclusions are drawn: 
(1) Though enactments respecting activity on the Sabbath 
had their genesis in religion/ judicary decisions have come 
to regard the Sabbath as a secular day of rest in the public 
interest and benefits occurring to a particular religion are 
incidental. 
(2) The school boards must show that accommodating an 
employee's religion practices causes an undue hardship in the 
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operation of the school by demonstrative evidence rather than 
on a hypothetical or conceivable basis. 
(3) Undue hardship has to be demonstrated beyond a de 
minimis cost. 
(4) The school board does not have to guarantee that an 
employee will never be asked to forego religious observance 
to fulfill employment needs. 
(5) The employee must demonstrate accommodation on his 
or her part before shifting the total burden of accommodation 
to the employer. 
(6) The employee must advise the employer of his reli­
gious needs that/ if followed/ will conflict with the employ­
ment work schedule and the employer has the burden to accom­
modate those beliefs short of undue hardship on the conduct 
of business. 
(7) The employee, after notifying the employer of his 
religious needs and if not accommodated/ has to establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination under provision of Title 
VII before shifting the burden of accommodation to the employer. 
(8) The employer does not have to accommodate purely 
personal preference of its employees. 
(9) Employer work rules respecting religion must meet 
constitutional muster by (a) being secular in nature; (b) 
not promoting or inhibiting free exercise of religion by the 
employees; (c) not causing an entanglement between its rules 
and religion. 
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(10) Accommodation for religion observance cannot abro­
gate a collective bargaining agreement between school board 
and teachers' unions. 
Recommendations 
Based on an analysis of judicial decision, the following 
recommendations are made: 
(1) School boards and administrators should be aware of 
the plurality of religious beliefs held by the employees and 
adopt policies that are neutral in intent and effect. 
(2) School boards and administrators should guarantee 
that policy dealing with employment practices are within the 
First Amendment limits as interpreted by the courts. 
(3) School boards and administrators must be vigilant 
in keeping within the guidelines of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 in pre-employment and employment practices to eliminate 
discrimination on grounds of religion. 
(4) School boards and administrators must ensure that 
neutrality is maintained in application of policy on religious 
observance by the employees. 
(5) School boards and administrators should grant leaves 
of absence for religious reasons consistent with guidelines 
for other leaves of absence. 
(6) School boards and administrators must be aware that 
undue hardship in making religious accommodation is construed 
by federal legislation as a relative rather than absolute 
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determination. 
(7) School boards and administrators should not summarily 
refuse all requests for religious accommodation but accommo­
date the religious practices of current and prospective em­
ployees unless refusal can be justified by tangible hardship. 
(8) School boards and administrators must be aware that 
cost associated with accommodation is compared with the 
employer's operating cost/ size, and number of persons actually 
requiring accommodation. 
(9) School boards and administrators, when made aware 
of an employee's religious needs/ should provide more than 
one alternative for religious accommodation. 
(10) School boards and administrators should adopt policy 
allowing at least four accommodation alternatives: voluntary 
substitution/ flexible work scheduling/ lateral transfer/ and 
change of job assignments. 
(11) School boards should be aware that religious accom­
modation results in undue hardship when proof is provided 
that such accommodation is a violation of a bona fide senior­
ity clause in a collective bargaining contract. 
(12) School boards and administrators should be aware 
that the First Amendment guarantees are beyond the reach of 
public sentiment and cannot be compromised by provincial 
opinion. 
Concluding Statement 
While no school' board policy will ensure against the 
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initiation of court action by employees who feel that their 
religious rights have been violated/ school boards and admin­
istrators can reduce the probability of having policies in­
validated by formulating and implementing guidelines assuring 
neutrality and shared responsibility for reasonable accommo­
dation for absences and leaves. Recent judicial decisions 
have required the employee to accept more responsibility in 
achieving a reasonable accommodation with the employer. 
Further study is recommended to assist school boards and 
administrators in formulating and implementing policy to 
address issues emerging from recent judicial decisions that/ 
while safeguarding individual religious rights/ do not give 
religious concerns control over all secular interests at the 
market place. 
Additional study is recommended to assist school boards 
and administrators in 1) avoiding religious discrimination 
in employment practices/ 2) assessing instructional impact 
of teacher leaves of absence/ and 3) developing criteria in 
establishing de minimis cost of religious accommodation for 
employees. 
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STATE STATUTES PROVIDING RELIGIOUS 
ACCOMMODATION FOR PUBLIC 
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 
...ALABAMA... 
Holidays enumerated; observance of Veterans' Day by closing 
of schools# banks and government offices; bank closings on 
certain other holidays. 
Section 1-3-8 
(a) Sunday# Christmas day*...and the days designated by the 
governor for public thanksgiving shall each be deemed a 
holiday. If any holiday falls on Sunday/ the following day 




(a) Public schools shall not be in session on school holidays 
which are...Thanksgiving Day...Christmas Day/...If one of 
these holidays falls on a Saturday/ the Friday immediately 
preceding is a school holiday. If one of these holidays 
falls on a Sunday/ the Monday immediately following is a 
school holiday. A teacher shall not be required to perform 
287 
employment services on these holidays/ nor may the salary of 
a teacher be diminished because the teacher does not perform 
employment services on a school holiday. 
Day in session. 
Section 14.03.040 
Each day within the school term is a day in session except 
Saturdays/ Sundays and days designated as holidays... 
...ARIZONA... 
ARTICLE 1. SCHOOL YEAR AND ATTENDANCE 
REQUIREMENTS 
School year; school month; holidays 
Section 15-801 
(a) Except as may be otherwise authorized by the superintend­
ent of public instruction to accommodate an approved extend­
ed school year operation/ the school year shall begin July 1 
and end June 30 and a school month is twenty days# or four 
weeks of five days each. 
(b) When Thanksgiving Day or December 25 occurs within the 
school week/ the schools shall be closed and the compensation 
of the teachers shall not be diminished on that account. 
Governing boards of school districts may declare a recess 
during the Christmas holiday season not to exceed two school 









The following days are hereby declared to be the sole offi­
cial holidays applicable to State Government in Arkansas:... 
Thanksgiving Day - the fourth Thursday in November; 
Christmas Eve - December 24; 
Christmas Day - December 25. 
Commercial paper payable day after holiday—Holiday falling 
on Sunday. 
Section 69-103 
...In case any legal holiday which falls upon Sunday, the 
next succeeding Monday shall be a legal holiday instead. 
Thanksgiving day a legal holiday. 
Section 69-107 
Any day made or designated by Act of Congress of the United 
States of America as a day of general Thanksgiving shall be 
proclaimed by the Governor as a legal holiday. 
289 
School "month" and school "day" defined. 
Section 80-1602. 
The term "month" as used in this act shall be construed to 
mean a period including twenty (20) school days, or four (4) 
weeks of five (5) such days each.... 
CONSTITUTION OF ARKANSAS 
Article 2/ sec. 24 
Religious liberty. 
Section 24 
All men have a natural and indefeasible right to worship 
Almighty God according to the dictates of their own con­
sciences; no man can, of right/ be compelled to attend/ 
erect or support any place of worship; or to maintain any 
ministry against his consent. No human authority can/ in 
any case or manner whatsoever/ control or interfere with the 
right of conscience; and no preference shall ever be given/ 
by law/ to any religious establishment/ denomination or 
mode of worship above any other. 
NOTES 
Sabbath Breaking. 
The Sabbath statute is a civil regulation providing for a 
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day of rest and imposes on no one any religious ceremony or 
form of worship. Scales v. State, 47 Ark. 476/ 1 S.W. 769/ 
58 Am Rep. 768. (1886). 
Christian Religion. 
The Christian religion is part of the common law/ and its 




Days that are holidays; Memorandum of understanding; Alter­
ing date of holiday. 
Section 6700. 
The holidays in this state are: 
(a) Every Sunday.... 
(1) December 25th. 
(m) Good Friday from 12 noon until 3 p.m. 
(n) Every day appointed by the President or Governor for a 
public fast/ thanksgiving/ or holiday. 
Holidays falling on Saturday or Sunday. 
If...December 25th falls upon a Sunday/ the Monday following 
is a holiday.... 
NOTES 
"Holiday" has reference to day set apart for worship/ for 
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reverence to memory of great leaders and benefactors/ to 
rejoice over some great national or historical event/ or to 
rekindle flame of an idea. Vidal'v. Backs 218 C 99/ 21.P2d 
952, 86 ALR 1134 (1933) 
COLORADO . . . 
School year - national holidays. 
Section 22-1-112 
\ 
The School year shall begin on the first day of July and end 
on the thirtieth day of June. The term "national holidays" 
in this title shall be construed to mean Thanksgiving day, 
Christmas day. New Year's day... 
HOLIDAYS 
Legal Holidays - effect. 
Section 24-11-101 
(1) The following days, viz: ...the twenty-fifth day of 
December/ commonly called Christmas day; and any day appoint­
ed or recommended by the governor of this state or the Presi­
dent of the United States as a day of fasting or prayer or 
thanksgiving# are hereby declared to be legal holidays and 
shall/ for all purposes whatsoever/ as giving notice of the 
dishonor of bills or exchange/ drafts, bank checks, promis­
sory notes, or other negotiable instruments and also for the 
292 
holding of courts/ be treated and considered as is the first 
day of the week commonly called Sunday. 
...CONNECTICUTT... 
CHAPTER 2 
LEGAL HOLIDAYS AND STANDARD OF TIME 
Days designated as legal holidays 
Section 1-4 
In each year...the twenty-fifth day of December (known as 
Christmas) and any day appointed or recommended by the 
governor of this state or the president of the United States 
as a day of thanksgiving, fasting or religious observance/ 
shall each be a legal holiday, except that whenever any of 
such days which are not designated to occur on Monday occurs 
upon a Sunday, the Monday next following such day shall be 
a legal holiday and whenever any of such days occurs upon 
a Saturday/ the Friday immediately preceding such day shall 
be a legal holiday. When any such holiday occurs on a school 
day/ there shall be no session of the public schools on such 
day. 
Towns to maintain schools. 
Section 10-15 
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Public schools including kindergartens shall be maintained 
in each town for at least one hundred eighty days of actual 
school sessions during each year. When public school ses­
sions are cancelled for reasons of inclement weather or 
otherwise^ the rescheduled sessions shall not be held on 
Saturday or Sunday. 
Persons who observe Saturday excepted from Sunday Law. 
Section 53-303. 
No person who conscientiously believes that the seventh day 
of the week ought to be observed as the Sabbath/ and actually 
refrains from secular business and labor on that day* or who 
conscientiously believes that the Sabbath begins at sundown 
on Saturday night/ and actually refrains from secular busi­
ness and labor during said period/ and who has filed written 
notice of such belief with the prosecuting attorney of the 
court having jurisdiction/ shall-be liable to prosecution for 
performing secular business and labor on Sunday/ provided he 
shall not disturb any other person who is attending public 
worship. 
...DELAWARE... 




The following days shall be legal holidays in this state: 
...Good Friday; ...the fourth Thursday in November/ known 
as Thanksgiving Day; the 25th of December/ known as Christ­
mas. 
If any of the legal holidays fall on Sunday/ the Monday 
following shall be a legal holiday. 
...FLORIDA... 
LEGAL HOLIDAYS 
Legal holidays designated 
Section 683.01 
(1) The legal holidays are; The first day of the week/ com­
monly called Sunday; ...Thanksgiving Day; December 25/ 
Christmas day; Good Friday;... 
(2) Whenever any legal holiday shall fall upon a Sunday/ 
the Monday next following shall be deemed a public holiday 
for all and any of the purposes aforesaid. 
(16) School vacation period. - That period of.the school 
year beginning on or before December 24 and continuing for 
a period of time to be fixed by the school board which shall 
include January 1, shall be set apart as a vacation period/ 




HOLIDAYS AND OBSERVANCES 
Public and legal holidays. 
Section 1-4-1. 
(a) The following days are declared to be public and legal 
holidays in Georgia: ... 
(11) The fourth Thursday in November, known as Thanksgiving 
Day; 
(12) December 25, known as Christmas Day; and 
(13) Any day proclaimed or designated by the Governor of 
this state or the President of the United States as a day of 
fasting and prayer or other religious observance. 
(b) Whenever a public and legal holiday, occurs on a Satur­
day, the preceding Friday shall be observed as a public and 
legal holiday. Whenever a public and legal holiday occurs on 
a Sunday, the following Monday shall be observed as a public 
and legal holiday. 
Religious holidays. 
Section 1-4-2 
The only days to be declared, treated, and considered as 









The following days of each year are set apart and established 
as state holidays: 
The Friday preceding Easter Sunday/ Good Friday; 
The fourth Thursday in November/ Thanksgiving Day; 
The twenty-fifth day of December/ Christmas Day;... 
Any day designated by proclamation by the President of the 
United States or by the Governor as a holiday. 
Hours of work of officers and employees; compensation for 
overtime; and premium pay. 
Section 80-4 
For pay and leave purposes/ if a legal holiday falls on a 
Sunday and following Monday is observed as a holiday pursu­
ant to section 8-2: 
(1) For employees whose regular workweek does 
not include Sunday/ the next regular work­
day following Sunday shall be held and 
considered a legal holiday/ in lieu of the 
holiday which so occurs on Sunday. 
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...IDAHO... 
CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 
Holidays enumerated. 
Section 73-108 
Holidays/ within the meaning of these compiled laws/ are: 
Every Sunday;... 
Fourth Thursday in November (Thanksgiving Day); 
December 25 (Christmas); 
Every day appointed by the President of the United States# 
or by the governor of this state# for a public fast# thanks­
giving# or holiday. 
Any legal holiday that falls on Saturday# the preceding 
Friday shall be a holiday and any legal holiday enumerated 
herein other than Sunday that falls on Sunday# the following 









...A teacher shall not be required to teach...Good Friday... 
December 25th and any other day appointed by the President 
of the United States or Governor as a day of fast or thanks­
giving. School boards may grant special holidays whenever 
in their judgment such action is advisable. No deduction 
shall be made from the time or compensation of a teacher on 
account of any legal or special holiday. 
Good Friday. 
Section 17-2202 
(1) The Friday immediately before Easter Sunday of each year 






The following are legal holidays within the state of Indiana 
for all purposes:...the movable feast day of Good Friday;... 
Thanksgiving Day/ the fourth Thursday in November; Christmas 
Day, December 25; the day of any general/ national/ state or 
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city election or primary; and the first day of the week/ 
commonly called Sunday. 
Government of schools. 
Section 33-512 
(9) To determine school holidays. Any listing of school 
holidays shall include npt less than the following: New 
Year's Day, Memorial Day/ Independence Day/ Thanksgiving 
Day/ and Christmas Day.. 
...IOWA ... 
Legal public holidays. 
Section 33.1 
The following are legal public holidays: ... 
8. Thanksgiving Day, the fourth Thursday in November. 
9. Christmas Day, December 25. 
CHAPTER 33. PUBLIC HOLIDAYS 
Paid holidays. 
Section 33.2 
State employees are granted/ except as provided in the fourth 
paragraph of this section/ the following holidays off from 
employment with pay: 




The school year shall begin on the first of July and each 
school regularly established shall continue for at least 
thirty-six weeks of five school days each and may be main­
tained during the entire calendar year. 
...KANSAS... 
Article. - LEGAL HOLIDAYS 
Legal public holidays designated. 
Section 35-107 
(a) On and after January 1, 1976/ the following days are 
declared to be legal public holidays and are to be observed 
as such: 
Thanksgiving Day/ the fourth Thursday in November; 
Christmas Day/ December 25. 
Chapter 69. - SABBATH 
Section 69-101 
Persons keeping Saturday as Sabbath; when exempt from mili­
tary duty or jury service. No person whose religious faith 
and practice is to keep the seventh day of the week/ commonly 
called Saturday/ as a day set apart by divine command as the 
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Sabbath of rest from labor and dedicated to the worship of 
God, shall be subject to perform military duty or to serve 
as a juryman in a justice's court on that day, except that 
such person shall be subject to perform military duty at 
any time in case of insurrection, invasion, or time of war. 
...KENTUCKY 
Holidays. (Effective January 1, 1986) 
Section 2.110 
(l)...the 25th day of December (Christmas Day) of each year, 
and all days appointed by the President of the United States 
or by the governor as days of thanksgiving, are holidays, 
on which all the public offices of this Commonwealth may be 
closed; and subject to the provisions of subsection (2) of 
this sectionf shall be considered as Sunday for all purposes 
regarding the presenting for payment or acceptance, and of 
protesting for and giving notice of the dishonor of bill... 
If any of the days named as holidays occur on Sunday, the 
next day thereafter shall be observed as a holiday... 
Working on Sunday - Work of necessity or charity,...and cer­
tain businesses and employers excluded. 
Section 436.160 
(1) Any person who works on Sundays at his own or at any 
other occupation or employs any other person, in labor or 
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other business/ whether for profit or amusement/ unless his 
work or the employment of others is in the course of ordi­
nary household duties/ work of necessity or charity or work 
required in the maintenance or operation of a public service 
or public utility plant or system.... 
(2) Persons who are members of a religious society which ob­
serves as a Sabbath any other day in the week than Sunday 
shall not be liable to the penalty prescribed in subsection 
(1) of this section/ if they observe as a Sabbath one (1) 
day in each seven (7). 
School month and school day. 
Section 158.060 
Twenty (2C> school days/ or days in which teachers are actu­
ally employed in the schoolroom/ shall constitute a school 
month in the common schools. The legal holidays designated 
by the state board of education to be observed may include 
the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of each 
year and shall be counted as school days. No teacher shall 
teach on Saturdays except in cases of emergency and then only 
upon authorization of the state board of education.... 
...LOUISANA... 
Days of public rest/ legal holidays and half-holidays. 
Section 55. 
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A. The following shall be days of public rest and legal 
holidays and half-holidays: 
(1) The following shall be days of public rest and legal 
holidays; Sundays/...Good Friday*..the fourth Thursday in 




The following provisions shall apply to school holidays. 
1. Unconditional holidays. Public schools shall close on the 
following days: 
G. Thanksgiving Day# as designated by the Governor; and 
H. Christmas Day/ December 25th. 
2. Conditional holidays. Public schools shall close on the 
following days unless the school board votes to keep its 
school open and observe the day with special exercises as 
defined in section 4803: 
A. New Year's Day, January 1st; and 
B. Washington's Birthday/ the 3rd Monday in February. 
Special observance days. 
Section 4803. 
Days marked by special observances shall be established as 
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follows: 
5. Temperance Day. Temperance Day# March 1st/ shall be 
observed by studying the history and benefits of temperance 
laws for at least 45 minutes. The commissioner shall pre­
pare appropriate materials for this observance; 
Sunday Holidays. 
Section 4804 
When a holiday or special observance falls on a Sunday/ the 
following Monday shall be considered the holiday or day of 
special observance. 
Definition of Lord's Day. 
Section 3201. 
The Lord's Day includes the time between 12 o'clock on 
Saturday night and 12 o'clock on Sunday night. 
Saturday as holy day. 
Section 3209. 
No person conscientiously believing that the 7th day of the 
week ought to be observed as the Sabbath/ and actually re­
fraining from secular business and labor on that day/ is 
liable to said penalties for doing such business or labor 





No court may be held on Sunday or any day designated for the 
annual Thanksgiving...or on Christmas Day. 
...MARYLAND... 
Legal holidays. 
Article 1/ Section 27. 
( ) "Legal holiday" defined - In this code and any rule# 
regulation, or directive adopted under it/ "legal holiday" 
means: 
( ) Good Friday; 
(13) The fourth Thursday in November# for Thanksgiving Day; 
(14) December 25/ for Christmas Day; 
(16) Each other day that the President of the United States 
or the Governor designates for general cessation of business. 
SABBATH BREAKING 
Working on Sunday; permitting children or servants to game 
hunt/ etc.;...and certain persons excepted. 
Section 492 
No person whatsoever shall work or do any bodily labor on 
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the Lord's day, commonly called Sunday; and no person having 
children or servants shall command/ or wittingly or willing­
ly suffer any of them to do any manner of work or labor on 
the Lord's day (works of necessity and charity always except­
ed)/ nor shall suffer or permit any children or servants to 
profane the Lord's day by gaming/ fowling/ hunting/ or unlaw­
ful pastime or recreation. 
(2) To any person who conscientiously believes that the 
seventh day of the week ought to be observed as the Sabbath 
and actually refrains from secular business and labor on 
that day/ and whose business establishment or establish­
ments...are actually closed on that day; or 
(3) To any person who conscientiously believes that the 
Sabbath begins at sundown on Friday night and ends at sun­
down on Saturday night and who actually refrains from secu­
lar business and labor during such period/ and whose business 
establishment are actually closed during such period. 
...MASSACHUSETTS... 
"Legal Holiday" - Eighteenth 
Chapter 4/ Section 7 
"Legal Holiday" shall include...and Christmas Day/ or the 
day following when any of said days occur on Sunday/...and 
Thanksgiving Day. 
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Establishment of Guidelines for celebration of Christinas and 
Other Festivals. 1 
Chapter 71/ Section 31A 
The school committee may set appropriate guidelines for the 
celebration of Christmas and other festivals observed as 
holidays for the purpose of furthering the educational, 
cultural and social experiences and development of children. 
Sunday Is Common Day of Rest; 
Chapter 136/ Section 1. 
Sunday shall be a common day of rest. Sections one to 
eleven/ inclusive/ of this chapter may be cited as the Com­
mon Day of Rest Laws. 
One Day's Rest in Seven; Penalty. 
Chapter 149/ Section 47. 
Whoever/ except at the request of the employee/ requires an 
employee engaged in any commercial occupation or in the 
work of transportation or communication to do on Sunday the 
usual work of his occupation/ unless he is allowed during 
the six days next ensuing twenty-four consecutive hours 
without labor/ shall be punished by a fine of not more than 
fifty dollars; but this and the following section shall 
not be construed as allowing any work on Sunday not other­
wise authorized by law. 
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One Day's Rest in Seven; Penalty. 
Chapter 149/ Section 48. 
Every employer of labor engaged in carrying on any manu­
facturing/ mechanical or mercantile establishment or work­
shop in the commonwealth shall allow every person/ except 
those specified in section fifty/ but including watchmen 
and employees maintaining fires/ employed in such manufac­
turing/ mechanical or mercantile establishment or workshop 
at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest/ which shall 
include an unbroken period comprising the hours between 
eight o'clock in the morning and five o'clock in the evening/ 
in every seven consecutive days. 
Penalty for Requiring Labor on Holiday. 
Chapter 149/ Section 45. 
Whoever requires an employee to work in any mill or factory 
on any legal holiday/ except to perform such work as is 
both absolutely necessary and can lawfully be performed on 
Sunday/ shall be punished by a fine of not more than five 
hundred dollars. 
...MICHIGAN... 
Seventh day as sabbath/ periodlof time included. 
Section 18-.856(1) 
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Sec. 1. Whenever in the statutes of this state# rights, 
privileges, immunities or exemptions are given or duties 
and responsibilities are imposed on persons who conscient­
iously believe the seventh day of the week ought to be ob­
served as the sabbath, said sabbath or seventh day shall 
mean and be construed in accordance with the worship and 
belief of such person to include the period from sunset on 
Friday evening to sunset on Saturday evening. 
Legal Holidays 
Public holidays for bills and notes transactions and holding 
of courts; banking business; adjournment of cases; Saturdays. 
Section 18.861 
The following days namely:...December 25, Christmas day;... 
Analysis of Note 
13. What days are holidays....the 25th day of December, 
commonly called "Christmas Day,"...and any day appointed or 
recommended by the governor of this state or the President 
of the United States as a day of fasting and prayer or 
thanksgiving were holidays, under a prior act. People v^. 
Ackerman, 80 Mich. 588. 
Holiday on Sunday, observance on Monday. 
Section 18-862 
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Sec. 2 Whenever ..or December 25 shall fall upon Sunday/ 
the next Monday following shall be deemed a public holiday 
for any or all of the purposes aforesaid. 
Public Holidays.... 
Section 18-861 
The following days namely.December 25/ Christmas day;.... 
and the fourth Thursday of November/ Thanksgiving Day/ for 
all purposes whatever as regards...except as otherwise pro­
vided in this act/ shall be treated and considered as the 
first day of the week/ commonly called Sunday and as public 
holidays or half holidays. 
...MINNESOTA... 
Conduct of school on certain holidays. 
Section 126.13 
The governing body of any district may contract with any of 
the teachers thereof for the conduct of schools/ and may 
conduct schools/ on either/ or any, of the following holidays/ 
provided that a clause to this effect is inserted in the 
teacher's contract; Lincoln's and Washington's birthdays/ 
Columbus Day and Veterans' Day/... 
Holidays/ (Subdivision 5.) 
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Section 645.44 
"Holiday" includes...Thanksgiving Day, the fourth Thursday 
in November; and Christmas Day/ December 25; provided, when 
...Christmas Day# December; falls on Saturday, the following 
day shall be a holiday, (effective January 1, 1986) 
SABBATH BREAKING 
Sabbath breaking; day 
Section 624.01 
The law prohibits.the doing on the first day of the week of 
the certain acts specified in section 624.02, which are 
serious interruptions on the repose and religious liberty of 
the community, and the doing of any such acts on that day 
shall constitute Sabbath breaking. Under the term "day", as 
used in this section and section 624.02, is included all the 




The following are declared to be legal holidays,...the day 
fixed by proclamation by the governor of Mississippi as a 
day of thanksgiving which shall be fixed to correspond to 
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the date proclaimed by the President of the United States 
(Thanksgiving Day); and the twenty-fifth day of December 
(Christmas Day). Provided/ however/ that in the event any 
holiday herein before declared legal shall fall on Sunday/ 
then the next following day shall be a legal holiday. 
Closing of schools for holidays and emergencies. 
Section 37-13-65 
(1) The county superintendent of education/ with the appro­
val of the county board of education/ may close all schools 
in the county school system for the Christmas holidays for 
an equal period of time/ but not exceeding two weeks. 
(2) The board of trustees may close all schools in the 
municipal separate school district for the Christmas holidays 
for an equal period of time/ but not exceeding two weeks/... 
Holidays. 
Section 37-13-69. 
All public schools of this state may observe such legal 
holidays as may be designated by the state board of education/ 
and no sessions of school shall be held on holidays so desig­
nated and observed...The holidays thus observed shall not be 
deducted from the reports of the superintendents/ principals 
and teachers shall be allowed pay for full time as though 
they had taught on said holidays. 
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Sunday - Violations of Sabbath generally. 
Section 97-23-63 
If any person on the first day of the week/ commonly called 
Sunday* shall himself labor at his own or any other trade/ 
calling or business/ or shall employ his apprentice or 
servant in labor or other business/ except it be in the 
ordinary household offices of daily necessity or other work 
of necessity or charity/ or other activity hereinafter 
expressly excepted/ he shall/ on conviction/ be fined.... 
Nothing in this section shall prohibit churches or religious 
societies or their officers/ agents and employees from trans­
acting any business, or performing any action the first day 




...the fourth Thursday in November/ and the twenty-fifth 
of December/ are declared and established public holidays; 
and when any of such holidays falls upon Sunday/ the Monday 




School holidays include...December twenty-fifth/... 
No penalty/ when 
Section 578.115 
No person may be denied employment or advancement in employ­
ment because of his or her refusal to work on his or her 
normal day of worship. 
...MONTANA... 
Legal holidays and business days. 
Section 1-1-216 
(1) The following are legal holidays in the state of Montana: 
(a) Bach Sunday; 
(j) Thanksgiving Day/ the fourth Thursday in November; 
(k) Christmas Day/ December 25; 
(2) If any of the above-enumerated holidays (except Sunday) 
fall upon a Sunday/ the Monday following is a holiday. All 
other days are business days. 
School holidays. 
Section 20-1-305 
(1) Pupil instruction and pupil-instruction-related days 
shall not be conducted on the following holidays:... 
(f) Christmas Day (December 25);... 
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(2) When these holidays fall on Saturday or Sunday/ the 
preceding Friday or the succeeding Monday shall not be a 
school holiday. 
Commemorative exercises on certain days. 
Section 20-1-306 
Attorney General's Opinions. 
"School Holidays" and "Legal Holiday": School district 
employees/ nonteaching and teaching alike/ throughout the 
state of Montana/ are entitled to days off on those holidays 
enumerated in 20-1-305/ rather than the holidays of 1-1-216. 
School district employees are therefore entitled only to 
days off on...Christmas Day/... 
Provisions of school code excepted. 
Section 20-1-307 
Attorney General's Opinions. 
"School Holidays" and "Legal Holidays": School district 
employees/ nonteaching and teaching alike/ throughout the 
state of Montana/ are entitled to days off on those holidays 
enumerated in 20-1-305/ rather than the holidays of 1-1-216. 








(1) For the purpose of the Uniform Commercial Code and 
section 62-301.1/ the following days shall be holidays: 
...; Thanksgiving Day/ the fourth Thursday in November;... 
and Christmas Day/ December 25. If any of such dates fall 
on Sunday/ the following Monday shall be a holiday. 
...NEVADA... 
Legal holidays; closing of state and county offices/ courts/ 
banks/ savings and loan associations/ public schools and 
University of Nevada System. 
Section 236.015 
1.- The following days are declared to be legal holidays for 
state and county government offices:...Fourth Thursday in 
November (Thanksgiving Day); December 25 (Christmas Day). 
Any day that may be appointed by th« President of the United 
States or by the governor for public fast/ thanksgiving or 
as a legal holiday except for any Presidential appointment 
of the fourth Monday in October as Veterans' Day. 
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Governor may proclaim holidays;... 
Section 223.130 
1. The governor shall have the power to issue proclamations 
designating certain days or weeks as holidays or legal holi­
days for purposes of celebration or otherwise. 
2. All days declared by the governor to be legal holidays 
shall be observed by the closing of all offices of the state 
and subdivisions thereof/...public schools/ unless all or 
part thereof are specifically exempted. 
SCHOOL TERMS; HOLIDAYS AND OBSERVANCES 
School year. 
Section 388. 080 
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2, the public 
school year commences on the 1st day of July and ends on the 





No employee shall be required to work in any mill or factory 
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on any legal holiday/ except to perforin such work as is both 




Whoever requires an employee engaged in any occupation to 
do on Sunday the usual work of his occupation/ unless he is 
allowed during the six day next ensuing 24 consecutive hours 
without labor/ shall be fined not more than $50; provided 
that this section and the following section shall not be 
construed as allowing any work on Sunday not otherwise 
authorized by law. 
Day of Rest. 
Section 275-33 
No employer shall operate any such business on Sunday unless 
he has posted in a conspicuous place on the premises a sched­
ule containing a list of employees who are required or allow­
ed to work on Sunday and designation the day of rest for each/ 
and shall promptly file a copy of such schedule and every 
change therein with the labor commissioner. No employee 
shall be required to work on the day of rest designated for 




Any school/ college or university which is supported by 
money which is appropriated by the state or by any city/ 
town or school district shall not be open for regular 
instructional purposes on Veterans' Day and Memorial Day as 
established in RSA 288:1 and as observed as provided in RSA 
288:2. Any person who permits or authorizes such school/ 
college or university to be open in violation of this section 
shall be guilty of a violation. 
Sunday Work. 
Section 332-D:l 
No person shall do any work, business/ or labor of his secu­
lar calling/ to the disturbance of others/ on the first day 
of the week/ commonly called the Lord's Day/ except works of 
necessity and mercy/ and the making of necessary repairs 
upon mills and factories which could not be made otherwise 
without loss to operatives; and no person shall engage in 
any play/ game/ or sport on that day. 
Exceptions. 
Section 332-D:4 
Nothing in this chapter shall prevent the selectmen of any 
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town/ or the city council of any city, from adopting bylaws 
and ordinances permitting and regulating retail business/ 
plays/ games/ sports./. and exhibitions on the Lord's Day/ pro­
vided such bylaws and ordinances are approved by a majority 




Thanksgiving Day whenever appointed. 
...and Christmas Day are legal holidays. 
Falling on Sunday. 
Section 288:2 
When either of the days mentioned in RSA 288:1 falls on 
Sunday/ the following day shall be observed as a holiday. 
...NEW JERSEY... 
CHAPTER 1 
LEGAL HOLIDAYS AND EFFECT THEREOF 
Presentment or payment of bill; checks; transaction of public 
business; state and county offices closed. 
Section 36: 1-1 
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The following days in each year shall, for all purposes 
whatsoever as regards...be treated' and considered as the 
first day of the week, commonly called Sunday, and as public 
holidays:...the days designated and known as Good Friday; 
...the fourth Thursday of November, known as Thanksgiving 
Day.December 25, known as Christmas Day;...and any day 
heretofore or hereafter appointed, ordered or recommended by 
the Governor of this State, or the President of the United 
States, as a day of fasting and prayer, or other religious 
observance... 
Rules regarding religious holidays. 
Section 18A:36-16 
The commissioner, with the approval of the state board, shall 
prescribe rules relative to absences for religious holidays 
including, but not limited to, a list of holidays on which 
it shall'be mandatory to excuse a pupil, but nothing herein 
contained shall be construed to limit the right of any board 
of education, at its discretion, to excuse absence on any 
other day by reason of the observance of a religious holiday. 
...NEW MEXICO..• 
Legal Holiday; designation. 
Section 12-5-2. 
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Legal public holidays in New Mexico are:...Thanksgiving Day/ 
fourth Thursday in November; and Christmas Day* December 25. 
...NEW YORK... 
The Sabbath. 
Section 2. General Business Law 
The first day of the week being by general consent set apart 
for rest and religious uses, the law prohibits the doing on 
that day of certain acts hereinafter specified/ which are 
serious interruptions of the repose and religious liberty 
of the community. 
5. Generally. 
The public policy of the state is to set aside Sunday as 
a day of repose. ftDePaul v. Berkowits/ 1967/ 54 Misc.2d 
156/ 281 N. Y. S. 2d 449 
The Sabbath is a political and civil institution as well 
as a religious institution/ and subject to regulation by the 
civil government. IPeople v. Polar Vent of America/ Inc. 
1957/ 151 N.E. 2d 621 
Sabbath Breaking. 
Section 3 
A violation of the foregoing prohibition is Sabbath breaking 
#Sec. 2. 
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Punishment for Sabbath breaking. 
Section 4. 
Sabbath breaking is a misdemeanor/.... 
Labor prohibited on Sunday. 
Section 5. 
All labor on Sunday is prohibited/ excepting the works of 
necessity and charity. In works of necessity or charity is 
included whatever is needful during the day for the good 
order/ health or comfort of the community. 
Persons observing another day as a Sabbath. 
Section 6. 
It is a sufficient defense to a prosecution for work or labor 
on the first day of the week that the defendant uniformly 
keeps another day of the week as holy time/ and does not 
labor on that day/ and that the labor complained of was done 
in such manner as not to interrupt or disturb other persons 
observing the first day of the week as holy time.' 
GENERAL CONSTRUCTION LAW 
Public holidays; half-holidays. 
Section 24. 
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The term public holiday includes the following days in each 
year: the second Sunday in June/ known as Flag Day;...the 
fourth Thursday in November/ known as Thanksgiving Day; and 
the twenty-fifth day of December/ known as Christmas Day/ 
and if any of such days except Flag Day is Sunday/ the next 
day thereafter; ... and each day appointed by the President 
of the United States or by the governor of this state as a 
day of general thanksgiving/ general fasting and prayer/ or 
other general religious observances. 
EDUCATION LAW 
Conditions under which districts are entitled to apportion­
ment. 
Section 3604 
8. No school shall be in session on a Saturday or a legal 
holiday/ except general election day/... 
8-b.* Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision eight of 
this section# a trustee or board of trustees or a board of 
education of a school district having fewer than six hundred 
pupils in grades kindergarten through twelve may provide for 
classes to be held on any day of the week in connection with 
educational programs for the disadvantaged operated under the 
elementary and secondary education act;^ provided/ however/ 
no pupils or teachers shall be required to attend such class­
es if they observe any such day as a Sabbath or a holy day in 
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accordance with the requirements of their religion. 
...NORTH CAROLINA... 
CHAPTER 103. 
SUNDAYS/ HOLIDAYS AND SPECIAL DAYS. 
Dates of public holidays. 
Section 103-4 
(a) The following are declared to be legal public 
holidays: 
(8) Easter Monday. 
(11a) Yom Kippur. 
(14) Thanksgiving Day/ the fourth Thursday in 
November 
(15) Christmas Day* December 25 
Length of school day/ month/ and term: Veterans' Day. 
Section 115C-84 
(b) School Month. ...Whenever it is desirable to com­
plete the school term of 180 days in a shorter term than 
nine calendar months/ the board of education of any local 
school administrative unit may, in its discretion/ require 
that school shall be taught on legal holidays/ except Sundays/ 
and in accordance with the custom and practice of such 
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community. 
Observance of Bona Fide Religious Holidays. 
Section 16 NCAC 2 F .0108 (J) 
(j) Absence from school for bona fide religious holi­
days may be allowed for a maximum of two days within any one 
school year with prior approval from the superintendent. 
The teacher must agree to make up the amount of time for 
which his or her absence has been excused. The superintend­
ent/ in consultation with the teacher/ shall designate such 
religious holidays/ provided that such days are not already 
scheduled as vacation or other holidays in the school calen­
dar. The designation of annual leave days(s) immediately 
following the last day of regularly scheduled classes for 
students for that school year shall be presumed to be reason­
able. Any such absence shall be with full pay. 
...NORTH DAKOTA... 
Holidays. Holidays are as follows; 
Section 1-03-01 
1. Every Sunday 
4. The Friday next preceding Easter Sunday and commonly 
known as Good Friday. 
9. The fourth Thursday in November/ which is Thanksgiving 
Day. 
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10. The twenty-fifth day of December/ which is Christmas Day. 
11. Every day appointed by the President of the United States 
or by the governor of this state for a public holiday. 
School holidays defined. 
Section 15-38-04 
School holidays defined. 
The following days shall be school holidays/ and schools shall 
not be in session thereon: 
(1) Every Sunday. 
(4) Christmas Day/ the twenty-fifth day of December. 
(6) Thanksgiving Day/ the fourth Thursday in November. 
(7) Good Friday/ the Friday next preceding Easter Monday. 
(10) Every day appointed by the President of the United 
States or by the governor of this state for a public 
holiday. 
...OHIO... 
School holidays specified. 
Section 3313.63 
Boards of education may dismiss the schools under their con­
trol on...the fourth Thursday in November/ the twenty-fifth 
day of December/ and on any day set apart by proclamation of 
the president of the United States/ or the governor of this 
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state as a day of fast/ thanksgiving/ or mourning... 
First day excluded and last day included in computing time; 
exceptions; legal holiday defined. 
Section 1.14 
"Legal holiday" as used in this section means;the follow­
ing days: 
(I) The fourth Thursday in November/ known as Thanks­
giving Day; 
(J) The twenty-fifth day of December/ known as Christmas 
Day; 
(K) Any day appointed and recommended by the governor of 
this state or the president of the United States as 
a holiday. 
If any day designated in this section as a legal holiday 
falls on Sunday/ the next succeeding day is a legal holiday. 
...OKLAHOMA... 
CHAPTER 2. HOLIDAYS 
Designation and dates of holidays. 
Section 82.1 
The designation and dates of holidays in Oklahoma shall be 
as follows: Each Sunday/...Thanksgiving Day on the fourth 
Thursday in November; Christmas on the 25th day of December; 
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and if any of such holidays other than Sunday at any time 
fall on Sunday, the succeeding Monday shall be a holiday in 
that year. 
Additional holidays - Acts performable - Optional closing by 
banks and offices. 
Section 82.2 
The following additional days are designated as holidays: 
...Mother's Day on the second Sunday in May; ...Youth Day on 
the third Sunday in March each year; ...and such other days 
as may be designated by the President of the United States or 
the Governor of the State of Oklahoma. 
Sabbath-breaking defined. 
Section 908 
The following are the acts forbidden to be done on the first 
day of the week/ the doing of any of which is Sabbath-break­
ing : 
First. Servile labor, except works of necessity or charity. 
Second. Trades * manufactures and mechanical employment. 
Third. All shooting/ horse racing or gaming. 
Fourth. All manner of public selling/ or offering or ex­
posing for sale publicly/ of any commodities/ except that 
meats/ bread/ fish and all other foods may be sold at anytime/ 
and except that food and drink may be sold to be eaten and 
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drank upon the premises where sold/ and drugs/ medicines/ 
milk« ice and surgical appliances and burial appliances and 
all other necessities may be sold at anytime of the day. 
•••OREGON.  . 
Legal holidays; acts deferred to next business day. 
Section 187.010 
(1) The following days are legal holidays in this state: 
(a) Each Sunday. 
(h) Thanksgiving Day on the fourth Thursday in 
November. 
(i) Christmas Day on December 25. 
(2) Each time a holiday/ other than Sunday/ listed in sub­
section (1) of this section falls on Sunday/ the succeeding 
Monday shall be a legal holiday. Each time a holiday listed 
in subsection (1) of this section falls on Saturday/ the pre­
ceding Friday shall be a legal holiday. 
Additional legal holidays. 
Section 187.020 
(1) In addition to those specified in ORS 187.010/ the 
following days are legal holidays in this state: 
(b) Every day appointed by the President of the United 
States or by the Governor as a day of mourning/ rejoicing or 
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other special observance. 
School month; holidays; teachers' holiday pay; Saturday 
instruction. 
Section 336.010 
(1) The common school month consists of 20 days. 
(5) No teacher shall:be required to teach on any Saturday# 
except as provided in the terms of the teacher's employment# 
or any legal school holiday.... 
...PENNSYLVANIA... 
CHAPTER 1 SUNDAY 
Section 1 
Repealed. 1978. April 28/ P.L. 202/ No. 53/ Section 2(a) (3)/ 
effective June 21, 1978. 
CHAPTER 2. OTHER HOLIDAYS AND OBSERVANCES 
Holidays designated: 
Section 11. 
Be it enacted/ that the following days and half days/ namely/ 
. .jj:he fourth Thursday in November/ known as Thanksgiving Day/ 
Good Friday/ the twenty-fifth day of December/ known as 
Christmas Day;...and any day appointed or recommended by the 
Governor of this State or the President of the United States 
as a day of thanksgiving or fastings and prayer/ or other 
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religious observance;... 
Days schools not to be kept open. 
Section 15-1502 
No school shall be kept open on any Saturday for the purpose, 
of ordinary instruction/ except when Monday is fixed by the 
board of school directors as the weekly holiday/ or on Sun­
day/..or Christmas/... 
Additional holidays; vacations. 
Section 15-1503 
The board of school directors in any district shall/ by a 
majority vote, decide which other holidays may be observed 
by special exercises/ and on which holiday/ if any/ the 
schools shall be closed during the whole or part of the day... 
...RHODE ISLAND... 
CHAPTER 20 
HOLIDAYS AND DAYS OF SPECIAL OBSERVANCE 
School holidays enumerated. 
Section 16-20-1 
...the twenty-fifth day of December (as Christmas Day)/ and 
each of said days in every year/ or when either of the daid 
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days falls on the first day of the week (commonly called 
Sunday)/ then the day following it/ ...and such other days 
as the governor or general assembly of this state or the 
President or the Congress of the United States shall appoint 
as holidays for any purpose/ days of thanksgiving/ or days 
of solemn fast/ shall be school holidays and no session of 
any school except as hereinafter provided/ in this state 
shall be held on any one of said days.... 
Special holidays for war effort. 
Section 16-20-2 
In addition to the foregoing/ the governor may proclaim 
school holidays for the purpose of using the school premises 
and/or personnel in whole or in part/ for the state and/or 
federal administration in connection with the war effort and 
such days so proclaimed may/ on specific recommendation 
of the governor be deducted by the authorities of the 
several cities and towns from the gross number of school 
days required by law. 
Elections falling on religious holiday. 
Section 17-18-5.1 
In the event that the date for the holding of any state or 
municipal election/....shall fall upon the day of a relig­
ious holiday/ on which the doctrines of the faith would 
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prohibit its followers from voting/ such election shall be 
held upon the next business day other than Saturday then 
following; provided/ however that nothing in this section 




General holidays enumerated. 
Section 25-1-1 
....the twenty-fifth day of December (as Christmas Day)/ and 
each of said days in every year/ or when either of the said 
days falls on the first day of the week/...and such other 
days as the governor or general assembly of this state or 
the President or the Congress of the United States shall 
appoint as holidays for any purpose/ days of thanksgiving/ 
or days of solemn fast/ shall be holidays. 
CHAPTER 40 
SUNDAY LAWS 
Work or recreation on Sunday prohibited. 
Section 11-40-1. 
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Except as provided in section 5-22-6 to 5-22-11/ inclusive/ 
every person who shall do or exercise any labor or business 
or work of his ordinary calling/ or use any game/ sport/ 
play or recreation on the first day of the week/ or suffer 
the same to be done or used by his children/ servants or 
apprentices/ works of necessity and charity only excepted/ 
shall be fined not exceeding five dollars ($5.00) for the 
first offense and ten dollars ($10.00) for the second and 
every subsequent offense; provided/ further/ however/ that 
the above prohibitions shall not apply to any person or 
persons operating of functioning under a valid permit or 
license. 
Faith observing other days as Sabbath. 
Section 11-40-4 
Every professor of the Sabbatarian faith or of the Jewish 
religion/ and such others as shall be owned or acknowledged 
by any church or society of said respective professions as 
members of or as belonging to such church or society/ shall 
be permitted to labor in their respective professions or 
vocations on the first day of the week/...and in case any 
dispute shall arise respecting the person entitled to the 
benefit of this section/ a certificate from a regular pastor 
or priest of any of the aforesaid churches or societies or 
from any three (3) of the standing members of such church or 
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society/ declaring the person claiming the exemption afore­
said to be a member of or owned by or belonging to such 
church or society# shall be received as conclusive evidence 
of the fact. 
...SOUTH CAROLINA... 
Unlawful to work on Sunday. 
Section 53-1-40 
On the first day of the week/ commonly called Sunday# it 
shall be unlawful for any person to engage in worldly work/ 
labor/ business of his ordinary calling or the selling or 
offering to sell/ publicly or privately by telephone/ at 
retail or at wholesale to the consumer any goods/ wares 
or merchandise or to employ others to engage in work/ labor/ 
business or selling or offering to sell any goods/ wares or 
merchandise/ excepting work of necessity or charity. Provided/ 
that in Charleston County the foregoing shall not apply to 
any person who conscientiously believes/ because of his reli­
gion/ that the seventh day of the week ought to be observed 
as the Sabbath and who actually refrains from secular busi­
ness or labor on that day. 
Penalties for violating prohibition on Sunday work. 
Section 53-1-70 
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A violation of any of the provision of sec. 53-1-40 shall 
be punished by a fine of not less than fifty dollars nor 
more than two hundred fifty dollars in the case of the 
first offense/ and by a fine of not less than one hundred 
dollars nor more than five hundred dollars for each and 
every subsequent offense.... 
Legal holidays enumerated. 
Section 53-5-10 
National Thanksgiving days/ all general election days and 
also the first day of January*...and the twenty-fifth and 
twenty-sixth days of December in each year shall be legal 
holidays. 
Christmas Eve may be declared holiday for State employees. 
Section 53-5-20 
The Governor of South Carolina is empowered to declare 





The first day of every week# known as Sunday;...the fourth 
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Thursday in November/ commonly known as Thanksgiving Day... 
the twenty-fifth of December# commonly known as Christmas 
Day; and every day appointed by the President of the United 
States/ or the Governor of this state for a public fast/ 
thanksgiving/ or holiday shall be observed in this state as 
a legal holiday. 
If...the twenty-fifth day of December falls upon a Sunday/ 
the Monday following is a legal holiday and shall be so 
observed;... 
Legal discontinuance of school—Holidays—Teachers' meeting 
Closing because of weather or disease. 
Section 13-26-3. 
School shall be legally discontinued only in the event that 
the following days occur on a regularly scheduled school day; 
any day designated by the Governor of South Dakota as a day 
of thanksgiving/...the twenty-fifth of December/ Good Friday. 
Acts performed on day after holiday. 
Section 1-5-4 
Whenever any act of a secular nature* other than a work of 
necessity or mercy/ is appointed by law or contract to be 
performed upon a particular day/ which falls upon such a 
holiday/ such act may be performed upon the next business 
day/ with the same effect as if it had been performed upon 
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...the fourth Thursday in November/ known as "Thanksgiving 
Day"; the twenty-fifth day of December; and Good Friday; and 
when any one of these days shall fall on Sunday then the 
following Monday shall be substituted; and when any of these 
days shall fall on Saturday/ then the preceding Friday shall 
be substituted; also/ all days appointed by the governor or 
by the President of the United States/ as days of fasting 
or thanksgiving, and all days set apart by law for holding 
county/ state or national elections/ throughout this state/ 
are made legal holidays/ and the period from noon to midnight 
of each Saturday which is not a holiday is made a half-
holiday/ ... 
Special days and holidays. 
Section 49-6-3016. 
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(a) Thanksgiving Day and the twenty-fifth of December are 
set apart as holidays for all the public schools/ and boards 
of education are authorized to pay the salary of teachers 
of all schools that have not closed their term for the year 
at the same rate as if the teachers had taught school on 
those holidays; provided/ that the failure to teach on any 
other day or days within the scholastic term shall not be 
counted as time for which salary shall be allowed. 
•••TEXAS.  . v 
TITLE 72 
HOLIDAYS — LEGAL 
Enumeration 
Article 4591. (4606) (2939) 
...the fourth Thursday in November and the 25th day of 
December/ of each year/...are declared legal holidays/ on . 
which all the public offices of the state may be closed and 
shall be considered and treated as Sunday for all purposes 
regarding the presenting for the payment or acceptance and 





The public schools shall not be closed on legal holidays 
unless so ordered by the board of trustees. 
2903 School terms and attendance; late afternoon and evening 
school programs. 
Article. 2906 
(a) Public schools shall be taught for five days in each 
week. Schools shall not be closed on legal holidays unless 
so ordered by the trustees. A school month shall consist of 
not less than twenty school days* inclusive of holidays#... 
Scholastic week. 
Section 21.003 




The public schools shall not be closed on legal holidays 
unless so ordered by the board of trustees. 
...UTAH... 
Legal holidays - Personal preference day - Governor author-
xzed to declare; additional days. 
Section 63-13-2 
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(1) For the period beginning with the effective date of 
this acti the following-named days are' legal holidays in this 
state: Every Sunday.the fourth Thursday of November called 
Thanksgiving Day; the 25th day of December/ called Christmas; 
and all days which may be set apart by the president of the 
United States/ or the governor of this state by proclamation 
as days of fast or thanksgiving. If any of the holidays pro­
vided for in this subsection (2)/ except the first mentioned/ 
namely Sunday/ shall fall on Sunday/ then the following Mon­
day shall be the holiday. 
Holidays — Schools may be taught on. 
Section 53-1-3 
Higher institutions of learning and boards of education are 
authorized to hold school on legal holidays/ other than 
Sundays/ provided that at least a part of the day is given 
over to appropriate exercises. 
...VERMONT... 
CHAPTER 7. 




(a) The following shall be legal holidays: 
Thanksgiving Day/ the fourth Thursday in November; 
Christmas Day# December 25. 
CHAPTER 73. SABBATH BREAKING 
Sections 3301-3306. Repealed. 1975/ No. 207 (Adj. Sess.)/ 
Section 2/ eff. March 27/ 1976. 
CHAPTER 74. A COMMON DAY OF REST 
Sections 3351-3353. Repealed. 1983/ No. 80/ eff. April 29/ 
1983. 
Section 3354. Repealed. 1981/ No. 107/ Section 1, eff. 
May 14/ 1981. 
Sections 3354a-3358. Repealed. 1983/ No. 80/ eff. April 29/ 
1983. 
Former section 3354a related to an alternative day of 
rest for persons who observe a Sabbath other than Sunday 
and was derived from 1981/ No. 107/ Section 3. 
VERMONT CONSTITUTION 
CHAPTER 1 
Freedom in religion; right and duty of religious worship. 
Article 3 
That all men have a natural and unalienable right/ to wor­
ship Almighty God/ according to the dictates of their own 
consciences and understandings/ as in their opinion shall be 
regulated by the word of God; and that no man ought tof or 
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support any place of worship/ or maintain any minister* 
contrary to the dictates of his conscience/ nor can any man 
be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a 
citizen/ on account of his religious sentiments/ or peculia(r) 
mode of religious worship; and that no authority can/ or 
ought to be vested in/ or assumed by/ any power whatever/ 
that shall in any case interfere with/ or in any manner 
control the rights of conscience/ in the free exercise of 
religious worship. Nevertheless/ every sect or denomination 
of Christians ought to observe the Sabbath or Lord's Day, 
and keep up some sort of religious worship/ which to them 
shall seem most agreeable to the revealed will of God. 
...VIRGINIA... 
CHAPTER 3 
HOLIDAYS AND SPECIAL DAYS; HOURS OF WORK/ ETC. 
Legal Holidays. 
Section 2.1-21 
It is-the policy of the Commonwealth to fix and set aside 
ce±ain days in the calendar year as legal holidays for the 
people of Virginia to honor and commemorate such holidays so 
established. In each year/ the following days are designated 
as. legal holidays; 
The fourth Thursday in November—Thanksgiving Day to honor 
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and give thanks in each person's own manner for the bless­
ings bestowed upon the people of Virginia and honoring the 
first Thanksgiving in 1619. 
Observance of Saturday as Sabbath. 
Section 18.2-343 
The penalties imposed by Section 18.1-363.1 or Section 18.2-
341 shall not be incurred by any person who conscientiously 
believes that the seventh day of the week ought to be 
observed as a Sabbath/ and actually refrains from all 
secular business and labor on that day/ provided he does not 
compel an apprentice or servant/ not of his belief/ to do 
secular work or business on a Sunday. 
Employers to allow employees at least one day of rest in each 
week. 
Section 40.1-28.1 
Except in an emergency/ every employer shall fallow each 
person employed by him in connection with any business or 
service at least twenty-four consecutive hours of rest in 
each calendar week in addition to : the regular periods of 
rest normally allowed or legally required in each working 
day. 
Employees entitled to choose Sunday as day of rest. 
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Section 40.1-28.2 
Every nonmanagerial person employed by any employer shall/ 
as a matter of right/ be entitled to choose Sunday as a day 
of rest in accordance with Section 40.1r-28.1 and upon the 
filing of written notice by the employee with the employer 
that such employee chooses Sunday as a day of rest/ no 
employer shall/ in any manner/ discharge/ discipline or 
penalize such employee for exercising his rights under this 
section and the provisions of this section may not be waived 
on an application for employment. 
Employees entitled to choose Saturday as day of rest. 
Section 40.1-28.3 
Any nonmanagerial employee who conscientiously believes that 
the seventh day of the week ought to be observed as a Sab­
bath/ and actually refrains from all secular business and 
labor on that day/ shall be entitled to choose the seventh 
day of the week as his day of rest in accordance with 
Section 40.1-28.1 and upon the filing of written notice by 
the employee with the employer -that such employee chooses 
the seventh day of the week as a day of rest/ no employer 
shall/ in any manner/ discharge/ discipline or penalize 





The following are school holidays/ and school shall not be 
taught on these days: Saturday; Sunday;...the fourth Thurs­
day in November/ to be known as Thanksgiving Day;...and 
the twenty-fifth day of December/ commonly called Christmas 
Day: Provided/ That no reduction from the teacher's time or 
salary shall be made by reason of the fact that a school 
day happens to be one of the days referred to in this section 
as a day on which school shall not be taught. 
"Legal holidays" 
Section 1.16.050 
The following are legal holidays: Sunday;...and the twenty-
fifth day of December/ commonly called Christmas Day:...and 
any day designated by public proclamation of the chief 




Sections 9.76.010 - 9.76.050 Repealed/ effective July 1/ 1976 
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...WEST VIRGINIA... 
Holidays; closing of schools; time lost because of such; 
special Saturday classes. 
Section 18A-5-2. 
Schools shall not be kept open on any Saturday nor on the 
following days which are designated as legal school holidays/ 
namely;...Christmas Day/...and any day appointed and set 
apart by the president or the governor as a holiday of 
special observance by the people of the state. When any 
such holiday falls within the employment term/ it shall be 
considered as a day of the employment term and the full time 
school personnel shall receive his pay for same. 
Legal holidays; official acts or court proceedings. 
Section 2-2-1 
The following days shall be regarded/ treated and observed 
as legal holidays/...the fourth Thursday of November/ common­
ly called "Thanksgiving Day"; the twenty-fifth day of Decem­
ber/ commonly called "Christmas Day"... and all days which 
may be appointed or recommended by the governor of this 
state/ or the President of the United States/ as days of 
thanksgiving/ or for the general cessation of business; and 
when any of said days or dates falls on Sunday/ then the suc­
ceeding Monday shall be regarded/ treated/ and observed as 
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such legal holiday. 
Same - Penalties; separate offenses; jurisdiction; persons 
observing Saturday as Sabbath. 
Section 61-10-27 
../Each Sunday a person is engaged in work/ labor or business 
or employs others to be so engaged/ in violation of section 
twenty-five of this article/ shall constitute a separate 
offense.... 
The penalties imposed by this section shall not be incurred 
by any person who conscientiously believes that Saturday 
ought to be observed as a Sabbath/ and actually refrains 
from all secular business and labor on that day/ provided he 
does not compel an apprentice or servant or employee/ not of 
his belief/ to do secular work or business on a Sunday. 
...WISCONSIN... 




...the fourth Thursday in November (which shall be the day 
of celebration for Thanksgiving)/ December 25/...On Good 
Friday the period from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m. shall uniformly be 
observed for the purpose of worship.... 
350 
Section 16-30 
(4) (a) The office of the department of state government 
shall be kept open on all days of the year except Saturdays/ 
Sundays and the following holidays: 
6. December 25; 
7. The day following if January 1/ July 4 or December 
25 falls on Sunday; 
8. After 12 noon on Good Friday/ in lieu of the period 
specified in s.895.20 
9. The afternoons of December 24 and 31. 
...WYOMING... 
HOLIDAYS 
Legal holidays; dismissal of schools. 
Section 8-6-101 
Thanksgiving Day to be observed on the fourth Thursday in 
November; Christmas Day/ December 25;... and upon declaration 
by the governor of this state/ any date appointed or declared 
by the President of the United States as an occasion of 
national mourning/ rejoicing or observance of national emer­
gency are hereby declared legal holidays in and for the state 
of Wyoming. If...or Christmas Day or any of the fall upon a 
Sunday/ the Monday following shall be a legal holiday. 
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...DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA... 
Subchapter I. Business Holidays. 
Holidays designated - Time for performing acts extended. 
Section 28-2701. 
The following days in each year# namely/... the twenty-
fifth of December/ commonly called Christmas Day;... and any 
day appointed or recommended by the President of the United 
States as a day of public feasting or thanksgiving.... When 
a day set apart as a legal holiday falls on Sunday the next 
succeeding day is a holiday. In such cases/ and when a Sun­
day and a holiday fall on successive days, all commercial 
paper falling due on any of those days shall/ for all pur­
poses of presenting for payment or acceptance/ be deemed to 
mature and be presentable for payment or acceptance on the 




Holidays/ within the meaning of sections 71-73 of this title/ 
are every Sunday/ ...Good Friday/ ...the twenty-fifth day 
of December/ ...and every day appointed by the President of 
the United States/ by the Governor of Puerto Rico or by the 
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Legislative Assembly/ for a public fast/ thanksgiving/ or 
holiday. 
Closing law for commercial establishments. 
Section 2201 
(a) Commercial establishments shall remain closed to the 
public and one hour after closing no work of any kind 
shall be carried out therein during the days and hours 
stated below: 
(1) All day Sunday/ except the 24th and 31st of Decem­
ber... the 25th of December/...on Thanksgiving Day 
and on Good Friday. 
